SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF COHERENCE AND SEQUENCING IN MOZAMBIQUE

Examining Peacebuilding Challenges of Defence, Police and Justice Reforms in a Neo-Liberal Era

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Keywords: Security sector reform, defence, police, justice, coherence, sequencing, peacebuilding, Mozambique

This thesis deals with the circumstances that lead to a fragmented implementation of post-conflict justice and security reforms and their negative impact on institutional capacity to provide justice and security for citizens. It strenghtens the existing critique of SSR by employing liberal peacebuilding critique to examine the development of the SSR agenda within the security-development nexus mainstream and the difficulties in learning from SSR experience. The main research question concerns the factors affecting the coherence and sequencing of justice and security system reforms, and is addressed through a case study of Mozambique. The analysis identifies power dynamics surrounding formal and informal interactions that impact institutional change, and showcase the vulnerability of justice and security system reforms to co-optation by powerful international and national players. Throughout, patterns of critical juncture and path dependence are identified that have influenced the adaptation of powerful local players to external and domestic pressures which resulted in political and institutional bricolage. The thesis also looks at how the sequencing of Mozambique's triple transition, in which economic liberalisation prevailed over peacebuilding and

democratisation, shaped the post-civil war direction and pace of the defence, police and justice reforms. The 1992 peace agreement and the public sector reform programme are investigated with regards to the failure of driving substantive SSR and of imparting it coherence and sequencing in the short, medium and longer term. Finally, lessons are proposed for future reform in Mozambique, and recommendations are drawn for improving the design of strategy and implementation of SSR in general.

Dedication

To those in my heart and whom I couldn't accompany
in their last breath:
Zubaida Abdul Carimo, Carlos Morgado, Joaquim Cardoso

To the new and joyous in my life who remind me that there is life
beyond PhD:
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

'There can be no peace without understanding'
Senegalese Proverb

A - Genesis, rationale and relevance of the research topic

1.1 Setting the scene

Developed under the security-development nexus discourse Security Sector Reform (SSR) has increasingly taken centre-stage in Western donor discourse and policy. However, when the SSR concept was first introduced in the late 1990s it occupied a marginal position despite the potential that it represented in terms of aligning human security and state security. Anchored in a problem-solving paradigm, the SSR policy agenda became focused on immediate conflict resolution through global peacekeeping and much less on the role SSR could play in the prevention of conflict in the first place. Furthermore, instead of concentrating on governance of the security sector through development of internal and external oversight mechanisms the focus of SSR programmes was put on building efficiency of the security forces through the provision of training and equipment. Political transitions towards democratisation, which did not entail armed conflict, were also sidelined in the SSR agenda (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 10). This supports the argument that SSR has developed based on the premise that post-conflict environments are more conducive to rapid change (Collier and Pradan 1994: 133), and therefore provide more fertile ground for implementation. Two United Nations

Secretary General (UNSG) reports (UNSG 23/01/2008 and 13/08/2013) and the first landmark resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the security sector (UNSC resolution 2151, 28/04/2014) illustrate the prominence of the post-conflict paradigm. This direction has been either preceded or complemented by increasing SSR research and policies by other multilateral organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU).[1]

Despite the idea that SSR could best be implemented in immediate post-conflict environments the reality of peace operations has not always supported the theory. Dismantling existing security forces and creating new ones from afresh, or merging different armed groups into a unified army, and reinforcing police units are tasks that are relatively easy to implement from a technical viewpoint. Governance reforms, however, which are inescapably political in nature, are rarely dealt with, and a lack of local ownership hinders the changes implemented, often undermining sustainability. Local actors have displayed resistance to rapid change (Goor and van Veen 2010: 90), and the likelihood of occurrence of unintended consequences has been higher (Peake et al 2006), including potential for backlash and further insecurity (Sedra 2010: 27).

[1] The AU Policy Framework on SSR (2013), in addition to post-conflict peacebuilding, foresees the possibility for implementing SSR in contexts of democratisation and as a measure of conflict prevention (AU PFSSR 2013, arts 11, 16(g)). Yet, it is too early to tell whether this provision will take root in practice.

Part of this discussion therefore must revolve around the question of what the ideal conditions for SSR implementation actually are from a timing perspective (Mugah and Downes, 2010, Ball, 2010). Many of the current peace operations take the form of stabilisation, i.e., are deployed with the goal to restore a minimum of security and stability in an environment where fully-fledged combat operations persist. In such precarious conditions, any SSR programme may be too ambitious, beyond sensitising the leadership and the wider society to the importance of the SSR agenda once conditions are less volatile. Iraq and Afghanistan offer examples of questionable outcomes of implementation of SSR, which have oftentimes endangered the very peace they were supposed to help create, maintain, or enforce (Rathmell et al, 2005, Perito, 2011, Sedra, 2006, Friesendorf, 2011). The probability of unexpected outcomes is high as demonstrated by the current violent and protracted conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen. Stabilisation operations have also been prominent elsewhere in Africa, as illustrated by successive UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or AU missions in Somalia (2007-), Mali (2012-) - following the French intervention deployed as an emergency to stop the advance of the Northern Islamists - and Central African Republic (2013-). It is therefore worthwhile to pursue an investigation on the contributions and limitations of SSR in such environments, even if that is beyond the scope of analysis of this thesis.

Whilst the examples above tend to be compelling for an investigation of such contexts, care must be taken with regards to generalisations derived from these case studies, since they represent charged stabilisation environments with extreme levels of coercion, distinct from other conflict-ridden situations. At the same time most peace operations - including those in more benign contexts - have been beleaguered by severe strategic and operational deficiencies around issues of policy coherence amongst different international actors, and disparity between the analysis by those on the ground and the decisions taken at headquarters. Rivalry and insufficient coordination amongst donors (Wulf 2004: 23, 24, Peake et al 2006: 251, Brzoska, 2006) have also been compounded by the inadequate preparation of foreign personnel (Chuter 2006: 2). Other complicating factors have included the dearth of knowledge about national contexts and the nature of each country's conflict (Chanaa 2002: 61, Cooper and Pugh 2002: 5-6), as well as the widespread tendency to neglect the specifics of local political struggles (Woodward 2003: 276-301, Cawthra and Luckham, 2003: 325, Hutchful and Fayemi 2005: 84, Olonisakin 2006: 333).

These variables, especially those concerning politics, are equally challenging in the application of SSR in non post-conflict countries - whether fragile or mid-income - which face challenges of implementing reform in post-authoritarian states (Hills 2010: 178). Evidence of this is provided by research carried out on security reforms in Ghana (Hutchful, 2002, 2003), Nigeria (Fayemi, 2003) and Indonesia (Muna, 2008), amongst others. Security challenges associated

with violent Islamic extremism such as those experienced by Nigeria and Kenya, also demonstrate the relevance of SSR contribution to balance the adoption of heavy-handed security responses with democratic and governance based security and justice decision-making. This is increasingly relevant for Africa, where the majority of countries, whilst not experiencing open combat hostilities, still fall short in providing physical safety and security to their people, given the combination of domestic vulnerabilities and transnational security threats, strongly rooted in shattered institutions, dysfunctional local governance, and poor service delivery. *Hence, there is a strong case for both policy and research to award more attention to the challenges of SSR in non post-conflict contexts, given the potential contribution towards understanding the role of SSR as part of wider conflict prevention strategies.* In addition, learning about contextual specifics that entail different levels of depth and pace of change, but which also face issues concerning the structure, management, governance and performance of the justice and security apparatuses, is beneficial to advance the field of SSR.[2] *As such, it is the goal of this thesis to contribute to the field of SSR through a case study of security and justice reforms in Mozambique from 1990 to 2009. Strong empirical research underlines the case study and traces the influence of the country's particular national history, political trajectories and contestations, as well as the impact of political economy and conflict dynamics over security and justice reforms over time. A long-term investigation of SSR*

[2] In the context of this thesis field refers to a set of policy, practice and concepts, which despite lacking coherent theoretical development and being marked by patchwork contributions and contested interpretations, come together to form a distinctive area of analysis.

in Mozambique prevents excessive emphasis on immediate post-conflict analysis and allows for the development of understanding about unfolding power interactions over time. Finally, this thesis affords the opportunity to gain knowledge from a relatively benign, although not totally uncontroversial, case of security and justice reforms.

1.2 The state of research

In the last decade an abundant body of SSR research has developed, identifying flaws and inconsistencies between policy and practice, and also seeking to address these gaps.[3] The majority of research produced, and considered relevant by global SSR players, has been geared towards problem solving and development of practice-oriented instruments.[4] Whilst these works have contributed to explain, clarify, and advance SSR, they were carried out from the predominant understanding of SSR as a technical field (Petovar 2005: 126, Ball 2006: 328, Andersen 2006: 6). This has been pointed out in the literature as a limitation, given that it has obscured the

[3] Examples of conceptual reviews include Chanaa, 2002, Brzoska, 2003, Hadžic, 2004, Edmunds, 2004, Chuter, 2006, Bryden and Olonisakin, 2010. Sector specific analysis has been carried out, amongst others by:
- Defence: Alagappa, 2001, Koonings and Kruijt, 2002, Williams, Cawthra and Abrahams, 2002, Rupiya, 2005, Augé and Klaousen, 2010.
- Police: Hills, 2000a, 2009, Baker, 2007, 2009.
- Justice: Méndez, O'Donnell and Pinheiro, 1999, Mani, 2002, Call, 2007.
- Intelligence: Hannah, O'Brien and Rathmell, 2005, Africa and Kwadjo, 2009.

[4] Examples of such policy-oriented instruments are: the 'Parliamentary Handbook of the Security Sector' (DCAF, 2003), 'Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook' (Ball and Fayemi, 2004), 'Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework' (Ball, Bouta and van de Goor, 2003), 'OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice' (OECD-DAC, 2007, 2008), 'Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes' (UN, 2012). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union are currently producing and the AU is producing Operational Guidance Notes on SSR/G.

political nature of the agenda and avoided systematic questioning of the underlying assumptions of SSR from its start (Egnell and Haldén 2009: 28, Jackson 2010: 118). It furthermore prevented understanding about the role and pressures exerted by the political economy of aid in which countries undergoing SSR were immersed (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 17, OECD-DAC 2005: 62).

Most research and policy attention has been devoted to identifying challenges for donor development agencies with security and justice programmes, and little attention has been given to the actors of the implementing countries. The impact of fast-paced security changes in the implementing countries, the limits of externally driven reform, and the conflicting mandates of different donors have been acknowledged as a hindrance to the comprehensive implementation of SSR (Hendrickson, 1999). Early criticism of SSR stressed the lack of systematic knowledge about the context and the relationships between formal state structures and informal layers of power in countries undergoing reform (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 17, Brzoska 2003: 48, Hills 2005: 183-202, Peake et al 2006: 251-252, Chuter, 2006, Egnell and Haldén, 2009). For example, pioneer studies of non-state security actors in Africa mainly treated these as independent from, and constituting a threat to, state actors (Reno, 1998, Cilliers and Mason, 1999, Musah and Fayemi, 2000, Mandel 2002). Recently, general recognition that state and non-state actors and public and private spheres are not absolute categories, has spurred

research that interrogate the fluidity between formal and informal power dynamics (Lund, 2006, Menkhaus, 2006, Boege et al, 2008, Baker, 2010). Concepts emerging from the literature on peacebuilding, such as *hybrid political orders* (Boege et al, 2008) and *friction* (Tsing 2005) have further reinforced research on security and justice reforms addressing power as a relational concept (Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005, Chopra, 2008, Sriram, 2010, Luckham and Kirk 2012: 13, Ball et al, 2012, Millar, 2013). Overall, however, SSR lags behind the profusion of studies produced in other fields of peacebuilding (Schroader and Chappuis, 2014). A special number of *International Peacekeeping* (2014 21(2)) focusing on SSR through the analytical lenses of hybridism has been a welcome addition to the sprouting literature (Podder, 2013, Gordon, 2014).

The emergence of these lines of enquiry is important because it helps to overcome the mainstream technical and problem-solving approaches that portrayed SSR as free of power dynamics, contributing to a narrow understanding of its conceptual and operational limitations. *It brings the 'political' to the centre-stage of security and justice analysis, and assists in understanding its constructed meaning, contested nature and implications, helping to generate better informed engagement on SSR.* Despite the renewed trend of decoding meanings and implications of local ownership in the context of SSR (see for e.g. Bendix and Stanley, 2008, Panarelli, 2010, Gordon, 2014), a practical contribution from global SSR actors is still faltering.

This state of affairs stems from the fact that the intertwining between security and politics, and the understanding of the contestations in this space, keeps being overlooked by mainstream policy actors, despite reiterated calls for attention to this aspect. Rhetoric has changed but practice has not followed; concern with security politics tends to gain currency when new crises emerge. Over time interest tends to wane or be directed to the new hotspot *without sufficient investment in in-depth empirical research detailing and learning from the power politics of reform in the country at stake.*

The generality of SSR research (both policy-oriented and academic driven) still suffers from a degree of superficiality, relying excessively on anecdotal evidence and case study chapters based on secondary sources (Luckham and Kirk 2012: 48). Moreover, even when fieldwork enables a deeper understanding of the situation, a flaw that tends to persist is that case studies usually address only a partial dimension of security and justice reforms, and do it predominantly within isolated short-time frameworks. *Such works allow, for instance, the unearthing of recommendations for programmatic purposes, but constrain the identification of trends, outcomes and lessons concerning issues central to SSR, such as the particularities of institutional development dynamics and oversight and accountability challenges.* This is a central reason why SSR literature is limited in its analysis of the interactions and struggles between different security and justice actors, and of how these shape the process of accommodation, co-optation and resistance to reform.

Despite mounting efforts on learning from SSR implementation, not enough is known about what drives the development of specific policies and the design of particular programmes, what determines success or failure, who the losers and the winners of the process are, and whether, and to what extent, citizens benefit from the programmes (Luckham and Kirk 2012: 48).

Against this background, *this thesis aims to add to the growing body of SSR literature that engages critically with the political contestations of security and justice reforms*, and which treats these as comprehensive processes, enmeshed in global, regional, national and local power dynamics. *This is done in the literature review by employing existing critique of liberal peacebuilding to analyse the development of the SSR agenda within the security-development nexus mainstream.* This analysis enables an understanding of the factors that shaped the stripping of politics and political factors from SSR design and implementation, which led to the neglect of central components such as ownership and sustainability. Engagement with liberal peacebuilding critique also adds value by explaining the difficulties in learning from SSR experience. Explanations include the subsuming of this agenda to other competing policies, to the strategic security and development interests of powerful international actors, and to the unpredictability of the results of interactions between international, national and local actors during implementation. Importantly, the adoption of the liberal peacebuilding critique helps to shed light on the reasons behind discrepancies between discourse,

policy and implementation of SSR, and the similar disjuncture between the levels of political commitment, strategic conceptualisation, programming and implementation.

In addition, this thesis aims to overcome the treatment of SSR as an event via research on the politics of reform in a long-term framework. This is done in two ways: 1) through developing a comprehensive empirically based analysis of the security and justice reforms implemented in Mozambique in the period 1992-2009; and 2) by looking back to the period of independence to understand the dynamics of security and justice reforms as embedded in the process of state building.

To understand the *politics of reform* of the different periods the concepts of *institutional bricolage* (Cleaver 2000, 2002), *critical juncture and path dependence* were adopted as case study specific analytical tools. The notion of *bricolage*, in particular, bears some resemblance, from the point of view of the analysis that it enables, to that advanced by the concept of *'hybrid political orders'* (Kraushaar and Lambach 2009: 8). Hence, the selection of institutional bricolage adds value by complementing the more generic examination of SSR based on the liberal peacebuilding critique. Institutional bricolage, critical junctures and path dependence allow the contextualisation of prevailing practices alongside new developments, and provide pointers for analysing the piece-meal and improvisational approaches in institutional

reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in Mozambique. In addition, their employment emphasises the agency of multiple interacting institutional actors and their methods of coping with pressure for change, including the dynamics of negotiation and strategies of cooperation, resistance, and accommodation. This is remarkably useful for understanding the resilience of Mozambique's political actors and security sector institutions and stakeholders through reforms that were mainly externally influenced under the project of liberalisation. Not least important is that the use of institutional bricolage has allowed a closer look into bottom-up processes and local agency, and how these shaped people's everyday lives, in spite of higher-level institutional security and justice reforms.

Further to the above, this thesis provides a *detailed account of the factors that impact security and justice institutional reforms.* This is done through *a triple level analysis, namely: 1) macro-level - scrutinising Mozambique's triple transition, 2) meso-level - focusing on SSR integration with simultaneous peacebuilding initiatives, and 3) micro-level - addressing coherence and alignment of defence, police and justice reforms. By bringing to light the inherent complexities, this thesis contributes to the demystification of the transformational and emancipatory stand of SSR, paving the way for a much more seasoned and pragmatic politics of SSR.*

1.3 SSR concept and practice: genesis and synopsis of the existing critique

1.3.1 The Concept of SSR

This thesis adopts the understanding of SSR as provided by the OECD-DAC definition. Rather than reinforcing security sector reform as a catch-word, it adopted the terminology of Security System Reform defined as *'transformation of the security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework'* (OECD-DAC 2005: 20).

The early concept of security sector reform that emerged in the late 1990s concerned the promotion of efficiency and the management of the security forces, conforming to democratic principles and good governance, all designed to contribute towards reducing poverty (Ball, 1998, Short, 1999). The originality of the concept resided in the fact that it captured the comprehensive nature of security, providing a coherent framework within which to address interrelated security problems in line with development strategies (Lilly and Page, 2002). In addition, SSR potentially provided a basis for constructive engagement with state security and that of the individual in a mutually reinforcing and interdependent relationship. Based on the premise that security is a public good, its main aim was the creation of professional, well-governed and accountable security sectors. The original use of the SSR

concept can be traced back to research (Ball, 1998) and policy statements (Short, 1999, United Kingdom's Department for International Development - DfID, 1999) where the security sector was described as comprising:

> *Core Security Actors: armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias)*
>
> *Security Management and Oversight Bodies: the Executive; National Security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions)*
>
> *Justice and Law enforcement institutions: Judiciary; Justice Ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen, customary and traditional justice systems*
>
> *Non-statutory Security forces: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies, political party militias (DfID, 1999).*

Whilst this characterisation alluded to a comprehensive understanding of SSR, the different contexts facilitated distinct implementations, leading to a proliferation of catch-phrases: security sector reform (Ball, 1998, Hendrickson, 1999), security sector transition (Hills, 2000) security sector transformation (Smith 2001: 16, Cooper and Pugh, 2002, Ball and Fayemi, 2004, Williams, 2005), justice and security sector reform (United Nations Development Programme- UNDP, 2002, Call, 2007), security sector management (*Journal*

of Security Sector Management, 2003; Hänggi, 2004: 3), security sector governance (Hänggi and Winkler, 2003, Ball and Fayemi, 2004), security sector reconstruction (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004), and security system reform (OECD-DAC, 2005). This multiplicity of labels is far from innocuous and, in addition to symbolising the disputed character of the concept, it represents a pre-announcement of different policy directions and corresponding contextual practices. One of the most disputed issues over time has been about how the rule of law and justice fit-in with security reforms in this systemic approach. For a long time not enough was done to incorporate rule of law dimensions into SSR, even if at the policy level the issues had been integrated (Oakley *et al*, 1998, Holm and Eide, 2000, Mani, 2002, Call 2007: 7). For example UN missions only began to consistently attempt to integrate efforts from both areas from 2007 onwards (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008: 11).

Furthermore, the rooting of the SSR concept within a holistic framework, although allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the subject, led to the formation of an overly ambitious policy agenda (Scheye and Peake, 2005, Egnell and Haldén, 2009, Sedra, 2010). It also inadvertently underscored the 'conceptual-contextual' divide between the goals of SSR policy and its corresponding implementation, which is far from being comprehensive. The reasons for this are numerous. They range from the dearth of political will of the leadership of implementing countries and of donors, to the existence of limited financial resources, and to the resistance of certain institutions and

their professionals to submit to fast change under externally-driven agendas (Williams 2000: 4, Edmunds 2003: 139). In addition, the ways these dynamics play out in a given context have been compounded by diminishing, yet still present strategic deficits in the field of SSR. Amongst these are insufficient dialogue between security and development professionals, and between practitioner and academic communities around the growing SSR evidence base that ought to allow learning. Yet another important aspect is the plethora of disjointed actors involved, which hinders the achievement of coherence and sequencing in implementation (Isima, 2010).

1.4 Research question

Besides the general assertion that the multiplicity of SSR actors hinders coherent implementation not enough is known about sequencing in and of SSR. Several authors have pointed out this deficit across time as well as the fact that in practice sequencing of SSR activities occurs randomly (Lilly *et al* 2002: 9, Forman 2004: 206, Lalá 2004: 12, Brzoska 2006: 12, Lalá 2006: 59, Isima 2010: 336, Schnabel and Born, 2011: 26). There is recognition that the limited information available is tangential, the existing analysis is insufficient, and theoretical knowledge lacks backing by serious empirical investigation (Isima 2010: 336). Hence, this thesis aims to contribute to fill-in this gap.

Drawing on prominent liberal peacebuilding scholar work, an important premise suggested is that in terms of sequencing, institutionalisation should

precede liberalisation. This means that institutions of the country emerging from war should first be built or strengthened, and only afterwards should democratisation and market reform processes be incrementally implemented (Paris 2004: 7,159). Whilst at first sight this appears a plausible argument, in most post-conflict environments institution building cannot be dissociated from liberalisation, because the former needs to adopt a particular shape to become an optimal vehicle for implementation of the latter. Thus far liberalisation has been the main goal, using institution building as a mere instrument.

A study of sequencing of post-conflict reconstruction programmes, departing from the premise of a mutually reinforcing security-development relationship, has argued that security should come first in a hierarchy of priorities (Timilsina, 2007). Activities such as supply of peacekeepers and restoration of order, restoration of essential infrastructure, and DDR and SSR should come first. Humanitarian and relief efforts, governance programmes, economic stabilisation, democratisation, large-scale infrastructure, and long-term development should follow. However, this research has conceded that the reforms do not necessarily need to be implemented consecutively. Rather, the distribution of resources amongst them needs to be mindful of the fact that *'if higher order objectives are not met, lower order achievements will ultimately prove transitory'* (Timilsina 2007: 137). This study also advanced that holistic SSR including police, army, penal and judiciary sector reforms should continue in later stages of the reconstruction process, but it did not look into how and

when these reforms should be articulated. This is probably because sequencing is better analysed, and needs to be adjusted to the specific context in question.

Sequencing is essential for SSR, for at least three central reasons. The first is that sequencing impacts outcomes in light of the timing and order (or lack thereof) in which security and justice reforms occur, whether that refers to a consecutive, parallel or random process. The second is that an adequate understanding of sequencing helps to identify entry-points for security reforms across time, and to seize opportunities to articulate the SSR agenda with other ongoing governance initiatives. The third is that strong knowledge about sequencing has potential to help in the definition of policy and programming priorities (Brzoska, 2006, UNSG, 11/06/2009, Isima, 2010). Hence, in light of its importance and given the dearth of insight about sequencing, this topic has been elected as the central line of investigation of the case study on Mozambique. In order to generate knowledge about the design, planning and implementation of security and justice reform strategies, the main research question guiding the case study is:

> *How did reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in post-civil war Mozambique evolve in the short, medium and long-term, and what factors affected the coherence and sequencing of these changes, and the ability of these institutions to fulfil their missions?*

A sub-set of questions complements the overall thesis' analysis, namely:

1. How do the roots of SSR in the liberal peace paradigm constrain its capacity to attain the goals set in the policy agenda, and is there potential to overcome these flaws?

2. How did Mozambique's post-independence political economy and justice and security reforms contribute to the outbreak of the civil war? How did they compare with, and influence reform immediately following the civil war and, later, in the longer-term process towards democratisation?

3. How did Mozambique's triple transition shape the context and direction of SSR in the post-civil war period?

4. How did coherence and sequencing (or lack thereof) of post-civil war reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors impact changes in these institutions, in the short, medium and long-term?

5. What opportunities for change existed beyond those provided by the peace agreement entry-points for SSR, and how could security and justice reforms be approached in a comprehensive and home-grown manner?

6. What broad lessons can be identified for future reform in Mozambique and what recommendations can be made to improve the design and implementation of SSR in general?

1.5 Levels of analysis and timelines

The case study on Mozambique is diachronic and analyses mainly reforms that took place between 1992 and 2009; however it also considers events between 1975 and 1992 for historical context purposes. The examination of the period 1992-2009 takes place at three main levels in which the coherence and sequencing of SSR are analysed:

1) At the macro level, the coherence and sequencing of wider political, economic, and security transformation processes are analysed and it is in this context that Mozambique's triple transition is examined.

2) Meso-level analysis focuses on the peace agreement and the processes of SSR and their coherence and sequencing with other peacebuilding policies, such as DDR and transitional justice initiatives.

3) Finally, it is at the micro-level where coherence and sequencing are looked at through the lens of a comprehensive framework including the reform of defence, police, justice and other strategic security institutions (in some instances subsumed under a national security strategy). This

requires an exploration of how reforms unfolded in each of these areas, with particular attention to how they interrelate, and mutually support or undermine each other in implementation. In this case study the intelligence and other security agencies have been excluded from analysis. The latter were judged to be beyond the scope of this study, both in order make it more manageable, but also because of the difficulties of gathering information and gaining access to the relevant actors.



Fig. 1 Levels of analysis

1.6 The relevance of a case study on Mozambique

The experience of Mozambique, despite pre-dating the SSR concept and agenda, is relevant because it facilitates an analysis of security reforms carried out over a long-term period, in this case, from 1992 to 2009. Although at the time of Mozambique's peace negotiations and subsequent peacebuilding phase, the concept of 'security sector reform' had not yet been developed, security reforms were implemented which could be considered a precursor to SSR. In addition, the concept of SSR formulated in the late 1990s continued to evolve simultaneously with the implementation of Mozambican security reforms. Thus, it is pertinent to establish whether the strategic direction of the Mozambican reforms was adapted (or not) to the holistic conception of SSR over the past seventeen years.

This thesis targets two significant historical periods, namely a post-independence era (in this case accompanied as well by an emerging civil war), and a post-civil war period, facilitating a nuanced understanding of patterns of continuity and rupture in this African state-building process. The focus on these distinct periods provides the opportunity to compare security and justice reforms carried out by a regime in control in the post-liberation war context, with those following a civil war period where governmental authority was under challenge.

Furthermore, this case study facilitates an enquiry about not only lessons learnt during conflict resolution and subsequent peacebuilding stages, but also about medium to longer-term conflict prevention. In addition, research on the post-civil war peacebuilding phase permits analysis of security-related decisions made during the peace process in terms of their impacts in the short, medium and long-term. This is particularly useful to comprehend the impact of the interaction of international, regional and national factors on security and justice reforms, as well as to understand the dynamics of powerful local players' adaptation to external and domestic pressures.

It is also the case that if a strict timeline to analyse SSR - as an integrated and comprehensive strategy to address security reforms - is set at the time when the concept first materialised in donor development discourse (the UK in the late 1990s), then many other relevant historical examples would be rendered worthless. These include cases such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti and South Africa (actually the first reported example of holistic SSR even before the term had been coined), which formed the basis of many current SSR lessons learnt. Such an option does not seem reasonable for at least two reasons. First, the actual security and development needs of these countries warranted a SSR approach even if the SSR concept had not yet been labelled as such; and the security development interface was not an entirely new feature in donors' aid agendas. Indeed, even during colonial times these two strategies had merged around the major geopolitical

objectives of the main actors in the international system (Duffield 2005: 148, Cooper 2006: 318). Second, the SSR concept has been an evolving concern and, despite improvements in policy implementation during the past decade, its application within an integrated and comprehensive peacebuilding strategy has barely taken root in practice, bar perhaps the example of Sierra Leone. In light of this, it is worth reiterating the importance of studying earlier as well as more current situations given the growing number of cases where the same shortcomings are re-occurring.

In addition, a case study on Mozambique is important given the shortage of studies of SSR on Lusophone countries. This group of states, beyond their shared language, have in common a history of liberation war against the colonial power, as well as certain similarities in their institutional frameworks and culture. However, this is not to say that they are unique, but rather that their specificity must be compared to more general and transversal sets of principles, conditions, and challenges that are common to state-building and to SSR in African countries.

1.7 Importance of research

Against the backdrop of a flawed, but nevertheless increasingly relevant, policy and practice of SSR in the international agenda, it is essential to ascertain why it still matters to research SSR.

First and foremost, SSR programmes have the potential to improve or contribute to the deterioration of the quality of security that people are (or not) provided by countries that are candidates for reform. They also impact the politics and organisation of the security system of those states in such a manner that they may alter (positively or negatively) a given balance of power in politics and society, triggering latent conflicts. One such example took place in the context of Croatia's war of independence from Yugoslavia, and in the context of US and German support for transforming an ex-Soviet force into a Western military force. The Croatian army was re-trained and equipped in 1994-95 by a private U.S defence contractor, in the midst of a UN declared arms embargo. Instead of acting as a professional, accountable and human rights observing force, they launched military offensives against UN protected areas and their civilian ethnic Serb inhabitants in 1995, in retaliation for earlier military aggressions committed by the Serb forces (Woodward 2003: 289-290).

Secondly, the progressive significance of SSR in the international cooperation agenda is matched by growing resources, ultimately provided by worldwide taxpayers, who, at best, possess minimal information about these programmes, their results and the effects produced in host reform states. In addition, it is relevant to understand the rationale and driving forces behind a policy agenda that prescribes holistic programmes and suggests simultaneous implementation of justice and security reforms in countries with debilitated

state structures and financial constraints. This gains additional importance against the background that Western countries prescribing those recipes do not carry out these activities in tandem in their own states. For example, defence reviews, assessment and adaptation of security budgets, strengthening or loosening security oversight legislation and judiciary reviews are not necessarily sequenced processes in Western countries, or form part of programmes called SSR. This duality of criteria weakens the legitimacy of the SSR agenda, and this hypocritical stance also contributes to the resistance that this agenda faces in several non-Western countries.

However, given that SSR has become a standard programme in the context of peace operations, and since it is linked to strategic interests - be they to maintain peace and stability, or to create security efficiency for protection of economic assets - African countries are also engaging in it from the position of providers of security assistance to its peers. A telling example is South Africa's contribution to the reform of the armed forces, the police, and immigration in the DRC (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013), and Angola's military mission in Guinea Bissau in 2012 (Uzoechina 2014: 20). Hence, it is also appropriate to understand how SSR unfolds in practice in a Western/non-Western security assistance context, to compare it to the politics of engagement by African SSR providers. Nonetheless, such comparative exercise does not take place in the context of this thesis. The rising SSR support by African countries to its peers constitutes an avenue of research

worth pursuing on its own, in order to learn about the principles and practice guiding their conduct, and subsequently assess them in light of those advanced by Western countries. As far as can currently be observed, they operate similarly to the majority of other SSR state sponsors in so far as they provide technical and training support, but with no inclusion of a governance perspective.

It is important, however, to redress some balance with regards to the claim that SSR is solely a Western agenda. Whilst SSR may have been initially articulated from a Western policy basis, subject to co-optation by geopolitical interests and suited to enabling neoliberal economic agendas, its espoused values of democratic governance, which in the most remain to be implemented, are not alien to the populations of African countries (Hendrickson 2004: 8). This is proven by African civil society's engagement in organic democratic change movements of the 1990s and early 2000s, and in recent initiatives to resist the return of authoritarianism (for e.g. in Mozambique from 2010 onwards, in Burkina Faso in 2014). Hence, a grassroots critical agency is in the making, and even if uncoordinated and merely discursive against violence, contributes towards hybrid post-liberal forms of peace (Richmond, 2011). In light of this the wider the availability of information deriving from case study informed research, the higher the potential for improvement of the SSR field, and more importantly, of the watchdog and

supportive roles that CSOs can play in building democratic governance of the security sector.

1.8 Contribution to knowledge

This thesis aims to contribute to expanding knowledge on at least four different counts. First and foremost, this work *provides new empirical evidence* through a case study on Mozambique, helping to overcome the excessively prescriptive and normative stances widespread in current SSR literature and policy (Brzoska 2003: 49, Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 17, OECD-DAC 2005: 61). Whilst the gap between prescription and empirical inputs is being filled with a growing body of case study research from different geographies, a case study on Mozambique is pertinent. Numerous data about Anglophone Africa are now being complemented by rapidly expanding literature on Francophone Africa, yet information is still lacking about Lusophone countries and the unfolding of reforms in their security and justice apparatuses.

Secondly, this research *supplements the existing literature on transitions and on SSR, by focusing on the sequencing and coherence* of reform processes, a little studied and understood subject (Lilly *et al* 2002: 9, Forman 2004: 206, Lalá 2004: 12, Brzoska 2006: 12, Lalá 2006: 59, Isima 2010: 336). At the macro level, coherence and sequencing in this case study of Mozambique comprises examination of how security and justice reforms evolved in light of other simultaneously ongoing political and economic transitions. This analysis

confirmed that the precedence and prevalence of economic liberalisation over peacebuilding and democratisation, significantly moulded the short, medium and long-term outcomes of reforms, resulting in weak post-conflict state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors.

At the meso level, coherence and sequencing are analysed with regards to institutional changes in the defence, police and justice, with evidence showing that Mozambique's 1992 peace agreement provided significant entry-points for security reforms. However, the peace agreement' provisions were highly contested during negotiations and implementation, precluding the enactment of a comprehensive framework for security transformation. This also resulted in unintended short and medium-term security outcomes, which led to miss opportunities for immediate police and justice reforms. Yet, opportunities for security and justice reform developed in the medium term as well, mainly through a public sector reform that started in 1999. However, this process was insufficient and inadequate, insofar as addressing the specificities of the security and justice sectors, leading to poor levels of ownership and failing to meet institutional performance needs.

Another subsumed contribution to knowledge deriving from the thesis engagement with issues of sequencing and coherence of SSR is that of *helping to fill a relevant policy gap* (Brzoska 2003: 41-4, Ball 2006: 329). This is done utilising praxis to augment specific knowledge about how the security

sector works on the ground, and unearthing the concrete lessons and recommendations that can be derived from that experience. The research findings show that involvement of all security actors (including potential detractors) in the preparatory phase of reforms is essential to ensuring the legitimacy of the process, but also to identifying the spoilers and building strategies to address their needs. In addition, they highlight how the minimalism of the security provisions and their deficient implementation has led to security vacuums that induced conflicting parties to engage in survival tactics, which tended to reproduce mistrust and violence in the short, medium and long-term. Whilst specific reforms may be introduced in the various institutions that compose the security and justice system, an overall framework is usually missing, and could be introduced through processes starting with national security assessments. Nonetheless, obstacles to such comprehensive processes tend to appear in the form of political mistrust between the government and opposition, and between the various stakeholders of the justice and security sector, a situation oftentimes compounded by the absence of societal pressure for security governance reforms.

A finding from the juxtaposition of the macro, meso and micro analysis carried out in this thesis, is that coherence and sequencing of SSR interventions is highly dependent on the interface between international, national and local political and economic dynamics. Yet, even if the context is relatively benign,

if external partners are unprepared to pursue a coherent strategy, opportunities for progress will be missed.

Fourthly, the thesis systematises, through the literature review, the critique about the security sector reform agenda. The contributions and limitations of IR in providing a useful theoretical framework for the debate on SSR are highlighted, moving on to an analysis in light of the liberal peace critique.

B - Research Methodology

1.9 Methodology

This study adopted a flexible *qualitative* research design to produce knowledge based on the analysis of fieldwork data, and drawing on the author's experience. The latter derives mainly from having worked as a civil servant at the Ministry of Defence in Mozambique (1997-2002), in a period of extensive transformation of the security institutions in the country. In addition, the author has investigated, over a number of years, the subject of post-conflict reconstruction as a researcher and lecturer at the Higher Institute of International Relations in Maputo.

Primary data collection methods including semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis and the analysis of archival data were employed during the fieldwork. These were complemented by secondary data collection, which drew on the limited existing research on security matters in Mozambique, and

on the growing number of publications focusing on the political economy of the country, as well as on its socio-political characteristics.

The choice of a qualitative research methodology derived from the nature of the research question, in this case the study of institutional security reforms with a focus on coherence and sequencing in post-conflict Mozambique (1992-2009). Numerical data, whenever available, were used to measure specific components of SSR, such as security expenditures, military spending, and polling data regarding the public perception of the army, police and/or judiciary. However, putting statistics at the centre of this type of research has limitations. In the case of Mozambique, these included scarcity of data over long historical periods, and especially concerning the immediate post-conflict phase, as well as the lack of systematisation and low levels of reliability. In addition, shortcomings usually derive from the time intervals in which surveys are conducted. Institutions may have been reformed and improved their performance, yet results do not fully reflect this outcome, because there is a natural time lag before improvements impact on public consciousness. Hence, a qualitative analysis based on field interviews enabled an updated and nuanced local perspective.

1.9.1 Research Strategy

Case study research was chosen for its several benefits, namely: 1) attention to empirical specifics and to research participants; 2) a detailed examination of

issues; 3) a fuller understanding of the socio-political and historical context of the study; 4) and the derivation of lessons (Vaus 2001: 231, 235, Yin 2003: 13, 41, Silverman 2005: 127, Flyvbjerg 2007: 392, Creswell 2003: 181).

However, the adoption of Mozambique as a single case presented research limits around the possibility of deriving generalisations and lessons applicable elsewhere. Whilst the use of multiple case studies was considered, issues associated with the scope of the research, fieldwork time and budget constraints ultimately ruled out this option. To overcome this limitation, examples drawn from other countries have been provided on the different issues examined, building generalisation through analytic and theoretical approaches as opposed to statistical benchmarks. The Mozambique case study also has intrinsic value for documenting features that have not yet been exposed academically, such as the dynamics of intersections in security reforms in the defence, police and justice fields, from an integrated perspective of security sector reform. This explanatory case study moves beyond the description of SSR in Mozambique, to draw associations with other economic and political reforms occurring within the wider liberal peace project.

The systematic implementation of the case study design ensured research reliability through construct validity (Robson 2002: 168, Yin 2003: 33). This was achieved by triangulating data from documentary analysis and from interviews, and by having, as much as possible, interviewees revise the

transcripts of interviews. Internal validity was built up through the consideration of rival explanations to the research questions and by pattern matching during data analysis. A draft theoretical framework on SSR prepared prior to the fieldwork, as well as the comparisons drawn with other documented cases served to enhance external validity. Finally, reliability (Janesick 1994: 217, Yin 2003: 34, Silverman 2005: 127) was built through a case study protocol, keeping a fieldwork research diary and a case study database.

In the past the researcher held some insider knowledge given her work for the Ministry of Defence of Mozambique. This instance of 'participant observation' at a given point in time entailed risks, insofar as biased views based on this experience could potentially influence research results. Aware of the danger of falling into a situation of *'self-fulfilling prophecy'*, i.e., *'the selection of only those data that fit the research hypothesis'* (Kimmel 1988: 39), the researcher used self-reflexivity, discussed the data analysis results with her supervisor and exposed her findings to academic audiences to obtain feedback.

1.9.2 Fieldwork

This PhD thesis comprises research carried out in a multi-year framework and data collected during three different fieldwork trips. The first field trip to Maputo occurred from 1 to 30 May 2005 and was undertaken for academic purposes, although it was carried out outside the scope of this PhD

programme. However, the information gathered had not yet been systematised or utilised elsewhere, and the interview data were relevant for the current PhD thesis.

Two other fieldtrips took place from 4 June to 30 September 2008 and from 6 February to 11 May 2009. The multiple visits made it possible to follow up on developments in the different security arenas, and meant that some of the participants were interviewed more than once. It also allowed the researcher the opportunity for deeper reflection, as well as a dynamic basis for interpreting and evaluating change. The second fieldtrip in 2008 entailed work in three provinces, two in the North (Cabo Delgado and Nampula - provincial capitals Pemba and Nampula) and one in the Centre (Sofala, provincial capital Beira), as well as interviews in the capital Maputo, mainly with people related to the defence establishment. The third trip in 2009 was devoted to work in the Southern province (Gaza, provincial capital Xai-Xai) and to the completion of interviews in Maputo, largely with representatives from the police and justice institutions. These provinces were chosen in order to obtain a representative sample from the South, Centre and North of the country, given Mozambique's regional imbalances and different cultures that might have shaped distinct security responses.

Over 55% of the time spent in the field was dedicated to scheduling and conducting interviews. Due to the scattered location of documentary and

archival data, their collection accounted for approximately 25% of the research time. Another 10% was dedicated to secondary data collection and logistical preparation for fieldwork in the provinces, whilst the actual travel time consumed the remaining 10% of the calendar.

Overall, the three fieldtrips produced a total of one hundred and fifty-two (152) interviews, of which 33 were carried out in 2005. These were complemented by the collection of a variety of legislation, newspaper clippings, reports, and publications.



Fig. 2 Map of Mozambique fieldwork in 2008 and 2009

1.9.3 Data Collection

As explained above, concerns with reliability of the data led to the use of a wide range of methods for collecting data from differing sources, in order to enable triangulation and the corroboration of information. The complementary methods used were *semi-structured interviews*, *document analysis*, *archival records* and *direct observation*.

1.9.4 Semi-structured Interviews

Interviews were the main source of data because they afford a deeper understanding of the reasoning, intentions, and driving factors behind specific behaviours and decisions on the part of actors in any given process. Semi-structured interviews in particular enabled participants to provide their account of events whilst, at the same time, allowing the researcher to introduce relevant issues and keep the interview focused. Annex A presents a master sample[5] of the research questions designed to ensure completeness without compromising comparability.

The initial purposive sampling strategy (Bernard 1995: 95, Creswell 2003: 185, Silverman 2005: 129) later gave way to snowballing sampling (Babbie 1992: 292, May 2001: 132). The primary interviewees had suggestions about other important actors and, whenever logistics permitted, the

[5] The interview questions were customised for each category of interviewees and within these categories between the different fields and their specific posts. They were also tailored according to whether participants were based at a central, provincial, district or administrative post. The tailored lists usually contained a maximum of 6-8 interview questions.

researcher interviewed as many suggested people as possible. The total of one hundred and fifty-two (152) interviewees can be divided into four general categories:

a) *Decision-makers, policy-makers, civil servants and operational staff of political, economic and security institutions*. These comprised mainly members of the national council for defence and security; defence ministry and armed forces; interior ministry and police; justice ministry, courts and public prosecution office. Additional contributions came from the foreign ministry, the ministry of public administration, the ministry of planning and development, the ministry of finance and the operational centre for natural disaster management. These actors were divided between those based in the capital, Maputo, representing a majority of sixty (60) interviewees, and those based in the provinces, numbering thirty-six (36) participants. The latter were distributed between four (4) different provincial capitals (Pemba- Cabo Delgado, Nampula- Nampula, Beira- Sofala and Xai-Xai- Gaza), seven (7) districts (Mueda, Mecubúri, Angoche, Maringué, Chokwé, Chibuto, Macia), five (5) administrative posts (N'Gapa, Namina, Namaponda, Subué and Malehice) and two (2) localities (Nonje and N'Saua).

b) *Diversified actors including both Frelimo and Renamo parliamentarians, civil society groups such as NGO like the League of Human Rights, JustaPaz,*

and the Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento e Democracia amongst others, as well as academics from institutions such as the University Eduardo Mondlane and the Higher Institute of International Relations. These actors were mostly based in Maputo, but there were also some in the provincial capitals, amounting to a total of thirty-one (31) interviewees.

c) *Two types of focus groups* participated*,* one made up of local community members and another of specific social and professional groups. They amounted to a total of nine (9) focus groups comprising about 136 participants. Those with the participation of local community members (including the *common citizen -peasants, tra*ders, etc- teachers, health practitioners, local security and justice providers) were carried out in the following administrative posts and localities, totalling six (6) focus groups:

   i. Nonge and N'Gapa in the province of Cabo Delgado (about 20 people each)
   ii. Namina and Namaponda in the province of Nampula (about 15 people each)
   iii. N'Saua in the province of Sofala (about 10 people)
   iv. Malehice in the province of Gaza (about 40 people).

The advantage of these focus groups was that they allowed flowing conversations, with some initial core questions posed to the group, which

enabled the interviewees to talk about the issues they wanted. The downside was that sometimes there were lengthy interventions from certain participants, diminishing the opportunity for others to express their opinions. Occasionally the same few people spoke, so the researcher had to cautiously encourage other participants to voice their opinions. Furthermore, confidentiality was not applicable in this open community setting, and this may have inhibited certain people from disagreeing with those in influential positions. However, the discussions were generally positive as the participants communicated actively. This type of meeting also allowed the researcher to probe for answers about issues regarding conflict resolution, justice and security as a follow up from other less sensitive issues, whenever they remained unaddressed by participants.

The remaining three (3) focus groups were composed of:

i. a group of liberation war ex-combatants in the village of Maringué (5 participants)
ii. officers working (mostly lecturers) at the Military Academy in Nampula (7 participants)
iii. Navy officers at the naval headquarters in Maputo (4 participants).

These collective interviews differed from those described above in that the groups were smaller and discussions focused around issues peculiar to their affiliation. Also, they allowed deeper and detailed discussions about

the issues at stake and the views expressed by the members of these smaller groups were more similar.

d) *Representatives of the main international bilateral donors and multilateral agencies* supporting reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in Mozambique from countries such as the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany and institutions such as the UNDP. From the bilateral cooperation milieu, staff from the embassies/high commissions, development cooperation agencies, military attaches, police representatives in technical cooperation missions and development foundations were interviewed. During the 2008 and 2009 fieldtrips the European Union Commission, a major supporter of justice reforms, and at the time also in the process of beginning support to the police, did not grant an interview. The same happened with Denmark - the main donor in the Justice domain - and the World Bank. The German embassy and development cooperation agency, despite their support for the MInt community policing initiative, did not see themselves as supporting reforms in the Police, nor in SSR. A total of sixteen (16) interviews were conducted.

Documentary Analysis, Archival Records and Complementary Sources

Documentary analysis was based on a review of communiqués, policy documents, legislation, non-classified organisational reports and documents, parliamentary session transcripts, newspaper and magazine articles, and official speeches. Some of these documents were obtained from open

sources such as the publications of official laws, the national newspapers, the national archive and the Internet. Others, such as non-classified organisational documents, like those containing institutional structures and organograms of the defence, police and justice establishments, as well as a wide array of legislation on these areas, were made available by the respective ministries.

Parliamentary session transcripts, including those related to debates on security and justice matters, were obtained from the archives in the Parliament library. The President's Office had no organised archive of speeches by the current and former Presidents, and these were directly sourced from the Internet page of the Government of Mozambique, and from blogs such as http://macua.blogs.com.

A substantial number of relevant newspaper and magazine articles (old and new) was collected from the national news agency, *Agência de Informação de Moçambique* (AIM), and from national newspaper and magazine archives such as those of *Notícias, Domingo, Savana*, *Zambeze and Tempo*. *Notícias* and *Tempo* in particular were good sources for post-independence legislation that was not readily available at most libraries. This was complemented by a set of security-focused newspaper clippings for the months of July and August 2008 that were provided to the researcher by the Secretariat of the National Council for Defence and Security. Additionally, videotapes of public interviews

were obtained from the TV station records of the *Televisão de Moçambique* (TVM). News was also collected from international and regional media providers such as the BBC and the Defence Web, mainly through their websites. The researcher drew extensively on the highly respected website *mozambiquehistory.net* for media articles related to the history of Mozambique.

Surveys that verified grass-roots opinions about state issues and the legitimacy of the security forces including, amongst others, the level of police and justice service delivery were also useful (Inquérito Nacional de Opinião Pública, 2001, Afrobarometer, 2005, 2008). Indexes such as the UNDP Human Security Index, the Global Peace Index, and the Legatum Prosperity Index were helpful because they provided comparative data on development, governance, corruption, and peace and security in an evolving timeline, highlighting both progress and setbacks.

Data gathering was highly time consuming because of the dispersion of information and, whilst a considerable amount of legislation existed, it was not possible to obtain all of it from one place. Furthermore, not all of the desired data were collected. This was the case with most national ministry documents, namely: policy statements, organisational development reports, institutional memoranda, internal meeting reports and statistical records. These documents were not made available as most state representatives and

officials from some embassies withheld permission. In some cases the researcher was told that staff shortages prevented the work needed to unearth unclassified ministerial or government documents, or to select those pieces from within documents that did not contain confidential information. Many institutions simply did not have organised statistical data. The Attorney General's office, for example, had only recently established the relevant department. Hence, over the years, significant gaps persisted with regards to statistics on justice, defence and security.

The accuracy and reliability of the data emerging from documentary analysis and archival records was of particular concern. Data analysis requires close scrutiny of the historical conditions, contextual considerations and target audience for which the documents were initially produced. The policy documents, in particular, were indicative of the general governance approach that existed in Mozambique at a given point in time. Moreover, historical documents referring to past practice have cultural underpinnings that are not always immediately obvious. There is also the difficulty of fully understanding the inherent preconceptions of the writer(s) of these documents, especially in those cases where the researcher was not present at the time of the reported events. However, through accumulated research and knowledge of the historical background of the country and of the security establishment the researcher was able to address these concerns.

Another concern was that a significant proportion of policy documents and legislation in Mozambique tended to be drafted from an ideal perspective that had little to do with reality. On the one hand, in many cases, legislation is still part of the colonial legacy. On the other hand, more recent legislative frameworks tend to reflect the influence (and legislative traditions) of one particular, or of various donors providing assistance in a specific area. This usually results in two tendencies. Sometimes action differs from that legislated due to the outdated nature of the provisions which still closely follow much of the original colonial legislation (Trindade 2003: 97, 2.3.1-25/02/09), as, for instance, in the case of criminal law. Another difference stems from an extremely formalistic attempt to legislate everything from afresh, but without any corresponding implementation of the laws (Pinheiro 1999: 1). Indeed, in Mozambique, the challenge of legal reform is very substantial, with long waiting lists of legislation to be examined and approved by the executive and the legislature.

Direct Observation

Direct observation took place in an informal manner, by registering events, details and behaviours that accompanied the process of data collection. Other relevant data consisted of contextual observations derived from the researcher's knowledge of the working conditions of certain security forces, such as the military stationed at the naval base in Pemba, the police facilities

in the districts and administrative posts, as well as visits to the prison centres of Rex and Ndlavela.

1.10 Ethical considerations

1.10.1 Informed Consent, Confidentiality and Anonymity

Ethical issues deserved special attention in this project, with the researcher taking the utmost care to protect the interests of those involved in the research process. All interviews were voluntary to prevent coercion and deception of any kind. An informed consent form (see Annex B) was distributed prior to the interviews, which contained information about the purpose of the research, its use, dissemination, and confidentiality measures. In addition, prior to beginning interviews, the researcher orally reiterated the information contained in the informed consent form. Approximately half of the total interviewees accepted the use of a tape-recorder, although the majority of these were based in the capital Maputo, in contrast with the provinces, where most people felt uncomfortable with the use of such a device.

Whilst the use of informed consent was sufficient for the urban-based and literate group of interviewees, additional care was taken in the process of obtaining consent from the illiterate and grass-roots respondents. This was done by orally explaining the information contained in the formal written consent letter to the community gatekeepers and asking them to convey the message to the group of interviewees. In addition, prior to commencing

interviews, the researcher addressed the interviewees and explained the process again, providing them with an opportunity to ask for clarifications.

The process, however, was not ideal. The researcher addressed interviewees in Portuguese and although simple language was used, some of them did not fully understand or speak the country's official language, which meant that translators had to be present in most collective interviews. Since relying on translators carries the risk that the nature of the research is not fully conveyed to the respondents, care was taken to select the best possible translators in each location. People spoke openly in most cases, including about the government, often expressing resentment about the lack of healthcare and poor education and infrastructure, even in the presence of state representatives.

Interview-based research relies heavily on the trust created between interviewer and interviewee. Ways of generating trust comprised the assurance of confidentiality and anonymity to the interviewees, as well as feedback in the form of transcripts to those based in urban locations. In relation to individual interviews, codifying of interviewees' identity ensured confidentiality; however, in certain cases, full anonymity was difficult to guarantee. That was because the Mozambican security setting is small and unusual views are likely to be indirectly identified by those familiar with the environment, even in the absence of interviewees' names. Given this

limitation, the researcher let interviewees know at the beginning of the interview that they had the option to discontinue involvement at any given point during the conversation. Participation in the interview was encouraged by outlining the benefits of the study whilst taking care to not overstate them. It is important to bear in mind that, whilst this project did not require covert research, the subject was of a sensitive nature in Mozambique where security issues are still treated as taboo at certain levels. The public does not receive much information about security reforms and, although democratisation is underway, limitations exist concerning effective accountability and transparency of security institutions. Consequently, issues related to power dynamics and job safety within the justice and security establishment were dealt with sensitively, particularly during the process of gaining informed consent.

1.10.2 Access and Gate Keeper Involvement

Gaining access to interviewees was assisted by the fact that the researcher is a Mozambican national and possessed a recommendation letter from the University of Bradford and had been affiliated with the Higher Institute of International Relations of Mozambique. Access to Defence Ministry and Armed Forces officials was relatively easy given the researcher's former affiliation with the Ministry of Defence. This was not the case with the Justice institutions or the Ministry of Interior and Police forces, where significant personnel changes, including in crucial leadership positions, had taken place.

These changes occurred not only between the time that the researcher worked in the security institutions' milieu, but also between the first and second fieldtrips, meaning that the contacts established during the first trip were of limited utility during the second.

The researcher relied on former colleagues to facilitate meetings with senior personnel in cases where introductory letters proved insufficient to secure such interviews. In the provinces data gathering was initially expected to take place either through association with national research institutions assembling information in the field or *via* local NGOs. The first option was ideal in terms of ensuring the degree of independence between the researcher and state authorities, but it proved impossible to identify such institutions coinciding with the time of the researcher's schedule. As a result, preparation of the trip to the provinces took considerable time because of the need to contact provincial and district state institutions, impacting negatively on the research timetable.

C - Thesis Structure

1.11 Chapter summary

This thesis is organised into eight chapters. The introduction is divided intro three sections. The first exposes the genesis, rationale and relevance of this thesis' research, through an assessment of the existing analysis and discussion of the paradoxes and disjuncture between the SSR concept, policy and its implementation. The research question is framed, and the thesis'

contributions to knowledge, and the pertinence of a case study on Mozambique are also presented. The second section comprises the research design and includes justification of the qualitative methodology adopted, the methods utilised and the ethical dimensions considered. Section three provides the structure of the thesis, through a short description of chapters.

The literature review carried out in chapter two starts with a brief overview of SSR in the context of different IR paradigms, underscoring its contributions and shortcomings and justifying the choice of a theoretical framework based on the liberal peacebuilding critique for examining SSR. The proceeding analysis focuses on the emergence of SSR and the contested role of politics in it and the impact of the international political economy of aid in SSR practice. Finally, a case is made for complementing the adopted theoretical framework of the liberal peacebuilding critique with the concepts of critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage for the specific case study analysis on Mozambique.

Chapter three commences the case study of coherence and sequencing of security reforms in Mozambique by setting the assessment of the country's post-civil war security and justice institutions (1992-2009) within a historical state-building framework. This chapter explains Mozambique's different trajectory to that of the majority of African countries where the immediate post-independence period was characterised by neo-patrimonial rule. Ruling

through rentierism and ethnicisation of politics and leading to a subjection of the security sector to manipulation for private gains and protection of particular elites did not occur in independent Mozambique. Nonetheless, an analysis of the political economy that characterised this historical period shows that this was insufficient to save the country from civil war. The implementation of Frelimo's socialist exclusionary ruling options and modernist nation-building aspirations, whilst simultaneously countering regional security destabilisation in a confrontational international environment, ultimately hindered its state-building project. The violent responses unleashed, resembling the colonial order that it had intended to dismantle, exacerbated societal, political and economic grievances paving the way to civil war, and to strengthening Renamo's insurgency.

A historical overview of the origins, structure and institutional culture of the justice and security institutions during the post-independence era (1975-1992) is provided in chapter four. The chapter draws on policy and institutional weaknesses that derived from the governing options adopted by the ruling Frelimo party, and analyses its responses to shortcomings. It is shown that a paradoxical and sequential coexistence of critical juncture and path dependence at the macro and state-building level fostered incoherence in institutional building policies for the justice and security system at the meso level. In addition, the chapter offers a baseline against which to test the

apparent rupture between the security and justice institutional apparatus and practice of the post-independence and of the post-civil war periods.

Chapter five focuses on the origins, driving forces and sequencing of Mozambique's triple transition, namely from a central planning model to a market economy, from one-party to multiparty politics, and from war to peace. It argues that the primacy of economic liberalisation over peacebuilding and democratisation significantly moulded the short, medium and long-term outcomes of the transition. This specific sequencing of processes combined with elements of path dependence (e.g. resurgence of Frelimo's past behaviour) shaped a particular type of political bricolage that resulted in weak post-conflict state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors. In addition to this, old and new patterns of exclusion - mainly but not exclusively fostered by economic liberalisation - have been reinforced through the emergence of neo-patrimonial logics in the ruling of the country. Mozambique is presently vulnerable to outbreak of new forms of armed violence, an outcome of Frelimo's poor learning from Africa's patterns towards violent conflict.

Chapter six focuses on the transition from war to peace by examining Mozambique's General Peace Agreement (GPA) and the implementation of its security provisions in the immediate aftermath of war. It analyses how bargaining extended into the period of implementation, and how regime

security dynamics that unfolded in this period affected the coherence and sequencing of subsequent medium to long-term security and justice reforms in the country. A central argument is that whilst the GPA represented an opportunity offering entry-points for security reforms, in practice it resulted in missed opportunities for police and justice reforms. Hence, whilst the GPA enabled a negative peace in Mozambique, a more modest view of its political success is warranted.

Chapter seven considers the security architecture of the country. This includes analysis of consultation mechanisms such as the National Council of Defence and Security and the oversight role of institutions like the Parliament. The chapter examines reforms that took place in the defence, police and justice institutions between 1992-2009 against the background of renewed opportunities offered by public sector reforms, but constrained by the underlining construction of a liberal peace. Reforms in the criminal justice system are also appraised given the prominence awarded to them by interviewees during fieldwork and their exponential intersectoral nature, which facilitated analysis of coherence and sequencing. The findings confirm how resistance to change, quality and change of leadership and cumbersome bureaucratic and legal processes affect security and justice reforms. They also illustrate how processes of justice and security reforms can become vulnerable to political expediency on the part of the government and donors, at times leading to political/ institutional bricolage arrangements.

The eighth and last chapter considers research findings against the main and subsidiary research questions, provides broad recommendations for the upcoming reforms in Mozambique and for SSR in general, and identifies relevant topics for further research. The main conclusion is that despite incremental institutional reforms and improvement the overall security and justice reform process in Mozambique has been flawed by the absence of a comprehensive framework, warranting an evaluation of the need of a national security strategy. The lack of such framework has had a negative impact on policy coherence and the sequencing of security reform implementation, hampering the efficient delivery of security and justice to citizens. Yet, such process is only valuable insofar as it is based on genuine and inclusive ownership by Mozambicans, something that is likely to face impediments. The persistent political mistrust between Frelimo and Renamo since the GPA, the GoM's apparent lack of interest in developing a NSS, and lack of societal pressure in this direction embodies the limits of Mozambique's justice and security reform processes.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

'Knowledge is like a garden;
if it is not cultivated, it cannot be harvested'
Swahili Proverb

This chapter analyses SSR in the context of the critique of liberal peacebuilding and uses International Relations (IR) paradigms to present a theoretical framework that can advance the insights provided by the prevailing problem-solving oriented research in the field. The resultant analysis from the application of IR theory - from positivist to post-positivist perspectives, including feminism - to SSR has two advantages. The first is that it explains the incoherent implementation of SSR and the power structures underlying it (Cox 1981: 126-155), through demonstrating how the transformative potential of SSR has been subjected to hijacking by co-option of powerful donors to suit self-centred geopolitical concerns. The second is that it underlines how the external nature of SSR implies lack of legitimacy to achieve sustainable political change in implementing countries, so as to anchor the development of a more inclusive (including gender-wise), accountable and efficient security and justice system.

However, the traditional paradigms of IR - realism and liberalism - offer a somewhat narrow contribution in view of the limited flexibility to overcome their

particular entrenched tenets. The liberal peace[6] critique has developed in reaction to these limitations, and therefore this thesis uses its lenses to further the analysis on SSR, by critically examining its constitutive nature in the existing liberal order.

The conceptual-contextual divide that characterises SSR indicates that this field shares common ground with the liberal critique of peacebuilding, and with a body of sceptical literature on a variety of other policies within the security-development nexus (Egnell and Haldén 2009: 48). This commonality is unsurprising given that, as is similar in emergent areas of knowledge and international policy initiatives, most SSR literature has been highly normative, subordinating reality to a desire to reform the world (Carr quoted in Griffiths 1999: 7). This prescriptive stance, despite being infused with the notion of 'doing good', has proven to be prejudicial because it relies on principles that are not (all) shared or awarded the same value by the actors implementing SSR. In addition, normative initiatives tend to be vulnerable to co-option by powerful actors that dominate the setting of international agendas (Pugh 2000: 6) and by domestic agents that define 'national interest'.

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[6] The 'Liberal Peace' reflects an ideology that aims at the establishment of sustainable peace, with democratisation and economic capitalism as the pillars of stability that resolve and/or prevent armed violence. Development is the end-result of the liberal peace, which is advanced through a western-centered global governance system that implements a kind of internationalism based on institutionalism and state-building as tantamount to peacebuilding. The peacebuilding enterprise in the framework of the international liberal peace encompasses a series of 'packages' to be delivered, such as humanitarian aid, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform, elections, human rights, transitional justice, rule of law, free trade and market economies (Richmond 2006, MacGinty and Richmond, 2007, Heathershaw, 2008).

The liberal peacebuilding critique focuses in particular on the contradictions and shortcomings of the current liberal peace model contribution to building post-war societies with the rights, freedoms, plurality and equality claimed by liberalism (Cooper et al 2011: 13). Whilst the liberal peace critique has roots in IR studies that questioned the nature of power and the way it shaped global structures (Cox 1981, 1987, Boulding, 1989), it also draws on contributions from peace and conflict studies, and adopts an interdisciplinary approach. Therefore, a systematic understanding of the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding is offered, and the theoretical and power assumptions guiding such interventions are questioned. This framework is useful for Mozambique's case study because it supports the unpacking of the neoliberal and modernisation canons that underpinned the country's triple transition from war to peace, from a one-party state to a multi-party state, and from a centralised economy to a market economy.

Despite these strengths the liberal peace critique encompasses an exclusionary stance with regard to institutionalism.[7] This is because institutionalism in its IR interpretation remains embedded in the analysis of the establishment, management and outcomes of organisations and regimes at the level of the international system and how these play out in light of state interests (Long 2002: 40-41, Duffield 2006: 642). Therefore, it does not confer

[7] Institutionalism emerged from a variety of social science traditions. As rooted in liberal IR theory, it is grounded in the understanding that institutions and the norms accompanying them offer regularity and constancy, building predictability and confidence through the sharing of valuable information (Snyder 1999: 103-104). The theory further holds that institutions ought to be based on legitimacy instead of coercion, reducing transaction costs and helping to promote coordination and cooperation rather than conflict, by regulating distributional gains (Lynn-Jones 1999: 56, Duffield 2006: 643-645).

adequate attention to the agency of individual actors in the shaping of institutional structures. IR Institutionalism also misses the interactions that take place within the realm of the state when creating or reforming institutions. Yet, elements of a dynamic approach to institutionalism are required to understand sequencing of institutional security reforms at the meso and micro levels in the case of Mozambique. As such, and within the spirit of an interdisciplinary approach, additional concepts were identified to guide analysis of the case study. These concepts are *critical juncture* and *path-dependence*, derived from historical institutionalism, and *institutional bricolage*, borrowed from sociological institutionalism.

This framework combining the *critique of liberal peacebuilding* with *critical juncture, path-dependence* and *institutional bricolage* provides for a nuanced investigation of security reforms in Mozambique. On the one hand, the framework enables the examination of historical circumstances and of the interaction of actors at both the national and international levels, mediated by power dynamics shaped by the global political economy. On the other hand, it facilitates analysis of the reactions of actors on the ground to a mostly internationally driven agenda such as SSR, and their capacity to shape outcomes at the local level. This is crucial because the results of the interactions between international, national and sub national actors deeply affect the coherence and sequencing of institutional security reforms that are at the core of this research.

The review of literature begins with a brief overview of SSR as it is presented in different IR paradigms, before engaging in analysis based on the liberal peace critique. Finally, the analytical framework drawn upon the concepts of critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage is discussed with regard to its suitability to the case study on Mozambique.

2.1 SSR in the context of IR theory - A brief overview

The older paradigm of IR - ***realism*** - influenced by an objectivist worldview views SSR as a foreign-policy instrument utilised by strong states to either foster pro-*status quo* positions (Dalby 1997: 11) or to promote change in countries undergoing transitions. For example, engagement in SSR represents a way of displaying power through the build-up or maintenance of a prominent position as a player in global peacekeeping. Such endeavour is undertaken in the strong states' own national interests as a means to keep instability at bay, and to legitimise a self-serving global configuration of power (Cox 1981: 127). In the multi-polar post-Cold War context SSR support follows intervention in countries involved in security and ethnic-related turmoil. In such environments, the *security dilemma* is transposable to the reality of civil war (Posen, 1993), where internal state anarchy developed as a result of the loss of central authority. *Hence, a major goal of support to SSR is to re-establish the monopoly of the use of force by the state, a logic that underpins the prevailing implementation of SSR through programmes centred on the provision of military training and equipment.*

However, the conceptual origin of SSR can be placed within an IR ***liberal theory***, more concretely underpinned by a *pluralist approach*. From this approach stem three main assumptions underlying SSR. The first underscores the relevance of other actors beyond the state, relinquishing the realist construct of a unitary state that rationally maximizes strategies for gathering power and political-military security in an anarchic environment (Krause and Williams 1997: 40-41, Lynn-Jones 1999: 54). In SSR this is materialised by acknowledging the existence of a tripartite state, including executive, legislative, and judicial components, while also recognising the role of non-state actors such as civil society, traditional authorities, and even private security companies.

The second assumption refers to a normative concern with the improvement of conditions of peace, including boosting global security and development (Keohane and Nye, 1977), for which 'good' states are required. Hence, the monopoly of the use of force by the state is maintained as a central and desirable outcome, explaining why many SSR programmes accommodate the train and equip approach with other institutional reform components.

The third assumption is the notion that interdependence leads to cooperation and that progress is achievable if solutions to conflicts are obtained through institutions, especially those multilateral in character (Keohane and Nye, 1977, Keohane, 1987). SSR as an instrument used in conflict resolution and

peacebuilding by multilateral organisations (and certain bilateral donors) incorporates a legacy of these assumptions.

Nonetheless, *the underpinnings of the SSR concept in liberal theory do not translate into practice, and liberal theorists noted that implementation has been influenced by a neo-realist ideology, carried out in partial continuity with past practices.* A central role continues to be accorded to the state in programming, with limited consideration awarded to the participation of non-state actors (Baker and Scheye, 2007, Abrahamsen and Williams 2008). Furthermore, the fundamental importance given to oversight in the SSR discourse does not cohere with the current prevalence of technical military and defence assistance (Ball and Hendrickson 2006: 3). *Hence, given the notorious dissonance between donors' SSR rhetoric and implementation, liberal analysts call for finding alternatives to improve liberal peacebuilding (Paris, 2004, 2010).*

Constructivism[8] questions the possibility of improvement of liberal peacebuilding policies such as SSR because of their exclusionary nature, and contributes to the analysis in two ways. Firstly, it focuses on how *securitisation*[9] of threats from the developing world in the form of

[8] Constructivist theory postulates that ideas are important and arise through social interaction, which, in turn, shape actors' identities, interests, and behaviours (Snyder 1999: 104, Buzan and Hansen 2009: 191).

[9] Securitisation consists of raising matters beyond the usual importance awarded to them, to a level of *'... politics beyond the established rules of the game, and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics'* (Buzan et al 1998: 23). In other words the issue at stake is turned into a magnified,

underdevelopment and conflict gave rise to post-Cold War interventionist discourses and containment policies such as SSR (Doty 1996: 129, Duffied 2001: 26, Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 260, Abrahamsen 2004: 679-683, Cooper 2006: 317, Duffield 2007: 123). Hence, constructivists argue that the exaggeration of this threat from the developing world led to an overstatement of the benefits of programmes such as SSR unduly placing them at the centre of Western development cooperation.[10] This results in *high expectations being created around SSR, in the conviction that it will promote conflict prevention and lead to improved governance, when in fact SSR is proving to be another tool of donor' crisis management, or 'liddism' (Rogers, 2000).*

A second contribution of constructivist analysis is that emerging from the perspective of hybrid political orders (HPO) (Boege et al, 2008, Kraushaar and Lambach, 2009, Brown et al, 2010).[11] HPO literature analyses primarily peacebuilding and state-building within the project of expansionism of the international liberal order, looking at the impact of formal and informal interactions on the reconfiguration of political orders that originate a hybrid peace (Mac Ginty, 2010). In the view of certain authors this interaction

existential threat, which needs to be dealt with using exceptional measures and justified allocation of resources (Buzan et al 1998: 23-24).

[10] Constructivism and realism share partial criticism with regards to the overstatement of the threat emanated from armed conflict in developing countries. Recent realist analyses posit that whilst manpower and financial commitment to missions addressing the threat had been assumed to serve the national interest of intervening countries, this position overestimated the benefits to said states from restored peace and stability in troubled countries (Walton 2009: 718). Therefore, there was a need for '*pragmatic multilateralism, removed from both the self-righteous fantasies of neo-conservatism and the utopian dreams of progressive humanitarian interventionists'* (Stewart 2008: 147). Realists have used such arguments to defend current neo-conservative isolationist approaches.

[11] A range of theorists, some of which have been described as critical theorists, have discussed this concept; but the notion fits well within constructivism, since it emphasises interactions between external and domestic realms, taking into account local agency beyond state-centric approaches.

between the local and the global can be characterised as *'friction'* because unexpected developments and unintended consequences emerge from these policy transfer attempts (Millar, Lijn and Verkoren 2013: 139). *Hence, from an HPO perspective the viability of SSR and its implementation outcomes need to thoroughly examine local actors and their formal and informal power interactions with national and international elites.* Such analyses imply *that the measurement of success of SSR considers fluidity, instead of focusing mainly on rational theory based planning and management.*

A **critical theory** appraisal of SSR reveals the existence of contradictory explanatory perspectives. One the one hand there is a strand which argues that an ostensible gap between policy claims - framed in the ambitious rhetoric of coherent security and development approaches - and the implementation on the ground persists (Chandler 2009: 29, Tschirgi et al 2010: 4, Reid 2011: 102). A disjuncture between the conceptual approach and implementation of SSR also demonstrates that, in practice, SSR interventions fall short of the policy discourse. They are oftentimes a-strategic and incoherent in themselves, and not only in relation to simultaneously implemented peacebuilding policies. In addition, the tendency to address SSR as a technical matter can be understood as a by-product of the fact that Western development cooperation agencies support SSR in the absence of wider foreign-policy strategies (Chandler, 2009).

On the other hand another strand asserts that security transformation is unlikely to emerge from existing efforts[12] because SSR *derives from the wider project of expansion of the liberal peace order, which is in turn underpinned by neoliberalism (Richmond 2006: 291-314, MacGinty and Richmond 2007: 491, Richmond 2008: 21-39).* The fact that SSR is imbued by a neoliberal ideology (Chuter 2006: 20) favours the reinforcement of hegemony of powerful international actors in this field. *Hence, whilst reform might possibly be achieved through SSR (Ball et al, 2003, Pugh 2006: 29), this is doubtful or in permanent danger of reversal (Hills 2010: 179, 189, Luckham and Hutchful 2010: 29).*

Little **post-structuralist** analysis of SSR is available in the published literature. However, in continuum with critical theory, *this perspective views SSR as reinforcing rather than addressing the pitfalls of a governance system characterised by global inequality.* Post-structuralism further establishes that SSR and similar techniques are instrumental to the strategic purpose of development as an apparatus for protecting western values and *modus vivendi* (Duffield 2007: 2). *In this sense SSR was designed and deployed as one amongst an arsenal of neoliberal techniques of governmentality devised to advance the strategic and bureaucratic priorities of Western security and development sectors.* SSR represents, therefore, an attempt to homogenise (via the production of donor consensus) the reasons, ways and means of

[12] There is a dearth of examples of security transformation, with the possible exception of South Africa following the end of Apartheid, but there the process was nationally driven and not called SSR (Cawthra, 2003, 2014, Williams, 2005).

reforming the security sectors of recipient countries in the name of good governance (Krause 2011: 33). In the process of implementation SSR disseminates the discourse and transfers policy priorities of powerful international donors to the elites of developing countries (Colleta and Muggah 2009: 429). This reveals the nature of SSR as a soft security tool intended to reduce the potential resistance to change on the ground (Krause 2011: 33). *SSR lacks, therefore, any organic characteristic that might allow it to transform or to achieve meaningful political change directed at a more inclusive, accountable and effective security system that would benefit the people of developing countries.*

Feminist research[13] contribution to SSR is central from the point of inclusivity, which SSR discourse proclaims as a central goal. The analysis deriving from feminist perspectives emerges from a broad range of IR approaches, ranging from liberal to post-positivist. At its lowest common denominator feminist research shares the criticism that SSR emerged as a gender insensitive policy (Valasek, 2008, Hudson, 2008, Salahub and Nerland 2010: 263). Beyond this, liberal feminists, on the one hand, favoured the adoption of pragmatic approaches towards gender mainstreaming in SSR policy-making, training and

[13] For a long period of time IR analysis has ignored the socially constructed roles of women in society, and the power interactions that underpin them. Recently, a series of SSR related topics including the absence of women in decision-making, the impact of militarism on gender in war and peace times, as well as the use of rape and gender-based violence as a strategy of war have been researched (Enloe, 1989, Kelly, 2000, Pankhurst, 2003, 2010, Cockburn, 2004, 2010). Additional topics comprise prostitution and sex tourism in conflict and post-conflict settings, as well as its relation to the wider political economies of peacekeeping, and the post-war backlash over women's security, including links between domestic violence and high levels of militarisation during peacebuilding (Meintjes et al, 2001, Tickner, 2004, Giles and Hyndman, 2004, Enloe, 2007, Pankhurst, 2007, Jennings, 2010).

programming (Bastick and Valasek, 2008). On the other hand, feminists from a critical theory tradition maintained that an add-on approach was insufficient and inadequate, resulting only in a superficial incorporation of gender into SSR (Clarke 2008: 58-59, Salahub and Nerland 2010: 264). According to this view, SSR did not question the masculinised assumptions of security and power subjacent to operations in the security system (Clarke 2008: 58-59). SSR did not attend to the differentiated meaning of security for women and other vulnerable groups, and it failed to make a positive impact on these groups by altering existing hierarchies (Salahub and Nerland 2010: 268-269). The deeper explanation for these limitations of SSR is found in its implicit exclusionary tenets, which were noticeably present in the security systems of the states exporting SSR models, and which invariably affected its application in implementing countries (Hudson 2008: 30, Salahub and Nerland 2010: 276). *Hence, feminist contributions reinforce the notion that in order to produce positive change SSR needs to address power relations, beyond the donor/implementing country viewpoint, to incorporate the requirement to shape power in favour of the end-beneficiaries of the programmes that belong to marginalised groups in society.*

2.1.1 IR Theory and SSR – Summary and Conclusion

While the various IR perspectives presented above and summarised in Fig. 3 below differ in their interpretation of SSR, certain arguments are common across two or more theoretical approaches. For example, feminist theory

crosscuts all other approaches and several liberal analyses find an echo within certain works of critical theory. This is because the roots of the latter are linked to criticism of the former.

Realism	Liberal Perspectives	Radical and Post-Positivist Perspectives			Feminist Perspectives
•SSR as a foreign-policy instrument utilised in function of strong states' national interest to maintain *status quo* or reinforce their power at a global level. •SSR to replicate in weak states the internal monopoly of the use of force held by strong states.	Pluralism, and Institutionalism: • SSR emerged from a pluralist strand. • Dissonance between donors' rhetoric and their implementation of SSR is commonplace. • Continuity of neo-realist influences is observable in practice.	Constructivism: •SSR excludes important non-state actors. • SSR promoted abroad in the self-interest of donors, which perceive countries in conflict as a threat to global security. • SSR as advancing the expansion of the liberal peace order, which given formal and informal interactions between donors and implementing countries' local actors results in Hybrid Political Orders. The space where interaction occurs is characterised by 'friction', provoking unexpected and unintended consequences.	Critical Theory (including post-Marxism): •SSR policy and conceptual improvements occurred but security transformation has yet to materialise in practice. This is difficult because SSR is rooted in a neoliberal ideology, which promotes the advance of capitalism through exclusionary means. •SSR interventions are a-strategic and incoherent in themselves and with other parallel development policies. This is a by-product of the lack of wider foreign-policy strategies, resulting in short-term interventions; an overall symptom of donors' evasion of responsibility in this arena.	Post-Structuralism: •Sees SSR as a technology of *governmentality*, designed to protect the Western world *modus vivendi*, and reinforcing rather than addressing, a governance system of global inequalities.	•Feminism shed light on the exclusionary nature of SSR and its superficial adoption of gender approaches. •In order to alter power relations in the security system SSR needed to go beyond liberal bureaucratic solutions. •Probing SSR models, including those of the security system of 'export' countries can reveal much about the patterns of power, hierarchy and cultural models being implemented in developing countries.

Fig.3 Summary of SSR in light of IR perspectives

The synopsis of SSR analysis in light of IR theory has reinforced the assertion that SSR is not a neutral agenda, but rather has its roots in the neoliberal ideology that pervades the expansion of the liberal peace order. SSR is not intrinsically evil, but its transformative potential has been hijacked through co-option by powerful donor countries to suit self-centred geopolitical concerns. These include the expansion of global capitalism and the protection of the *modus vivendi* of Western countries by keeping insecurity threats at bay. SSR is therefore a technique of *governmentality* designed to suit this purpose,

explaining the disjuncture between the stated good intentions of the SSR discourse and its implementation. In its disguise as a soft power tool, SSR attempts to prevent and/or control the resistance to change resultant from the social engineering involved in the reconfiguration of the provision of security in implementing countries. Moreover, the external nature of SSR implies that it lacks legitimacy to achieve sustainable political change in implementing countries, so as to anchor the development of a more inclusive (including gender-wise), accountable and efficient security and justice system.

The result of this assessment could be in itself compelling enough to conclude that SSR is a lost cause. However, such a sceptical stance is not embraced in this thesis. The analytical contributions of mainstream IR perspectives suffer from a bias that ensues from focus on the agency of donors and of the global governance system, whilst failing to consider the role of actors on the ground in shaping SSR practices.[14] This lacuna existed in the wider field of peacebuilding, but has been filled by contributions from liberal peacebuilding scholarship in the last two decades (Pugh 2000: 6, Taylor, 2007, 2010, Reid 2011: 99). Concepts such as *'hybrid political orders'* (Boege et al, 2008, Kraushaar and Lambach, 2009, Brown et al, 2010), *'post-liberal peace'* (Richmond, 2011), and *'friction'* (Tsing, 2005, Millar, 2013) have gained momentum in liberal peacebuilding critique. However, only recently have they

[14] The shortage of analysis about the agency of SSR actors from 'implementing' countries is indicative of the extent to which IR has been 'colonised' by a liberal intellectual hegemony in the last few decades. Indeed, the argument by post-colonial theorists that security studies and development theories are Western-centric (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 1, Munck and O'Hearn 1999: 1-26) is also appropriate to IR and to the field of SSR.

resonated in published critique of SSR (Podder, 2013, Gordon, 2014, Schroader and Chappuis, 2014). Thus, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing SSR critique through a case study of security and justice reforms in Mozambique. Given the value of the liberal peacebuilding critique for the framing of analysis of power exchanges between the 'local' and the 'international', a discussion on SSR in view of the liberal peacebuilding critique follows.

2.2 SSR and the Security-Development nexus in the context of the liberal peacebuilding critique

The development community found in the security-development nexus discourse a new direction to drive its activity in the immediate post Cold War era, and used it to anchor the foundation of the liberal peace paradigm that would drive the field of peacebuilding. The embracing of the security-development nexus represented a breakthrough given the longstanding rejection by development practitioners of the importance of security challenges, and the antagonist attitude between the security and the development fields (Willet 2005: 575, Ball 2005: 86, Krause and Jütersonke 2005: 455).[15] This change in the discourse of the development community

[15] Several interrelated debates occurred as a precursor to this change. The first revolved around the need for a continuum between provision of humanitarian aid and longer-term development support, at a time when humanitarian relief prevailed (Duffield 2001, 2010, Junne and Verkoren, 2005, Pupavac, 2006). The second focused on the nature of complex political emergencies (Duffield, 1994, 2007, Cliffe and Luckham, 1999, Goodhand and Hulme, 1999, Wheeler, 2000, Kaldor, 2007) and lead to the agenda on the Responsibility to Protect (UNGA, 24/10/2005, A/RES/60/1, UNSG 12/02/2009, A/63/677). The third asserted the centrality of human security (UNDP, 1994) and led to realisation that the cohabitation between conflict, insecurity and poverty impeded its achievement (Willet, 2004). Backed by the prominent study 'Voices of the Poor' (WB, 1999) a *security first* approach emerged on the premise that in order to engage in meaningful aid assistance, the security situation on the field required prioritisation in the form of stabilisation.

assumed moving towards conflict-sensitive assistance, and from disengagement with the state towards commitment to state-building (Smith 2001: 6, Cooper and Pugh 2002: 5). These principles became the bedrock of peacebuilding through statebuilding, and were advanced under the logic that shoring-up stabilisation, introducing human rights and regular elections would lead to democratic institutions and economic-growth based development (Paris, 2004). The package oftentimes applied regardless of the context, region, history and culture failed to address the root causes of conflict leading to a relapse into war or the emergence of extremely violent politics and crime (Cramer, 2006, Darby, 2006, Dodge, 2006, Call, 2007). It was usually concerned with a fast exit strategy for interveners (Paris, 2002, Fearon and Laitin, 2004, Rees, 2006, Rubin, 2006) and failed to transform power relations and pave the way towards more equitable societies in implementing countries, as promised by the emancipatory goals of the liberal peace (Richmond, 2009).

The poor results of this liberal peace-based peacebuilding agenda spurred contestation over the hegemonic development policies framed in the assumption of the security-development nexus as a mutually reinforcing bi-directional movement (Duffield 2001, 2005, 2007, 2010, Cooper, 2006, Waddell, 2006).[16] Criticism focused on the widespread acceptance of the

[16] To conceptually address the considered poor understanding of the constitutive nature of the nexus, it was proposed that the nexus be understood as a network of connections between separate ideas, processes or objects, which implied an infinite number of possible linkages and relations. This implied different potential configurations of linkages between security and development, and not all were mutually reinforcing (Stern and Öjendal, 2010: 11).

security-development nexus as unproblematic, consensual, and progressive, despite being of a complex and unclear nature and plagued by incoherence and confusion (Tschirgi, 2005, 2006, Tschirgi et al 2010, Cramer, 2006, Chandler, 2009, Stern and Öjendal, 2010). *Regardless of the contestation, SSR was framed within the mainstream discourse.* Despite increasing prominence in the development agendas of more multilateral and bilateral actors - similarly to other peacebuilding policies - SSR results in 'arresting insecurity' in conflict-ridden countries have remained, at best, questionable (Scheye and Peake, 2005).

2.2.1 SSR and the Withering Away of Politics

In retracing the origins of the SSR agenda, the literature recognises that its roots were based in different policy debates and research strands that emerged with the end of the Cold War (Brzoska, 2003, Ball, 2010). Besides the security-development nexus debate, SSR emerged under the influence of studies on civil-military relations and democratic transitions (Hutchful and Bathily, 1997, Stepan, 1988, Alagappa, 2002, Cawthra and Luckham, 2003), and amidst debates that attempted to move beyond a purist perspective of military expenditure reduction in the context of neoliberal economic policies (Ball, 1988, DfID, 2000, Hendrickson and Ball, 2002). *Regrettably, the central political analysis and the underlying political-economy examination that both types of reflections brought to the emerging field of SSR were downplayed in*

the policy development process, which anchored itself in the traditional tenets of the security-development nexus.

The emergence of SSR as a pillar of development policy meant that it carried along some of the legacy of this field, such as that development intervention ought to be perceived as apolitical, abiding by the imperative of impartiality and neutrality (Anderson, 1999: 146; Duffield 2001: 88; Junne and Verkoren 2005: 5). This engendered the (much denounced) technocratic approaches adopted in the overall implementation of SSR (Williams 2000: 2; Ball 2006: 328; Peake et al 2006: 252; Egnell and Haldén 2009: 47-48), which emerged also as a function of the need to distinguish SSR from more controversial regime prompting security agendas that characterised the Cold War period (Ball 2010: 29). This largely explains why the predominant policy and practice on SSR has for a long time only engaged superficially with the political dimensions affecting security reforms, despite research reiterating that SSR is intrinsically linked to politics (Hills, 2000, 2010, Cawthra and Luckham, 2003, Luckham and Hutchful, 2010, Schnabel and Born, 2011). The liberal peacebuilding critique suggests that this SSR posture has been in sync with similar fields of practice since technocracy, driven by the goals of neutrality and efficiency, has been a trend in peacebuilding and conflict approaches (Mac Ginty, 2012).

The rise of the apolitical stance brought about by the *developmentalisation* of SSR resulted in practical deficits in the implementation of this agenda. The first was an insufficient understanding of the historical and state formation record of the countries undergoing reform and a lack of sensitivity concerning political and cultural factors (Egnell and Haldén 2009: 27-50, Hills 2010: 179, Albrecht et al, 2010). This has been compounded by a certain amount of political correctness on the part of donors - and sometimes retrenchment - in the delivery of aid in this field, given that this support concerns core areas of state sovereignty (Lalá, 2001). Intimately linked to state delivery in security and justice areas is the degree of legitimacy harnessed by these institutions, or the lack thereof because the African state, in its Westephalian conception, tends to either be weak, be a progress in the making, or predatory to its own people (Zartman, 1995, Reno, 1998, Miliken and Krause, 2002, Fukuyama, 2005). This state conception - trying to accommodate different levels of *stateness* - rather than one that considers the different locus of power in a society has prevailed in a first generation of SSR programmes (Sedra, 2010). The implications were that programmes were shaped in a top-down configuration that centred on formal state institutions and the government as interlocutors (Hutchful 2003: 35-41, Human Security Centre, 2005), lacking participation of civil society and of ordinary citizens in the formulation of security policy, and disregarding marginalised voices (Caparini, 2002, 2004, 2010, Fluri and Hadžic 2004: 171-234, Farr, 2004). The literature has been very critical of SSR policy and programming overlooking the role of non-state

security and justice agents, as well as that of private security and military companies, despite their crucial role simultaneously as drivers of insecurity and as providers of security and justice (Sharf 2004: 61, Mancini, 2005, Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006, Isima, 2007, Baker and Scheye, 2009). The dearth of knowledge about non-state actors has been bridged by growing literature which has probed into the mutually reinforcing as well as exclusionary state interactions with traditional chiefs, militias, warlords, paramilitaries, vigilante groups, local defence forces, private military and security companies (PMSCs), business communities and transnational rebel groups (Faundez, 2003, Golub, 2003, Francis, 2005, 2012, Avant, 2005, 2009, Kyed, 2006, Baker and Scheye, 2007, Abrahamsen and Williams, 2008, Jones and Munoz, 2010, Alden et al, 2011).

This trend has led the SSR agenda to gradually recognise non-state actors, in particular in the context of community policing work and of justice delivery (Albrecht et al, 2011, Francis, 2012), and with the development of specific policy frameworks on areas such as PMSCs and business and SSR.[17]

The criticism of SSR as an exclusionary agenda has also prompted the incorporation of participatory approaches - already common in other

[17] An International Code of Conduct for Private Security service providers (ICoC) has been devised, and the area of business and SSR has been focusing on private-public partnerships to promote security, development and protection of human rights, including through abiding to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Whilst there has been analytical and normative progress in these areas SSR programming and implementation is yet to reflect these advances. http://icoca.ch/, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ http://www.securityhumanrightshub.org/

development policies - and the rising importance of the local ownership principle, beyond the elites and the bureaucracies implementing institutional security reforms (Ebnöther and Fluri, 2005, Scheye and Peake 2005: 234, Nathan, 2007). For instance, cross-governmental and societal consultation are becoming a common practice in SSR programmes as attested by the examples of the defence and security reviews carried out by countries such as South Africa, Uganda, Burundi and Sierra Leone (Africa, 2011, Hendrickson 2007, 2014, Jackson and Albrecht, 2010). *Yet, the degree to which the inputs provided by the different actors is centrally considered in the ultimate security decision-making remains questionable, and constitutes a valid research topic, although one beyond the scope of this thesis.*

The second major deficit emerging from the prevailing apolitical stance of SSR relates to a deficient level of political analysis concerning the levels of commitment of the ruling elites in implementing SSR, and therefore negatively affecting donors' political risk management. Published research argues that the willingness of the implementing countries is oftentimes taken for granted (Cooper and Pugh 2002: 11-12, Sedra, 2010), when there are usually both plausible and vested reasons for them to resist SSR. Amongst these reasons is the perception by ruling elites that SSR is an avenue for external meddling in internal state affairs, which usually implies efforts to emasculate the security forces and to cut security expenditures (Hendrickson 2004: 7). The discussion on security expenditures has shifted from defence budget cuts towards

alignment of budgeting priorities and longer-term planning cycles (Omitoogun and Hutchful, 2006). Despite this change in the discourse which now anchors security expenditure reviews (ISSAT, 2012, WB, 2012, WB, 2013), implementation has yet to show progress beyond models of conditionality, since this pre-empts serious engagement towards sustainability. This trend has led to downplaying of legitimate security needs of the implementing countries, which are left unprepared to deal with incoming threats and upon crisis, recurrently engage in security off-budget expenditure. In the bigger picture, even when there is agreement on the need for SSR, the values, principles, priorities and methodologies are not always consensual, leading to a disjuncture between donor SSR policies and the demand-driven needs of developing countries (Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, Ball, 2010).

Reasons for a non-committal attitude from the ruling elite of the implementing country also tend to relate to carrying out reforms that allow them control in terms of the pace of change. Genuine SSR implementation disrupts the status quo, entailing not only far-ranging institutional consequences, but also internal political upheavals with power distribution consequences (Luckham and Kirk 2012: 11).

From an institutional perspective, implementing countries face the challenge of managing power quests that appear in the guise of inter-institutional rivalry,

and which further the lack of coordination of the institutions and actors involved in security and justice delivery (Peake et al 2006: 251).

From an internal politics viewpoint the test concerns, on the one hand, the maintenance of power through competitive elections and people's perceptions of the SSR programme, in terms of outcomes related to safety and public security, as well as justice service delivery. On the other hand, more acute challenges arise through the pursuance of undemocratic and manipulative strategies pertaining to regime survival, such as those of politicisation, ethnicisation and instrumentalisation of security forces (Bryden et al 2008: 327). Examples of nefarious regime security dynamics include Mauritania, Nigeria, Guinea, Niger, Togo and Liberia. These countries have all witnessed coups d'état and the deliberate manipulation of ethnic, regional, or political interests by presidents and their inner circles, in order to take and maintain control of the state's security apparatus. *The failure of SSR to consider these political aspects has been worsened by lack of analysis of the implementing country's polity, including its democratisation process, and the internal power dynamics of the major political party actors, which significantly determine the choice of leadership and its governing strategies.*

The lack of informed assessment of political aspects often leads to situations where following engagement in SSR programmes, and upon facing difficulties in progressing in areas of democratic governance (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008:

18, Brzoska 2009: 7, Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 9), donors revert to more traditional areas of assistance such as those of train and equip (Sedra, 2010).

The flaws to factor-in the history of state formation, the role of non-state actors, the nature of the commitment of ruling elites to the SSR agenda, the formal and informal power configurations, the political dynamics in transition periods, and the internal dynamics of crucial political parties of the implementing countries, have been central to the disruption of SSR programmes, and the poor consideration they devote to local ownership and sustainability during implementation. This failure to grasp complex internal political dynamics and to carry out iterative adaptation according to major contextual changes in the making clearly demonstrates the limits of the mainstream SSR approach adopted in the last decade. However, SSR has not remained static, and therefore it is relevant to review what has been learned and what the limitations have been in the process.

The (un)learning curve

Cumulative learning processes have occurred in the field of SSR insofar as policy and programming is concerned. For instance, conflict-sensitive approaches have been adopted (Andersen, 2011) and concerns for monitoring and evaluation are now awarded greater programming priority (Popovic, 2008, Rynn and Hiscock, 2009). Yet, whilst evidence points to the need for flexible programming that allows for regular adaptation to changing conditions (Ball,

2014), this is not predominant in practice and it remains difficult to identify successful examples of comprehensive SSR (Schnabel and Born, 2011). An assessment of the implementation of SSR carried out by the OECD-DAC recognised that learning was slow to translate into organisational behaviour change, and into practice, with donors' lack of coherent SSR strategies hindering progress (OECD-DAC 2007: 13-14). This explains the burgeoning of knowledge development to support security and justice implementation in terms of country case studies, but also of specific thematic areas such as that of customary justice in the last decade (for e.g. Harper, 2011, Keane and Downes, 2012).

Liberal peacebuilding critics also acknowledge the incorporation of earlier critique and improvements in development aid frameworks and peacebuilding deriving from the growing accumulation of policy-based evidence (Chandler, 2009, Paris and Sisk, 2009, Cramer and Goodhand, 2011). This has been reflected, for instance, in the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) (WB, 2011) and with the emergence of the New Deal.[18] Nonetheless, despite UN calls for delivery of peacebuilding in accordance with the conditions and needs of implementing countries (UNSG, 11/06/2009), it is observable that this has

[18] The 2011 WDR uses the concept of citizen security moving away from state-centric security, and recognises that building institutions is a long-term process, which does not necessarily conform to Western models. It stresses lessons learned in terms of conflict prevention and resolution (WB, 2011). The New Deal is a framework designed to aid countries to move from fragility to sustainable development. It was signed in 2011 in Busan at a meeting on aid effectiveness between the G7 and donor countries. There is emphasis on the implementing country's own ownership of reforms, as well as a commitment by donors to be accountable as well. Legitimate politics, security and justice are three main components of the framework alongside economic foundations and revenue and services (http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/).

not taken root (Andersen, 2011). A compelling explanation is offered for this lack of translation of learning into practice through the argument that significant contradiction and competing goals prevail amongst distinct aid policies (Chandler, 2009). The tensions surrounding structural adjustment policies (SAP) and subsequent poverty reduction strategies (PRSP), and post-war reconstruction plans are illustrative, with the first prevailing over the latter given that it served the purpose of expanding global capitalism (Barayani 2008: 23). In the SSR camp a notorious example is the clashing of direction of SSR and Counter-Terrorism (CT) assistance, demonstrating the pressure between enhancing democratic governance, whilst providing needed train and equip assistance.[19] Yet, what appear to be common when distinct policies are at odds is that those that prevail tend to mirror donors' own interests, such as the provision of more traditional security assistance programmes which tend to favour militarised responses (Sedra, 2010, Sherman, 2010, Schnabel and Born, 2011). This appears to be a cyclical matter and suggests the resurgence of old practices criticised in the early days of SSR. At the time the criticism concerned the fact that if 'train and equip' prevailed in SSR programmes, then these would resemble mere re-labelling of pre-existing international security cooperation programmes (Chalmers, 2000, Chanaa, 2002, Ball 2004: 2, Wulf 2004: 23). Currently, the blurring of boundaries

[19] OECD-DAC policies prescribe that security assistance measures to improve developing countries' capacity to prevent terrorism should be in accordance with democratic rule of law, and in observance of the principles of accountability and respect for human rights (OECD-DAC 2003: 16, OECD-DAC 2004: 28). This has not been observed in practice and CT assistance in the context of the 'War on Terror' hinders the implementation of SSR governance components (Wulf 2004: 24, Willet 2005: 569,586, Keenan 2006: 271, Ball and Hendrickson 2006: 19-23), as demonstrated by the example of Somalia (Menkhaus 2009: 231, Bah 2009: 506, Bryden and Brickhill 2010: 260).

between these two agendas questions who the beneficiaries of SSR are, as well as the legitimacy of this global policy given that it ends up being politically compromised.

Liberal peace critics engaged in a debate showcasing two different viewpoints about these tensions. On the one hand are those who interpreted the contradictions as being a by-product of the lack of a political project driving foreign policy, resulting in short-term interventions which are a function of an evasion of responsibility and accountability by the main donors (Pupavac 2006: 265, Chandler 2008: 427, 2009). Along these lines SSR programmes have been accused of adopting short timelines rather than long-term strategies (Hutchful and Fayemi 2005: 80), and they have lacked follow up upon the exit of peace support operations (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005: 9).

On the other hand are those arguing that the rationale lies beyond an a-strategic stance; it is rather connected to the higher hierarchy interest of Western donors in maintaining a global hegemony of their system of values, protect their security, and advance global capitalism (Cramer, 2006, Reid-Henry, 2011, Pugh et al, 2011, Duffield, 2001, 2010). Alongside this direction of research SSR analysis has been dedicated, for instance, to questioning the apparent neutrality of the agenda (Chuter, 2004 unpublished), to unpacking it as an ideological construct of the liberal peace (Jackson, 2010) and to examining the nature of SSR as a soft power tool (Krause 2011: 20-39).

These lenses have been particularly useful in unveiling the deeper level of constraints facing SSR given the agency of global players in setting and implementing the agenda, and in explaining why tokenism prevails in SSR programming, preventing meaningful engagement with issues of ownership and sustainability.

The difficulties surrounding the processes of learning and the real possibilities of improving the SSR agenda and its implementation have been exposed by the above arguments. In the main, improvement seems to be compromised whenever higher order security and economic interests of powerful actors are at play, showing that SSR is subordinated to their hegemonic quests. Nonetheless, this rationale is valid from a donor centred analytical point of view; a political economy of aid perspective, focusing on the interactions between donors and the implementing countries provides a more complex picture, further unpacking the delusion of the apolitical nature of SSR.

2.2.2 SSR and the International Political Economy of Aid

The perception of hegemony of liberal peacebuilding leads to a powerful image of an organised intervention, when in fact the outcome reveals serious contestations from those that are subjected to it (Selby, 2013). The standardised packages applied - of which SSR is part - are met with backlashes that stem from the level and depth of social engineering involved in the expansion of the liberal model, and from the degree of divergence with

the values and organising frameworks of the society at stake (Cooper and Pugh, 2002, Egnell and Haldén, 2009, Hills, 2010). Certain liberal peacebuilding critics argue that in most cases, hegemony is far from encompassing since Western policy prescriptions and expectations are not fully incorporated into the polity and modus operandi of implementing countries. This is because they interface with local perceptions and interpretations of the practice of peacebuilding and impact on it (Taylor, 2007, Tadjbakhsh, 2011).

Reactions from implementing countries come not only from the elites, but also from everyday manifestations of social life although resistance may manifest itself in more subtle ways, including within non-state and customary level dynamics (Baker,2009, Schmeidl and Karokhail, 2009; Richmond, 2009, 2011).

However, when elite interests clash with liberal peacebuilding prescriptions different outcomes emerge more visibly in the form of resistance, adaptation and even obstruction (MacGinty, 2010, Luckham and Kirk, 2012). The strength of these reactions is also connected to the effectiveness of the structure of incentives provided by liberal peacebuilding (peace, stability, foreign investment, capital accumulation through privatisation, democratic institutions, etc), and whether the promised peace dividend materialises in a predominantly inclusive or exclusionary manner. Neo-patrimonial dynamics tend to gain prominence in contexts where power redistribution is at play, with

high levels of competitiveness included in the equation. Dynamics of co-option of powerful elites by donors, as well as of prominent societal groups by national elites come into play shaping outcomes in fluid and unpredictable manners (MacGinty, 2008). The reactions are juxtaposed to the expansion of liberal values and modes of governance more widely, and not confined to post-conflict situations as shown by the example of Zimbabwe. In this case resistance was extreme, and SSR was publicly vilified by the ruling elite as being an external regime change tool, and therefore 'intrumentalised' and 'politicised' during the 2008 electoral campaign, and continuously during the tenure of the Government of National Unity (NewsDay, 14/08/2013).

The outcome of these interfaces has generated a scholarly line of work around the notion of 'hybridity', which has been useful to explain liberal peacebuilding not as a fully imposed and implemented model, but rather as a negotiated and mediated reality, reflecting local agency at play (Richmond, 2014). The utility of this model further resides in capturing the fluidity of social interactions and mutual accommodation allowing for more flexible approaches at the level of programming. In SSR for example, *adopting these lenses as iterative context and conflict analysis would be useful, as it would potentially allow for more flexible programming. It would support moving from institutional and sector to thematic and issue approaches, but also incorporating a diversity of actors and planning for conscious actions upon evolving interactions.* Nonetheless, certain authors guard against the temptation of using the hybridisation

analytical framework as a tool to develop new prescription and societal management formulae and intervention, thus up scaling social engineering and control attempts. In this sense the danger is that even if external intervention is calibrated to operate in more subtle and negotiated ways, unexpected outcomes will still persist (Millar, 2014). *For SSR the unpredictability further highlights the level of risk faced by actors involved in the enterprise, whether this concerns donors, implementing countries' elites, CSOs or communities, insofar as the level of possible violent responses. This is why it is important that any such process be owned and led by nationals in an inclusive and synergetic process that will sustain itself due to the actors' genuine interests. Nevertheless, one of the shortcomings of the hybrid political orders approach is that it describes the outcomes with an implicit assumption of 'interactive empowerment', with little said about the ethical and equitative merits of the solutions found, and about their potential emancipation blockages. Ultimately, however, HPO encapsulates a more fine-tuned approach to capture the nuanced interactions and outcomes, leading to a more pragmatic assessment of what can be achieved through SSR.*

2.2.3 SSR and Liberal Peacebuilding Critique - Progress and Limits

The liberal peacebuilding critique engaged above was useful to shed light on the consequences of the emergence and development of the SSR agenda within the security-development nexus mainstream in the post-Cold War period. It succeeded in demonstrating how the roots of the SSR discourse

within the development field led to a superficial engagement with political factors and implications that surround and derive from security and justice reforms. It further enabled understanding about how the withering away of politics and political factors resulted in the neglect of the central components of ownership and sustainability in implementation.

The analysis of SSR that emerged from engagement with the liberal peacebuilding scholarship has added value by providing an explanation about the difficulties to learn from SSR experience, given the subsuming of this agenda to other competing policies, to the strategic security and development interests of powerful international actors, and to the unpredictability of the results of interactions between international, national and local actors during implementation. In addition it has debunked the myth of the hegemony of the liberal peacebuilding model, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of negotiated realities where local agency plays a significant role in shaping outcomes. The use of this analytical approach has been useful to attain a more realistic assessment of what can be achieved through SSR, to highlight the need to plan for conscious actions upon evolving interactions, and to accommodate more flexible and iterative approaches to programming.

Importantly, the liberal peacebuilding critique shed light on the reasons behind discrepancies between discourse, policy and implementation of SSR, and the similar disjuncture between the levels of political commitment, strategic

conceptualisation, programming and implementation. It demonstrated the need to interrogate the quest for coherence and sequencing as a standard formula, given the level of unpredictability characteristic of SSR and its sensitivity to multiple factors, pressure and tensions. However, the analysis of SSR against the background of the liberal peacebuilding critique lends itself to a degree of relativism that may suggest powerlessness, and therefore the adoption of a hands-off approach. This is dangerous because it fails to recognise that not adopting a position implies taking a stance that implicitly reinforces the status quo in favour of the powerful groups in society. In addition, such stance fails to engage with the need to understand the organic and interactive makings of institutions, and the openings where positive change can occur and become sustainable. For that reason this thesis complements the preceding analysis drawing on a concept similar to that of hybridisation, namely *institutional bricolage.*

2.3 Complementing the liberal peace critique: critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage as analytical tools

Institutional bricolage, drawn from sociological institutionalism, is used in conjunction with the concepts of *path dependence* and *critical juncture*s, deriving from historical institutionalism, to complement the theoretical framework of this thesis, based on the above examination of SSR in light of the liberal peacebuilding critique. Under the wider field of New Institutionalism (March and Olsen 1984, 1989), historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism were the chosen combined approaches given their suitability to

address the central goal of understanding patterns of sequencing in Mozambique's case study of security reforms.

2.3.1 Historical Institutionalism, Path Dependence and Critical Junctures

Prominent scholars have underscored the importance of sequencing as an explanatory factor by stating that *'When things happen within a sequence it affects how they happen'* (Tilly 1984: 14). Hence, it is relevant to further explore how the timing and order (Pierson 2004: 54, Campbell 2004: 41) in which security reforms took place partially shaped their outcomes. Sequencing has been widely studied by rational choice scholars. Game theorists, in particular, have built theoretical arguments about the consequential nature of the temporal order of choices (Pierson 2004: 59). However, their explanations apply to limited and abstract kinds of sequences, occurring in restricted scenarios, where utility maximising rational individuals choose within '*rules of the game that provide equilibrium "solutions" to collective action dilemmas'* (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 706). This theory is comparable to neo-realist IR theory and has influenced thinking on peacebuilding, including that from other IR schools, by reinforcing the perception that it is possible to extract formulas that can be generalised.

These approaches are inadequate for studying the sequencing of security reforms in post-war Mozambique as the linearity assumed does not conform to the complexity of the context and the multiplicity of actors and institutional interactions, which are not limited to one clear set of 'rules of the game'.

Moreover, the differing and competing values and interests of internal and external actors and institutions shape their decisions and subsequently impact the dynamics enabling and constraining security reforms. Similarly, in Mozambique, as in most post-war environments, institution building cannot be dissociated from liberalisation because the former needed to take a particular shape to become the optimal vehicle for implementation of the latter. Indeed liberalisation was the main goal and institution building a mere instrument, as illustrated later in chapter V.

In view of the limitations of rational theories, historical institutionalism was selected as a more suitable analytical approach to study sequencing. Historical institutionalism focuses on the historical development of institutions looking at how their formal and informal attributes affect the outcomes produced. It postulates that the logic of *path dependence* prevails, *i.e*., that later occurrences are determined by earlier events and decisions, following a similar sequencing pattern. Yet, it also recognises that this path is not inevitable and that *critical junctures* may occur, implying that crisis may prompt rapid change and a different course of action to that predicted. The following explanation helps to clarify why the theory is relevant to the study of Mozambique's security reforms:

> *Historical institutionalists… probe uneasy balances of power and resources, and see institutions as the developing products of struggle among unequal actors… typically at meso or macrolevel analysis that examines multiple institutions in interaction, operating in, and influenced by broader contexts. They pay close attention to ways in which multiple institutional realms and processes intersect with one another, often*

> *creating unintended openings for actors who trigger changes… Analyses tend to highlight and explore causes operating at the interorganisational or interinstitutional level* (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 706-707).

The above definition shows that historical institutionalism reinforces the importance of actors' interaction and of power relations, offering as well a new contribution by establishing the relevance of *inter-institutional* dimensions and of the *sequencing* element. Historical institutionalism is the best option for analysis in the context of Mozambique because it examines sequencing from a diachronic point of view, paying attention to a longer time span (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 698). This historical view is necessary in order to gain a suitable understanding of Mozambique's security reform processes over a period of seventeen years. It also utilises a relational view of timing, i.e., it highlights the occurrence of one specific event relative to another (Pierson 2004: 55), enabling the analysis of the interconnections of major security reform choices and (in)actions.

Within the analytical dimension of timing the concepts of path dependence - pointing at self-reinforcing dynamics - and of critical junctures - underscoring the possibility of change - support the sequencing analysis. Together with the emphasis that historical institutionalism places on processes that structure and reshape states, politics and public policymaking (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 693-695), these concepts are useful to examine, for example, Mozambique's General Peace Agreement as a critical juncture that conditioned the subsequent path of security reforms. Critical junctures are important because

they challenge the pattern set by path-dependence, and emphasize the potential for change (Pierson 2004: 69). In the case of Mozambique this is illustrated by the fact that although police reforms were poorly factored in the GPA, they subsequently became a priority.

Despite recognising the importance of critical junctures the reinforcing nature of path dependence outcomes in longer-term contextual and historical analysis prevails in historical institutionalism. It is commonly highlighted that '*institutions have shown considerable robustness even when facing radical social, economic, technical and cultural change'* (March and Olsen 2006: 11).

This resistance to change seems to manifest itself especially when relevant security stakeholders understand change as being predominantly imported from/induced or imposed by external sources. Realising this, global actors promoting SSR began encouraging the local ownership of these processes. Nevertheless, even when national state security actors take SSR on as their own strategic project, and engage in formal political and legal decisions to enact new policies and their respective implementation, they still have to confront embedded institutional cultures. As in cases of reform in other fields of public policy and institutional change security reformers are constrained by the pervasiveness of informal customs, traditions and codes of conduct (North 1990: 6). These render most reform efforts into *ad-hoc* activities based on

technocratic procedures that are usually found wanting in terms of wider stakeholder legitimacy (March ad Olsen 1989: 69, Stryker 1994: 859).

Hence, analysis of longer-term continuities (before and after the critical junctures), first and foremost draw attention to processes of incremental change (North, 1990, Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 21, Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 703, March and Olsen 2006: 12, Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 1-37). In Mozambique, an attentive look allows to understand that justice reforms, for example, had been taking place in the context of the democratisation framework, and even over a longer timeframe beginning, at least, with independence in 1975. These perspectives are central to the study of SSR because, as argued by one prominent scholar, *'continuities are more significant than change per se, and reform as improvement or mitigation is a more realistic goal than the social engineering required to achieve SSR goals and objectives'* (Hills 2010: 189).

The attention to time-frame, the multiple actor focus, and the process-oriented examination allowed by historical institutionalism are critical given that most studies of SSR take place within a restricted time framework, often marked by a peace agreement and its subsequent implementation by state actors. This short-tem approach results in three particular consequences. Firstly, the longer-term drive and the interaction between the state and other relevant security stakeholders that shape the process of security sector reform are

obscured. Secondly, such analyses tend to ignore the fact that the actors who participate in the institutional arrangement/policy design are not necessarily the same who implement it, nor are they those who engage in later policy struggles (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 22). Thirdly, studies become skewed because they either tend to identify a major change in the short-term and conduct analysis uniquely around this event, or they arrive at predominantly sceptical conclusions failing to see the makings of a more gradual pattern of change.

Attention to incrementalism within a process-oriented analysis of SSR reinforces the viewpoint that it is vital to understand the characteristics of the process of change at stake. For example, institutional breakdown is not the sole cause for modifications, as change may also be driven by the need to improve performance. Despite the need for institutional adaptation to the demands of a shifting environment, change might not occur if crucial actors perceive that the potential gains are outweighed by their costs (Powell and Dimmaggio 1991: 4). Similarly, change in the context of security reforms may imply negotiations and trade-offs, as well as the constant threat of regression or reversal (Hills 2010: 179, 189, Luckham and Hutchful 2010: 29). Finally, institutional inertia (Matthews, 1986) can also play a role in slowing implementation. These different dynamics are not unfamiliar to the case of security reforms in Mozambique. Indeed they are incorporated in a

controversial process of change, with inter and intra-institutional conflict, multi-level power struggles, resistance to change and unintended consequences.

2.3.2 Sociological Institutionalism and Institutional Bricolage

Sociological institutionalism complements historical institutionalism in the theoretical framework guiding this case study of Mozambique's security reforms. Sociological institutionalism contributes by paying specific attention to actors' agency in the outcomes resulting from change processes. In this way, it counterbalances the weight of the structural institutional analysis provided by historical institutionalism, favouring a less deterministic analysis.

Sociological institutionalism concentrates on the formation of institutions and the role that actors play, looking at their identity, and at how cultural and historical aspects shape their preferences, rendering their decisions a product of social construction. The main conceptual tool for this work is *institutional bricolage*. Bricolage is a concept that characterises human beings' capacity to adapt and innovate, drawing on the resources at hand (Levi-Strauss 1967: 17). This concept was initially introduced into institutional analysis as referring to the endogenous capacity of an organisation to blend its existing components in innovative ways to produce new outcomes (Douglas 1987: 66). It has subsequently been used by several disciplines and tailored to analyse multiple contexts (Campbell, 2004, di Domenico, Haugh and Tracey, 2010), but the definition used here is that developed by Cleaver (2000, 2001, 2002) when studying water resource management.

According to Cleaver, institutional bricolage represents an ad-hoc, partial, social and historically embedded process rather than a clear-cut managerial activity where individuals pursue maximising solutions (Cleaver 2000: 379). It involves a blend of the formal and informal, the traditional and the modern, into a complex process of construction shaped by individuals acting within the limits of circumstances (Cleaver 2002: 15). These individuals or institutional actors have multiple and complex social and cultural identities that produce contending motivations for the use of resources at hand, a fact which influences their decision-making in the face of changing circumstances (Cleaver 2002: 15). These actors engage in bricolage, i.e. using old institutional values, existing philosophies and instruments, and combining them with new elements that they adapt (Cleaver 2002: 16,17), transforming change into more organic, legitimate and effective innovations.

This concept is useful for the study of SSR in Mozambique as it contextualises prevailing practices alongside new developments, and provides pointers for analysing piece-meal approaches and improvisation in security reform. The notion draws attention to the agency of multiple interacting external and internal institutional actors, allowing the author to investigate a wide range of situations where institutional arrangements are decided and produced (Cleaver 2002: 19). It also presents an analytical advantage because it underscores local actors' methods of withstanding pressured change, such as through 'political bricolage', including dynamics of negotiation and coping

strategies through cooperation, resistance, and accommodation. This is remarkably useful for scrutinising the resilience of Mozambique's security sector institutions and stakeholders when faced with reforms that were mainly induced under the neo-liberal triple transition.

Institutional bricolage contributes in two ways to this research. On the one hand, it is used to characterise the end-result of the institutional security reform processes. On the other hand, it is understood as a deliberate method utilised both by agents carrying out institutional security reforms and by the beneficiaries of those processes. Using the concept to underscore the end-result of security reforms is justified because, despite the intentional nature of external and internal actors involved in the processes of institutional decision-making, policy-making, programme design and implementation, outcomes almost never resemble the original goals. The process is affected by contingent factors, by other stakeholders' attitudes, and occasionally even by accidental developments (Goodin 1996: 25). As spelt out above, SSR, with its conceptual variety pointing towards different reform rationales and entry-points, is susceptible to bricolage, leading to outcomes that were not envisaged at the outset. Given the malleability of the SSR agenda, elites with the political and economic leverage to engage in these programmes tailor them according to their interests and preferences in light of the context they face. Yet, beyond this intentionality, the SSR process is usually conflict-ridden. This happens because, even when the aim is clear and shared by all

intervening actors, the views about how to reach the goals typically collide, spoilers hinder the process, and both the political nature and technical components of the process carry a number of unforeseen risks.

The use of the concept of bricolage as a method is particularly useful for understanding how influential actors utilise existing arrangements, blending them with novel elements and directions to obtain new institutional configurations through the reform process. This is helpful for explaining more gradual change since institutional building is rarely 'design *de novo*', but is rather a process through which social engineers work with materials inherited and shaped by the past (Goodin 1996: 30). They recombine them with new inputs and craft, via an innovative process of bricolage, contemporary institutions that differ from, but also resemble, previous ones (Douglas 1987: 66-68, Campbell 2004: 70). The application of this concept to SSR is valuable because it reinforces the potential to elucidate the implementation of policy and institutional security reforms in the short-to-longer term continuum. More importantly, in the case of Mozambique, it fosters a nuanced insight into the use of bricolage by national political decision-makers and top security personnel as a method to manage and control the pace and depth of change. A certain degree of continuity with existing models and practices dating from the liberation war has helped Mozambican elites avoid the perception that post-civil war institutional reform represented a complete rupture with the past, thus nurturing staff engagement whilst minimising the effect of spoilers.

Two aspects of bricolage are of interest to this analysis: substantive bricolage and symbolic bricolage. The first comprises the recombination of pre-existing institutional principles and practices to address problems according to the idea of *instrumentality* (Campbell 2004: 69). The second focuses on the notion of *appropriateness*, which is important insofar as the solutions that actors devise must be acceptable and legitimate within the broad social environment. Hence, for new institutions to survive, they must combine existing cultural symbols consistent with the dominant normative and cognitive principles, and make use of corresponding symbolic language and rhetorical devices (Campbell 2004: 70). Mozambique's case study, drawing on the voluminous data gathered identifies the new and historical elements that have been combined through bricolage. An example concerns arrangements of security and justice provision at the community level in the post-civil war (Chapter VII), which in certain cases operate in ways that resemble mechanisms of social and political control during the post-independence period (Chapter IV).

Finally, another benefit of the use of the concept of institutional bricolage is its contribution to analysing relations of power. It is of utmost importance to recognise the differences in the power held by different actors because the institutions and SSR processes generated through bricolage are not necessarily the result of disinterested efforts. In fact, they may actually end-up reinforcing and perpetuating patterns of exclusion (Cleaver 2002: 20). This has a bearing on what actors are allowed to contribute, to decide, and to

benefit from SSR programme outputs and outcomes. Those who feel excluded from direct participation may well find indirect and unconventional ways of impacting, and even re-shaping the outcomes of SSR, whether or not that thwarts the reform process. The use of institutional bricolage in Mozambique's case study permitted an examination of the role that non-state actors such as traditional leaders, community policing groups and communities themselves play in the provision of everyday security, and how that can be connected/disconnected from nationally designed institutional reforms. Ultimately, it offered a reality check on the configuration of power relations. These can be far from straightforward in areas where the state has little implantation, and where state agents have to conform to the (oftentimes undemocratic) traditional values of the community at stake and its leader, at the risk of retaliation.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the contributions of IR theory in explaining SSR. Through this analysis the supposed neutrality of SSR was unveiled and its vulnerability to hegemonic quests of powerful actors exposed. Subsequently, SSR policy development, implementation and learning processes were examined in the context of the liberal peacebuilding critique, which underlined the limitations of the transformative power of this agenda given its roots in the liberal peace paradigm. The apolitical stance of SSR was questioned in view of the power relations' intricacies that cut to the core of this agenda and the

shortcomings that derive from this posture were analysed. The complexity of the interactions between donors and implementing countries was examined demonstrating that the liberal peace order suffers from fundamental contestations that prevent it from acquiring a full hegemonic status. These contestations and the dynamics of accommodation and resistance were shown to be at the centre of the difficulties to learn given their entailing of unexpected interactions and outcomes. As such, the importance of strategy, and the ways to understand coherence and sequencing require innovative approaches beyond the traditional institutional structuralism. This, therefore, warrants that the SSR analysis in light of the critique of liberal peacebuilding be complemented by a theoretical framework based on a combination of historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. This is done drawing respectively on the concepts of critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage to analyse the coherence and sequencing of security reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in Mozambique. The combined theoretical framework enables the interplay between deductive and inductive analyses, drawing extensively on the voluminous data gathered from field research in Mozambique. Furthermore, it allows for institutional security reforms to be examined in the short-to-longer term, creating scope for analysing multiple actors' interaction and inherent power relations. Importantly, this theoretical framework focuses attention on the methods utilised by domestic actors to withstand externally pressured adjustment, including coping strategies through cooperation, resistance, and

accommodation, in attempts to manage and control the pace, shape and depth of change.

CHAPTER THREE

Mozambique's post-independence political economy and the roots of the Civil War

'Can one see the track of a boat on the river?
After a while all traces are wiped out'
Bambara Proverb

3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the case study about coherence and sequencing of security reforms in Mozambique and its place in the wider transitional and peacebuilding processes. It also sets the assessesment of Mozambique's post-civil war security and justice institutions (1992-2009) - the central concern of this research - within a historical state-building framework, by looking at the political economy that prevailed in the post-independence period and which contributed to the outbreak of the civil war.

Mozambique's post-independence period has been the subject of significant exploration and many contending views about the causes of the civil war. Whilst this chapter does not intend to replicate those discussions, it is important to underscore that they focused mostly on explaining the origins of the war as based either on external motives, i.e., the regional destabilisation war launched by neighbour countries against Mozambique's, or on internal factors such as the political options adopted by Frelimo's ruling elite.[20] This

[20] For instance, the sizeable literature on the nature and dynamics of the civil war has come to contradictory conclusions regarding the origins of the conflict with some writers emphasising external factors (Munslow, 1983, Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, Fauvet, 1984, Saul, 1985, Johnson and Martin, 1986, Hanlon, 1986, Cawthra, 1986, Minter, 1989, Vines, 1991, O'Laughlin, 1992, Saul 1993, Minter,

chapter reinforces the literature that overcame monocausal explanations[21] by presenting an analytical perspective that juxtaposes internal, regional and international elements, as well as the political and economic trajectory of the independent country as inseparable factors at the root of the civil war.

Africa's history is populated by states where the immediate post-independence period was characterised by ruling through rentierism and ethnicisation of politics leading to a subjection of the security sector to manipulation for private gains and protection of particular elites. Mozambique followed a different trajectory, where the ruling elite's reactive stance to regional developments and policy choices created fundamental grievances that fostered instability. Elements of ethnicity and elite corruption played a minor part in the conflict, and the country truly represented an exception to the neo-patrimonial paradigm that swept the post-independence continent. This generated high hope for the country, but it did not prevent the occurrence and the consequences of the civil war. Towards its end the ethical economic stance of Frelimo's ruling in the immediate post-independence period was unfortunately lost. Economic and political liberalisation was introduced and the exploitation of natural resources through skewed governance and *'democratisation of corruption'* accompanied the process (4.1.3.5-18/05/05). In the long run Mozambique's elites have not learned from the history of most other African

1994) and others pointing to domestic features (Hoile, 1989, 1994, Cline, 1989, Cahen, 1987, Clarence-Smith, 1989, Geffray, 1990, Wilson, 1992, Bowen, 2000, Cabrita, 2000, Lubkemann, 2005, Dinerman, 2006).

[21] Contributions to overcoming monocausal approaches included, for example, Henriksen, 1978, Vail and White, 1981, Hanlon, 1984, Egerö, 1987, Young, 1990, Coelho, 1992, Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994.

states, where the 'politics of the belly' (Bayart, 1993) and systems of patronage have led to grievances and armed conflict. The country is currently on the path of fierce politics, with reinforcement of old, and the breeding of new grievances likely to produce violent conflict, albeit of a different nature from that of the civil war. These developments are analysed in chapter V, which focuses on the sequencing of the country's triple transition at the macro-level.

This chapter considers the political history and political economy of the country in the aftermath of independence in 1975, which represented a unique type of rupture with the former colonial regime. The main exception to FRELIMO's stated break with the colonial system was the adoption of Portuguese as the official national language, given that it represented a core unifying factor of Mozambique's nation and state-building project within a diversified ethno-linguistic population.

3.2 Frelimo's state-building project and post-independence armed conflict

3.2.1 Transitioning into a Fragile Independence

After more than a decade of a liberation war against the fascist Portuguese colonial regime, Mozambique declared its independence on 25 June 1975. A period of nine months of transitional government rule preceded independence, in accordance with the provisions set by the Lusaka Accords signed on 7 September 1974 by the Portuguese state and FRELIMO.

This period was marked by tension and uncertainty, with secrecy surrounding the negotiations and the contents of the Lusaka Accords. There were security challenges as well, posed by those that opposed either independence or the terms on which independence was enacted. Hence, an additional cease-fire agreement set out measures to cope with some of the expected challenges.

Although the agreement specified a timeline for the gradual withdrawal of the Portuguese armed forces, it also stipulated that both military forces needed to collaborate in interventions to re-establish internal order during transition (Cease-Fire Agreement, 1974, Arts 4, 6). This provision conferred the joint military commission with the operational means to resolve extreme cases of insurrection, as both parties agreed to jointly detect and neutralise reactionary and subversive actions. All militias (including those of private groups) and other similar organisations, as well as the members of the Portuguese military Special Forces, including the *Comandos,* were to disarm immediately (Cease-Fire Agreement 1974, Arts 9,13,14). Particular attention was to be paid to potential disruptive activity by the former affiliates of the Portuguese repressive political police called *Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE, later PIDE-DGS) (Cease-Fire Agreement, 1974, Art 10).

However, in practice, the fulfilment of these goals fell short of the desired outcome. Armed uprisings and acts of sabotage were regularly carried out by former PIDE elements, extremist Portuguese settlers and by previous

members of military units (Jardim, 1976, Newitt 1995: 539-540, Veloso 2006: 105). In addition, propaganda was widely used by these groups to spread the belief that FRELIMO would be unforgiving towards white populations in general, and not merely towards colonial state officials (Pitcher 2002: 39-40).

FRELIMO worsened the situation with strong anti-colonial and anti-capitalist speeches, accompanied by the arrests of sabotage suspects, and of landowners and civil servants accused of wrongdoing by common citizens (Pitcher 2002: 39-40, 4.5.1.5-17/05/05). Such arrests were based on often-unsubstantiated accusations, given the lack of investigative capacity during the rule of the joint transitional government (Veloso 2006: 100).

The signed agreements also foresaw the need to defend Mozambique's integrity against external aggression, and measures to stop Portuguese and Mozambican nationals from becoming involved in military collaboration with the Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia were agreed to be necessary (Cease-Fire Agreement 1974, Arts 6,11). Nonetheless, similar to the case of curbing internal armed uprisings, implementation proved difficult.

3.2.2 Ethnicity and Corruption: Begging to Differ from the Rest

The previous section showed that the background against which FRELIMO implemented its nation and state-building project was one marked by a generalised feeling of insecurity concerning the future of the independent country. This fragility was shadowed by the contested process around the

emergence of FRELIMO, which at the beginning encompassed a series of different groups with a plurality of political and ideological views. Internal dissent to mainstream socialist views was resolved through violent party purging leading to the consolidation of one of the factions at the head of the Front.[22] An example of such process is the controversy surrounding the disappearance of former leaders such as Uria Simango, Joana Simeão, and Lazaro Nkavandame, who are thought to have been killed extrajudicially. Part of the accusation against them relied on what was perceived as their liberal and capitalist orientation, with this schism bringing great damage to the party. Questions around ethnicity complicated matters, with widespread perception that southerners, mainly from the *Shangane* ethnic group, controlled Frelimo. This perception developed from a prevailing historical presence of southerners in Frelimo's top leadership and was reinforced by the fact that the nationalist group leaders named above and killed belonged to ethnic groups from other regions. Frelimo has addressed the issue by maintaining over time a balanced regional representation in the party, especially regarding state and government appointments. Whilst this has been crucial in the management of national politics and internal party power balance it does not always work in favour of efficiency.

[22] FRELIMO's Central Committee Report to the Third Congress provides insight about the internal contradictions between the groups in FRELIMO. Several authors have also addressed the issue (e.g. Munslow, 1983, Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, de Bragança and Depelchin 1986: 29-52, Ncomo, 2003, Cabaço 2010: 282-84, Igreja, 2010: 781-799, Vieira, 2010).

After independence, the dominant group transformed into a single party (Frelimo) and became the incumbent ruler of the country (Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 1975, Art 3), adopting socialism and the creation of an egalitarian society as the driving ideology behind its nation and state-building project.

This ideological choice driving the build-up of an egalitarian society created a highly disciplined, politically committed and responsible leadership united around the goal of achieving socialism (Newitt 1995: 544, 546). Standing-out against the tendency of the era, Frelimo's elite rejected the individual enrichment and corruption that were widespread in many newly independent African countries (Hanlon 1991: 15, Newitt 1995: 545, MacQueen 1997: 236-237, Saul 2011: 93). The following quote extracted from the inauguration speech of the Transitional Government is illustrative:

> *"Material, moral and ideological corruption, bribery, seeking comforts, string pulling, nepotism, that is favours based on friendship, and especially giving preferential employment to relatives, friends or people's from one's region, all this is characteristics of the system we are destroying. Tribalism, regionalism, racism and unprincipled alliances are serious onslaughts on our political line and divide the masses. Because Power belongs to the People those who exercise it are servants of the People." (*Transitional Government Inauguration Speech 1975: 7)

Compared with West Africa where cronyism was rampant, in Mozambique the quoted orientation was generally followed, and campaigns against corruption, especially targeting public officials and security forces were strong throughout president Samora's rule and not just at independence. This non-corrupt and

highly moralised stance boosted Frelimo's post-independence legitimacy and the aim of constructing a Webberian state, able to deliver welfare and security to the Mozambican people, based on the principles of equality and freedom from oppressive colonial structures. Yet, the combined effects of the centralised economic policies adopted and of the war led to inflation, and with it the spread of *societal corruption* in the guise of illicit trade and black market practices (The Times 21/12/81, Makwala 1983: 46) which were sternly combated by the state's judicial apparatus as analysed in Chapter IV. In general however, the modesty and austerity abided by the ruling elite and the economic model adopted postponed capital accumulation.

In hindsight, it can be observed that this stance resulted in two paradoxical tendencies. The first was the growth of corruption in the emergency food distribution services, and in the armed forces, accused of theft of livestock from the populations towards the end of the war (Herald 5/2/92). Adding to the loss of operational capacity, the credibility of the FPLM-FAM was also tainted by suspicions of widespread corruption by high-ranking military, which eroded the forces' logistical capacity (Saul 1991: 108, Notícias 25/01/92, Human Rights Watch 1992: 57, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 27), and who became stakeholders in the continuity of the war. The second was that parts of the ruling elite became actively engaged in the resolution of the conflict, as they were eager for the country to become part of a lucrative global economy as further analysed in Chapter V.

3.2.3 Ideology and the Quest for National Identity

Frelimo's post-independence goal of creating an efficient administrative bureaucracy anchored in explicit development and security strategies included a strong ideological and identity element. Measures intended to boost the sense of belonging to a Mozambican nationality were launched. These comprised the ideals to eradicate divisions on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion, class and sex, and to attain women's emancipation and the provision of universal education and healthcare (Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 1975, Arts 16,17, 26, 31). Indeed, Frelimo achieved significant progress in the latter two areas until the early eighties (Hanlon 1991: 16, Newitt 1995: 549, Minter 1998: 28). Furthermore, the FPLM-FAM - prior to the incidence of corruption in the latter years of the war - also became a symbol of national unity, given the countrywide recruitment, the active fostering of a national culture, and the bonds forged between people from different ethnic groups at its service (Transitional Government Speech 1975: 5, 16, Malache et al 2005: 174).

Yet, in contrast, and despite the rhetoric of inclusion, the nation-building endeavour led, in practice, to the ostracism of many groups including the traditional authorities, small-scale traders and 'well-off' peasants due to the perceived ideological alignment of these groups with colonialism and capitalism which generated exclusion and exploitation (Geffray 1990: 50, Hanlon 1991: 12, 16, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 180, 220, Newitt 1995: 548).

In addition, the modernisation project entailed the implementation of measures that resulted in the prohibition of indigenous cultural and religious practices considered superstitious and backwards, such as polygamy, initiation rites and rain dance ceremonies (Hanlon 1991: 13, 25, Pitcher 2002: 73, Cabaço 2010: 285). There was also hostility towards religious congregations.[23] All this was based on priority being given to the pursuit of scientific progress that ended up impairing the legitimate bonds formed between FRELIMO and part of Mozambique's society (e.g. people living in liberated zones and those with nationalist aspirations living in cities) during the liberation struggle (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 33). [24] It is no coincidence that in learning from its own mistakes, after the end of the civil war the state (still under Frelimo's rule) endeavoured to mend relationships with the religious congregations, and allowed the creation and proliferation of identity and ethnic based associations.

All in all, at the political level, the choice of a single-party model meant there was no way to accommodate dissenting voices in a legal and peaceful

[23] For example, at his inauguration as President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Samora Machel stated that: *'It is in order to respect the freedom of conscious that the state can not be confused or be linked to any religion…Mass mobilisation is a right and duty exclusively conquered by Frelimo through a difficult struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The close association of religious institutions to the machinery of domination and aggression of our people, certainly does not grant them the right to currently claim something they have always fought against'* (Machel, 1975b). Author's own translation.

[24] A renowned Mozambican scholar argued that the relationship between FRELIMO and the rural populations in the liberated zones of the northern province of Cabo Delgado was based on a combination of mobilisation and repression. In addition, the alliance between them was sustained by immediate mutual objectives such as the population's need for military protection and FRELIMO's need to feed its guerrillas, much more than by any common ideological thinking (Adam, 1993).

framework of opposition, which led to an exclusionary pattern in an eminently multicultural and plural society.

3.2.4 Flawed Economic Policies

Notwithstanding Frelimo's unity behind the single party model, its economic policies became a strong point of contention within the leadership (Negrão, 2001, *Africa Confidential* 06/10/78*)*. One line of argument, supported by President Machel, was based around providing pragmatic responses based on socialist inspiration but contextualised in the reality of the country (*Afrique Asie* 17/05/76). This favoured the support for the traditional agricultural activity of the peasants and a fair integration of these practices into the wider national production system, even if concrete policy instruments to implement such a vision were lacking (Negrão, 2001). In contrast, others argued for a more purist and theoretical interpretation of socialist economic models and promoted concrete policies such as the mechanisation of large state farms (Newitt 1995: 543, Negrão, 2001, *Africa Confidential* 06/10/78).

Between 1975 and 1977 a debate ensued regarding the direction to follow and during that phase pragmatism seemed to prevail over ideology concerning economic matters (*Financial Times* 03/11/75, African Development 1976: 1236-37, Pitcher 2002: 38). For example, the initial take over of land and private property by the state and the appointment of state representatives to manage production units was prompted by the massive flight of around 200,000 Portuguese settlers and qualified Mozambicans who left the country

between 1974 and 1975, presenting significant security and economic challenges for the new state-building enterprise (Pitcher 2002: 38, *Financial Times* 03/11/75, *African Development* 1976, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 37).

However, the political outcome of Frelimo's third congress in 1977 consolidated support for an economy based on central planning. Frelimo declared itself a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard party (Frelimo, 1978) and adopted an Indicative Prospective Plan (PPI) that aimed to end underdevelopment within a decade (Castel-Branco 1995: 598). The state centralised investment and controlled the market at the same time that it institutionalised the previously ad-hoc policies of *aldeias comunais* (communal villages)[25] and large state farms, accompanied by the intention to train the work force (Francisco 2003: 157).

The state-farms were intended to replace the big agricultural enterprises previously run by Portuguese settlers and other foreign concessions. Frelimo's added goal was to mechanise agriculture but this proved unsustainable in practice since it required intensive financial investment and a skilled labour force (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 65, Alden 2001: 7, Pitcher 2002: 53). Furthermore, small-scale farmers deliberately disrupted this

[25] The communal villages were a form of concentration of rural population in delimited territory in order to organise production and economic life.

project, which they perceived to be against their interests (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 215).

The communal villages were aimed at setting up a viable administrative structure with adequate territorial coverage. It was thought they would also allow for better service delivery and party control, as well as improved organisation of people for collective and cooperative-oriented production (Pitcher 2002: 86). However, except for those areas where they had been put into practice in the context of the liberated zones, implementation advanced slowly.[26] In addition, support for cooperative-oriented production suffered from lack of investment given its absorption by the state-run farms (Castel-Branco 1995: 599).

At the same time, dissatisfaction prevailed because the communal villages model was not aligned with the needs of family-based agriculture and commerce. Frelimo's measures to subsidise the distribution of seeds and farming instruments failed to meet the requirements and the credit system did not work. The commercial network that customarily absorbed surplus production had collapsed with the flight of the Portuguese and Indians and had

[26] The 4th session of Frelimo's Central Committee (CC) that took place between 7-16 August 1978 analysed matters of discipline, political deviation, corruption and violation of the ideology of the party. The then Minister of Agriculture, Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho was expelled from the CC under disciplinary action because he espoused an 'erroneous' notion of development, which 'obstructed' the advance of socialism. Apparently he had been admonished several times, but maintained his conviction, refusing to implement the priorities defined by the party organs of direction in relation to the Communal Villages. After the third session of the Popular Assembly (12-13 August 1978) he was relieved of the position of Minister of Agriculture (*Tempo* 27/08/78, *25 de Setembro 09-10/1978*).

not been replaced (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 46, 219). To make matters worse, the organisation of rural areas resembled colonial policies of *aldeamentos* ('villagisation')(Coelho, 1993, Newitt 1995: 549).[27] The end result of this flawed rural development strategy was a decline in agricultural production and the creation of food dependency in a formerly self-sufficient countryside.

When these policy failings were officially recognised at Frelimo's fourth congress 26th-30th April 1983, the decision to address them was implemented with severe limitations: civil servants and the managers of the state-led enterprises stalled the process; a drought occurred and the war of destabilisation advanced (Hanlon 1991: 26, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 233). By then, discontent had also grown in rural areas and Mozambique's National Resistance (RENAMO) gained ground by profiting from this vulnerability.

3.2.5 Inherited Economic Vulnerabilities

Further to the points made above, Mozambique inherited a colonial capitalist economy, highly dependent on subsidies from the central government and on regional and global networks of trade and commerce, through which foreign

[27] The policy of *villagisation* was implemented by the colonial regime in order to prevent and/or curb FRELIMO's support by local populations. Implementation started in 1966 and attempted to build political support amongst the populations for the colonial regime, through the delivery of socio-economic services such as health, schooling, technical support for agriculture and the establishment of commercial networks. However, amongst other problems, the administrative structures faced difficulties in the implementation, and the conditions promised were not always in place, oftentimes leading the populations to abandon altogether these delimited areas (Henriksen, 1978, Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, Coelho, 1993).

currency was injected into the economy. Initially Frelimo and the Apartheid regime took a pragmatic stance by maintaining neutrality to safeguard economic relations (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 77). However, subsequently, and in response to Frelimo's hardening of its anti-racist and anti-capitalist political discourse, increased support for Zimbabwe's war of independence, and the rise of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), South Africa (RSA) opted for an economic blockade. It decreased quotas of foreign workers in the gold mines, which together with the fall in gold prices, dramatically cut Mozambique's foreign income (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 77).[28] In addition, the price decrease of Mozambique's primary commodities in international markets, together with successive natural calamities and Renamo's destruction of economic targets, converged to strangle the newly independent country's agricultural production and overall economy (Hanlon 1991: 20-23, Alden 2001: 7).

The lack of access to foreign currency dramatically reduced the nation's ability to import food for internal consumption, which until 1981, had been met by state farm production. The resulting food scarcity fostered an increase in crime, economic speculation and black market activity in urban areas (*Africa*

[28] In April 1978, i.e. before the creation of the SADCC in 1980, the RSA denounced the payment to Mozambique in gold according to fixed prices, which was carried out as a percentage of workers' salary. From then onwards, Mozambique could only receive in gold if it accepted international market rates, representing a huge economic setback. The beginning of Renamo's war led to a tougher stance on the part of neighbouring countries towards the RSA which, together with their increased support for the African National Congress (ANC) and their enforcement of economic sanctions imposed by the international community, led the RSA to expel mine workers from countries such as Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe following independence.

Now 1983: 43-46). This, in turn, led Frelimo to introduce more restrictive security legislation, and to transform the security and justice institutions into punitive and repressive establishments, as discussed in Chapter IV. The outcome was a severe disruption of the nation and state-building project, intensified by the advent of a post-independence armed conflict that lasted sixteen years, and which ended only in 1992.

Frelimo came to power facing enormous challenges from the confluence of difficult national, regional and international conditions. To believe that an entirely different result could have stemmed solely from their governmental performance would be academic naiveté. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assert that its immediate problem-solving responses, coupled with its strong ideological orientation, failed to mitigate the problems it faced, whereas more strategic political consideration might have delivered better results. Whilst these important fault lines represent Frelimo's responsibility in the development of the post-independence armed conflict, its outbreak was undeniably affected by the regional and international context surrounding Mozambique.

3.2.6 In the Epicentre of International and Regional Dynamics: RENAMO's Creation and Survival

At independence and during subsequent years, Mozambique's main donors and advisers came from socialist countries like China, Russia and Cuba. This contributed to the disruption of Frelimo's state-building project and turned

Mozambique into a pawn in the East-West ideological confrontation, despite its affiliation with the Non-Aligned Movement. Frelimo did not officially embrace a Marxist-Leninist ideology until 1977, but by then, a silent regional war of destabilisation and the roots of RENAMO's insurgency had been sown, with the goal of curbing the expansion of communism in Southern Africa.

The regional dynamics were focused around the opposition of the Front Line States (FLS) - Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola, as well as Zimbabwe and Namibia, after independence - to the dominance of the white and racist rule of Rhodesia and South Africa.[29]

Within this context, the newly independent Mozambique, against its own national economic interests, implemented mandatory UN SC sanctions against Rhodesia, and provided support for Zimbabwe's struggle for independence. This was contrary to the predominantly pragmatic responses to domestic problems, and to the logic of maximisation of interests in relation to economic transactions with the RSA. In this case, Frelimo acted according to its espoused principles of internationalism and solidarity, guided by values of appropriateness. Thus, the country adopted varying guidelines in its decision-making processes, choosing courses of action according to different criteria in

[29] The FLS (1976) pre-dated the SADCC (1980) and whilst the former was eminently a political organisation of defence and security in light of the RSA threat, the latter was more directed at building economic independence from South Africa's economic domination, although it never lost sight of its Anti-Apartheid perspective, and of support for the liberation movements.

distinct situations, in an attempt to balance domestic interests with international legitimacy.

In retaliation - and as confirmed by the head of the Rhodesian intelligence services of the time - the regime of Ian Smith, began Mozambique's destabilisation by recruiting and training a 'pseudo-terrorist' unit comprised of a variety of Mozambican dissidents (Flower 1987: 262, 301). This group included members of the former Portuguese counter-insurgency forces and of the colonial secret police, FRELIMO army deserters and escaped prisoners, Rhodesian spies, and individuals that had run away from Frelimo's re-education camps (*To the Point*, 03/06/77, Finnegan 1992: 31, Human Rights Watch 1992: 20, Minter 1998: 42, Flower, 2004).

At its start, in 1976, the group that subsequently became RENAMO mainly destabilised and counteracted activities of the Zimbabwean liberation fighters based in Mozambique. Upon Zimbabwe's independence, RENAMO would likely have surrendered had it not been for the extensive logistical and financial support received from RSA's 'Total Strategy' against the perceived 'Communist Total Onslaught' (Jaster, 1986, Minter, 1994, Stiff, 1999). Despite the RSA's external aggression against another sovereign state, the West did not openly object, allowing the conflict to escalate.

Nevertheless, following the refusal of the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) to accept Mozambique as a full member in 1981,[30] Mozambique realised that a strategy of rapprochement with the West was indispensable, as the country had become increasingly reliant on emergency food aid. Whilst Mozambique enjoyed support from Western partners such as the Nordic European countries and even the UK following independence, appeasement with the US became essential.

This rapprochement created the conditions for a formal political agreement between Mozambique and the RSA in 1984, namely the N'komati agreement, which was supposed to have ended the civil war. However, internal RSA disputes led to its continuing support for RENAMO (Newitt 1995: 568, Minter 1998: 58, Alden 2001: 9).

With the end of the Cold War and the fall of Apartheid, the causes of the conflict as widely perceived at the time, i.e. international confrontation and especially regional destabilisation, should have been resolved and obstacles to peace removed. However, the war showed no signs of abating in Mozambique and RENAMO gained control of considerable parts of the countryside, despite committing atrocities and using violent, forced conscription in its expansion (Hanlon, 1984, Gersony, 1988, Geffray, 1990,

[30] COMECON accepted Mozambique only as an observer given its weak economy, including a low gross national product and reduced export potential. However, in practice political factors appear to have motivated this decision. Mozambique was most likely not perceived as 'enough' Marxist by the Soviet Union. It had adhered to the non-aligned movement, had refused a Russian naval base following independence, and did not take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict (Jinadu 1984: 16-47).

Morgan, 1990, Vines 1991, 1996, Wilson, 1992, Finnegan, 1992, Nilsson, 1993a,b, Minter, 1994, Hall and Young 1997: 169-170). This clearly indicated that it had succeeded in building a support base amongst a relevant share of the population, by capitalising on the vulnerabilities created by the flaws of Frelimo's internal rule.

3.3 Conclusion

Mozambique's immediate post-independence period was filled with expectations of implementation of a modernising state-building project anchored in the construction of an inclusive and fair society, united by the goal of forging a common national identity. Led by an ethically oriented ruling FRELIMO, energised in the revolutionary quest against corruption, and legitimised through the achievement of independence via liberation war, the country nevertheless succumbed to its political economy make-up.

This chapter demonstrated that a number of core explanatory factors beyond ethnicisation of politics and corruption interacted to produce the outcome of the civil war in Mozambique. The absence of rentierism and neo-patrimonial politics that was at the root cause of armed conflict elsewhere in Africa was not enough to withstand a regional destabilisation strategy with links to international dynamics of the proxy wars of the Cold War. Furthermore, in the internal domain a series of policy choices exacerbated the already fragile transition to independence. First was Frelimo's fascination with applying in Mozambique globally prominent theories of economic growth and models of

modernisation, in a bid for overall social engineering that would create a *'progressive'* Mozambican society. This central pillar of Frelimo's state-building project was in line with the mainstream development narrative of the time, anchored in the primacy of scientific knowledge and technology as the panacea for 'underdevelopment', and therefore cutting across the East-West ideological divide. Second was the initial improvisation by Frelimo and its adoption of problem-solving reactive approaches, accompanied by certain policy and decision-making immaturity during the troubled independence transition. Third was the prevailing myopic reading of the Mozambican society, downplaying the importance of rural economic dynamics and social stratification, as well as the central role of traditional authorities. Fourth was the consolidation of initially reactive measures into fully-fledged policies of Marxist-Leninist orientation (at least theoretically) after the third party congress. Fifth was the nationalist revolutionary fervour imprinted in the social, political and economic directives that resulted in unrestrained implementation behaviour. The exclusionary stances resulting from this combination of factors were successfully exploited by the RENAMO insurgents, which aptly transposed and perpetuated the asymmetric armed conflict interactions between the regional and global variables into the domestic realm. The negative introduction of the ethnic card into politics, and the enmeshing of the country in global trends and networks of corruption was something to arrive with the end of the armed conflict and the unleashing of the triple transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

CHAPTER FOUR

Revisiting the Past: Historical Roots of Mozambique's Security Challenges

'Fragile is the present without the past
mediocre is the future without the present
sad is humankind without memory'
José Craveirinha

(author's own translation from original
Portuguese version)

4.1 Introduction

This chapter continues the case study of coherence and sequencing of security reforms in Mozambique through the historical state-building framework first adopted in Chapter III. This is done through an examination of the origins, structure and institutional culture developed by the Security and Justice apparatus during the post-independence phase that followed the liberation war (1975-1992).

Questioning the implicit assumption within much of the war-to-peace transition literature that post-conflict environments represent blank slates warranting high levels of social engineering, this chapter provides a baseline to test the institutional ruptures and continuities in the post-independence and the post-civil war periods in Mozambique. In this way it sets out a foundation for comparing how the legacy inherited by Mozambique's Security and Justice institutions in each of the transitions shaped or not the make-up of the successor institutions.

In the post-independence period less attention has been paid to the workings of the Security and Justice institutions in the 'liberated zones'[31] of Mozambique's Liberation Front (FRELIMO),[32] when compared to research carried out on political and economic topics and civil war issues.[33] This is due to at least three factors: 1) incomplete historical and primary archival records; 2) difficulties in gaining access to institutional documentation pertaining to the period in question[34] as well as in obtaining comprehensive and reliable interviews from crucial players; and 3) limited numbers of secondary sources,[35] in particular of published accounts of those involved. Such data are beginning to emerge (e.g. Veloso, 2006, Moiane, 2009, Pachinuapa, 2009, Vieira, 2010) although they form more of a patchwork, rather than a coherent storyline, in contrast to the predominantly oral narrative surrounding

[31] The functioning of the liberated zones lacks systematic analysis, although insights have been provided by certain publications. See e.g. Mondlane, 1969, Machel, 1975a, Adam, 1993, Vieira, 2010.

[32] FRELIMO was created in 1962 as a front bringing different independence movements together, namely the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) and the African Union of an Independent Mozambique (UNAMI). The front emerged under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane as president and Uria Simango as vice-president.

[33] Research on security and justice in post-independence Mozambique suffers from a dearth of scholarly attention. However, a few contributions do exist, which deserve mention:
a) on justice: Isaacman and Isaacman, 1982, Cruz, 1986, Sachs and Welch, 1990, Gundersen, 1992. Scattered insights can also be gained from certain chapters in de Sousa Santos and Trindade, 2003;
b) on wider security: Igreja, 2010 and Machava, 2011 offer compelling analyses of Frelimo's use of violence as a means to consolidate power;
c) on the armed forces: Honwana, 1995, Macaringue,1997 and 2002, Malache *et al*, 2005.

[34] The first attempt at the reorganisation of Mozambique's public administration documentation and archives took place as part of the 2001 Public Sector Reform and began after the 2006 approval of a 'Records and State Archives Management Strategy'. In addition, a National System of State Archives was approved in 2007, revising its earlier format from 1992, but its reorganisation is still on-going.

[35] In this case 'limited' refers not only to the dearth of data, but also to the fact that the media was controlled by the state. Laws and official speeches were vastly reproduced in the newspaper *Notícias* and in the magazine *Tempo*, as a way of keeping the public informed. Hence, on a positive note, the media outlets constituted a good repository of the official documents of that time. However, the control exerted by the state restricted any analytical or critical posture in the editorial line of those articles, especially if they were thought to challenge Frelimo.

FRELIMO's foundation and rule during and following the war of independence.[36] The perpetuation of this oral narrative aimed at protecting the legitimacy of the regime in the absence of systematic historical analysis warrants further research. This could help balance the typical tendency of political actors such as Frelimo who, despite espousing democratic ideals, continually reproduce and reinforce a mentality of secrecy (Honwana's Preface in Vieira, 2010, Coelho 2011: 8-9).[37] Nonetheless, given the information gaps, this chapter does not provide a comprehensive historiography of the Security and Justice institutions in the post-independence period. Instead, based on the distinct sources consulted, it sheds light on the factors of coherence and sequencing in the development of the Security and Justice institutions, within the context of Frelimo's overall post-liberation state-

[36] de Bragança and Depelchin offer a powerful critique of uncritical examinations of the historical development of Frelimo, from being a liberation front with nationalist goals into a socialist, and subsequently Marxist-Leninist party. They also raise awareness of the danger of confounding the history of Frelimo with the history of Mozambique (de Bragança and Depelchin, 1986).

[37] This mind-set appears to have developed from a combination of factors. 1) The first relates to the liberation movements' enduring perception of being under siege, developed during colonial times. In the case of Frelimo, this perception was maintained in the post-independence period given the Cold War's contribution to the start and continuation of the Mozambican civil war. 2) The second concerns the lack of transparency that characterises the management of Frelimo's internal party business, such as processes dealing with internal dissent. Examples are the controversial killings of former party leaders such as Uria Simango and Joana Simeão, which are thought to have been extrajudicial. 3) The third, which probably developed as a consequence of the first and second, is a longstanding internal party ideological guideline postulating that all criticism and self-criticism must take place within the party, which must address and solve problems, promoting change from the inside. Criticising the party in venues external to the party was unwelcome because it provided information to outsiders, who could manipulate information against the regime. Professional journalists and scholars ought to obey these orientations as stated in the report of the first National Seminar on Information, 1978. This old pattern of thinking has not disappeared and in fact seems to have strengthened with the return to power of the more conservative wing of Frelimo since 2005. However, in contrast to the party discourse by senior representatives, it appears that space for criticism within the structures by regular Frelimo members has diminished, or that discordant opinions are no longer considered. This prompted influential party members to break with the tradition of internal criticism as prescribed by the party and publicly criticise the way the country and party business have been managed in recent years. In turn, this led to public campaigns of character assassination carried out by unidentified authors, and fierce debates emerged in the media between the supporters and the opponents of the current regime, whether belonging or not to the party.

building project. The concept of critical junctures and path dependence as defined in the literature review guide this scrutiny with the aim of unveiling the ruptures and continuities that have impacted the institutions of Security and Justice.

4.2 The state security and justice system between 1975-1992

The revolution that followed Mozambique's war of independence dismantled existing colonial structures and created new ones, epitomising the rupture of the state apparatus, including the institutions of Security and Justice. Independence represented a critical juncture, bringing about opportunity to set up effective and legitimate Security and Justice institutions. However, whilst Frelimo aimed to develop a new and modern Mozambican state, the external and internal threats it faced led it to emulate some of the measures adopted by the colonial regime.

At the same time, counterrevolutionary activity created security and military operational demands, leading FRELIMO to draw on the experience of governing the 'liberated zones' to provide immediate security and justice responses (Mondlane 1976: 182-186, J.Veloso-08/04/09, 4.5.1-27/02/09, personal comm. S.Vieira-11/09/08). This required the development of integrated security solutions by way of liaisons between the people and the security forces - through institutional bricolage - partially explaining the creation of securitised structures at various levels of society, to support the work of the uniformed security forces in the post-independence period.

At first, all security forces derived from FRELIMO guerrilla groups, most of whom had not received any training prior to joining the regular armed forces or Police (J. Veloso-08/04/09). Nonetheless, given the impending threats, Frelimo could not afford to allow a security vacuum to develop whilst these forces were being trained. In addition, the Security and Justice institutions were seen as vital to both the movement's political survival and the legitimacy of the revolution. In keeping with their experience in the liberated zones, these institutions remained actively controlled by Frelimo. This meant that in the face of new realities, FRELIMO still resorted to its past experience instilling a degree of continuity between the old practices of the liberation struggle and the new post-independence decisions, in line with path dependence theory.

In this interaction between critical juncture and path dependence, threat determined priority; hence the subordination of policy-making and implementation to pragmatism and institutional bricolage became prominent as a coping measure. This constrained coherence and sequencing in the Security and Justice system institution building, with long-term institutional development being downgraded in the face of the primacy of power politics.



Fig. 4 Post-independence patterns in the justice and security system

4.2.1 Defence

The Legacy of the Colonial War and the Lusaka Accords

The Defence forces of the newly independent Mozambique embodied their time and context. The armed wing of FRELIMO, the *Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique* (FPLM), which fought the guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonial army, formed the core of the post-independence armed forces (FPLM-FAM). In conformity with FRELIMO's governing stance, the creation of the FPLM-FAM represented rupture with colonial structures and policies, and therefore members of former colonial forces (including Mozambican citizens) were not incorporated into the newly created army.

The Lusaka Accords between the Portuguese state and FRELIMO created a joint military commission to oversee the maintenance of a cease-fire during transition (Lusaka Accord, 1974, nr 8), but did not include post-independence

provisions for the security forces. This demonstrated that the negotiations preceding the agreement concerned a transfer of power rather than the terms of independence (de Bragança, 1986, Sachs and Welch 1990: 1), signalling that, instead of a negotiated settlement, Frelimo obtained *de facto* unconditional authority from the Portuguese state.

The dispositions of section V of the Cease Fire Agreement were the precursors to the complete rupture surrounding institution building of the independent country's armed forces. They determined that those Mozambicans serving in the Portuguese armed forces, whether in Mozambique or abroad, should be demobilised by the Portuguese state and reintegrated into Mozambican society by FRELIMO. This was typically representative of a critical juncture, where the rupture materialised in the exclusion of the Mozambicans who had been members of the Portuguese colonial army, representing a lost opportunity to build competence within the new armed forces.

It must be recalled that the climate of suspicion was acute and that Frelimo legitimately feared that those who had worked for the colonial system could not transform overnight and become loyal to the new revolutionary regime.[38]

[38] In part, the flaw was that they considered all civil servants, including all security forces, as a threat and were not able to differentiate amongst them. However, Frelimo's concerns were not unfounded as armed uprisings and acts of sabotage against independence were carried out by groups of extremist Portuguese settlers, members of former Commando and Special Forces units, in addition to affiliates of the former PIDE-DGS (Jardim, 1976, Newitt 1995: 539-540, Veloso 2006: 105).

However, this political consideration clouded concern with the declared process of egalitarian and inclusive nation building.[39]

From the point of view of state-building and institutional performance, the FPLM-FAM could have benefited in the initial stages from the experience of those Mozambicans who had served in the colonial armed forces to train a regular army[40] (Malache et al 2005: 163-164), and afterwards to effectively halt RENAMO's insurgency.[41] The majority of Mozambicans had served in the colonial army not out of conviction but due to the compulsory nature of Portuguese military service (Cabaço, 2010: 241). Any resistance on their part would have opened them and their families to the threat of retaliatory action by the colonial authorities and by the PIDE-DGS. In addition, military service represented a means of subsistence for those in the regular army and also for

[39] An inclusive policy might possibly have helped to avoid the support of these disaffected groups for future counterinsurgent forces. Whilst Renamo had not yet developed, it was not implausible to foresee the emergence of such a group, given the regional context. Frelimo was aware of emerging internal and external threats as proven by the inclusion of provisions to tackle these in the cease-fire agreement that accompanied the Lusaka Accords (Frelimo-Portuguese Cease-Fire Agreement, 1974, Arts 6,9,13-14). In fact the same document foresaw the implementation of measures to stop Portuguese and Mozambican nationals from becoming involved in military collaboration with the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia (Frelimo-Portuguese Cease-Fire Agreement, 1974, Art11).

[40] Frelimo military instructors trained in Tanzania, both in guerrilla tactics and in conventional army training. However, the downside was that their actual experience was in guerrilla warfare, which is why, after independence, the Mozambican armed forces sent many of its officers to be trained in former socialist republics, in order to help transform its mainly guerrilla army into a conventional force. In this context, Mozambican members of the colonial army could have provided useful organisational input (1.1.1-01/09/08).

[41] The usefulness of the former colonial military was implicitly recognised when the war intensified, since President Machel 'rehabilitated' the *Comandos* that had remained in Mozambique in the meeting of the *Comprometidos* (compromised), which took place between *3-7/06/1982*. After this it appears that he prompted them to collaborate with a special counterinsurgency unit created to combat Renamo, which some analysts likened to the *'Flechas'*, a similar unit created by the Portuguese within the PIDE to deal with the Frelimo guerrillas in the course of the war of independence (Igreja 2010: 799).

those that were part of the Provincial Organisation of the Voluntary and Civil Defence (OPVDC) (Cabaço 2010: 238).

Portugal's adoption of an 'Africanisation' policy for its army in Mozambique accelerated when faced with the threat of FRELIMO's insurgency, resulting in Mozambicans accounting for around 60% of the colonial army in 1974 (Macaringue 2002a: 7, Malache et al 2005: 158, Cabaço 2010: 240). Few, however, were promoted to officer's rank, with the most senior Mozambican serving as captain (Macaringue 2002a: 8). This reflected the practice of Mozambicans being used solely to execute orders, and not to set policy or strategy. Yet, instead of reasoning in terms of institutional performance, FRELIMO acted from the point of view of appropriateness and concern for safeguarding the legitimacy of the FPLM-FAM, which allegedly could have been hindered in the eyes of the people, if elements from the colonial forces had been integrated. Also, in addition to maintaining consistency between their anti-colonial discourse and practice, Frelimo feared insurrection on the part of the former colonial military, as well as disruption to the unity and the future build-up of the FPLM-FAM (1.1.1- 01/09/08, J.Veloso-08/04/09).

This decision and the lack of a consistent policy on integration into Mozambican society of the African members of the colonial army (Darch and Hedges 1999: 146) resulted in unintended security costs (Malache et al 2005: 163). Many of these Mozambicans, feeling excluded from the new nation-

building project, and humiliated by the naming and shaming campaigns that occurred post-independence (Coelho 2002: 150, Coelho and Macaringue 2002: 50, Igreja 2010: 781-799) joined the group of the disaffected assembled by Rhodesia to perpetrate acts of sabotage.

The FPLM-FAM

The creation of the FPLM-FAM, i.e. the transformation of FRELIMO's guerrilla units into a regular army, was limited by international bipolarity and regional destabilisation (Malache et al 2005: 163). According to different interviewees, this led Frelimo into actions based on reaction rather than initiative and prevented the emergence of a well-structured vision, institutional strategy, mission, composition and capacity plan for the FPLM-FAM (1.2.1.5-27/05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08, 1.2.2-14/09/08, 4.5.1-27/02/09).

However, the aim of building a well-trained and well-equipped professional army did exist as proven by the fact that at the same time that Mozambique was engaging in operational missions to counter destabilisation, military cadres were being sent abroad to study in Eastern bloc countries (4.5.1-27/02/09). In addition, there was also an intention to define an institutional strategy but implementation was hampered by the necessity to respond to regional and domestic threats (Coelho and Macaringue 2002: 49), implying a response guided by the priorities of border defence and maintenance of internal order (J.Veloso-08/04/09).

From the point of view of organisational structure, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces was the president of Frelimo (Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 1975, Art 5) and the Defence institutions represented an evolution from the Department of Defence that the liberation struggle movement established to coordinate military action during the war.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Armed Forces General Staff existed as a unified institution to administer the FPLM-FAM, and both were subject to direct party control, with the Minister and the Chief of General Staff sitting high in Frelimo's hierarchy (Malache et al 2005: 169). The primary mission of the MoD was to implement Frelimo policy to defend the nation and the state. This implied the consolidation of independence and of national unity through the coordination and organisation of the FPLM, which were established as a force of defence and consolidation of the revolution (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 3).

Interviewees confirmed the bond between the armed forces and the party in power (4.5.4-09/09/08, 4.1.1-26/02/09, 4.5.1-27/02/09, 1.1.1-01/09/08). A top political decision-maker at the time claimed that the FPLM-FAM were a state instrument but that, given that Frelimo was the only party in government, '*the party and the state acted as a single entity*' (4.5.1-27/02/09). At the same time he emphasised that this was not equivalent to saying that all those in FPLM-FAM were party members as:

> *…not everyone that entered the armed forces to serve in the destabilisation war were party militants, although in general everybody*

> *followed the orientation provided … some people had doubts, and only adopted or consolidated party values once inside that institution* (4.5.1-27/02/09).

This explains the chief function of the National Political Commissariat that ensured political direction and indoctrination in the FPLM-FAM, thus maintaining its allegiance to Frelimo (Honwana 1999: 162, Macaringue 2002: 148, Malache et al 2005: 162). Thus, the armed forces were a core element of Frelimo's rule, and they were kept under political control, displaying hybrid civilian-military characteristics, as a result of path dependence at work. This set up was in keeping with the war of independence tradition, where the military branch and other sectors of FRELIMO were indistinguishable, since all were engaged in the political-military task of liberating the country (Macaringue 2002: 139).

From 1975 until the early 1980s the FPLM-FAM forces transitioned from being a guerrilla group to a conventional army. Yet a paradox existed, since having originated from a guerrilla movement, the institution now had to confront another emerging insurgency. The FPLM-FAM conventional army model became inadequate to fight a guerrilla war, yet its transformation gained momentum through extensive training, the acquisition of equipment and advisory services provided by Eastern bloc aid, even if support did not reach the levels envisaged by Frelimo (Malache et al 2005: 163). From there on, it rapidly adapted its composition and methods of warfare to fight increasing

guerrilla activity, and adopted more 'forceful' means of recruitment to strengthen its presence in the provinces (Malache et al 2005: 174).

Nonetheless, FPLM-FAM vigour declined as the war intensified with the consequent destruction of infrastructure and the lack of new investment in the military apparatus, resulting in a significant loss of efficiency (1.2.1.5-27/05/05, 1.2.2-14/09/08, 1.1.4-12/08/08). The latter was a consequence of reduced support from the Eastern bloc, in response to the perceived betrayal by Mozambique due to the signing of the N'komati Agreement with South Africa in 1984 and the country's rapprochement with the West.

Finally, the high prestige and respect gained by the FPLM-FAM during the liberation war and early independence slowly waned due to the lack of military capacity to protect populations from rebel attacks. This was aggravated by the government soldiers' indiscipline and harassment of people, which stemmed from state failure to meet their basic needs such as the provision of food and equipment in the field (Newitt 1995: 574, Malache et al 2005: 175, 1.1.4-12/08/08).

Thus far, it has been shown that in the post-independence period Frelimo's policies were informed by the past practices of the liberation war, thus denoting a degree of path dependence. Although independence represented a critical juncture, and despite the effective rupture in the security arena

demanding the creation of Defence institutions from afresh, Frelimo did not give strategic priority to longer-term institution building in these areas. Instead, its strategic priority was to face immediate internal and external threats resulting in the adoption of reactive stances designed for survival. At the same time Frelimo was not driven to maximise institutional performance and focused instead on retaining the legitimacy of the regime and its security forces. Hence, appropriateness featured as much as pragmatism in domestic and foreign policy decision-making. Paradoxically, such decisions, like the exclusion of former colonial Mozambican military from the new post-colonial army, led to unintended consequences that furthered security vulnerabilities, namely the creation of a pool of disenfranchised people for its opponents to draw upon.

4.2.2 Public Security

The Legacy of the Colonial System and the Lusaka Accords

During colonial times the system of dual policing resembled that of the Portuguese metropolitan areas. This system included public protection police units and judiciary police, etc, working in the main Mozambican cities and paramilitary units consisting of local recruits operating in rural areas. These answered to local Portuguese administrators that held, amongst others, executive and judicial discretionary powers (Trindade 2003: 100). The latter arrangement, in tandem with the traditional leaders' conflict resolution mechanisms, was applied to the indigenous populations, whilst the former

covered the white, the coloured and the *assimilados*. In FRELIMO's view it was a system of ostracism that fostered inequality amongst Mozambicans, and had to be changed.

The Lusaka agreement foresaw the creation of a Police corps to maintain order and security during the transitional government period (The Lusaka Accords, nr 11), but the legal provision for this body was only enacted on the eve of independence (Decree 54/75 of 17/05). The resulting Police corps comprised a few residual members of the earlier Portuguese public security police and former members of FRELIMO guerrilla troops that received six-months police training in Nachingwea, Tanzania in 1974 (3.1.5-20/09/08). FRELIMO's practical policing experience was limited to that undertaken in the liberated zones (4.5.1-27/02/09, J.Veloso-08/04/09, 4.5.4-09/09/08). However, high levels of suspicion kept it from integrating the remaining Portuguese elements in the new Police force (J.Veloso-08/04/09). As in the case of the FPLM-FAM, this decision reflected the fact that independence was an instance of critical juncture, where rupture was preferred over gradual reform.

The PPM

Training for the new Police force began (3.1.1.5-23/05/05) in 1976, but the *Polícia Popular de Mocambique* (PPM) was only legally created in 1979 (Law 5/79 of 26/05). Similarly to the experience of the armed forces, the civil war

disrupted the medium to longer-term efforts of institution building of the Police. Its mission to uphold order and public security was shared with the FPLM-FAM, as during the civil war the PPM barely extended beyond provincial capitals, and even there, it was very limited in its operational capacity (3.1.2.5-18/05/05, 4.5.1-27/02/09). In turn, the Police were also entrusted with the mission of containing internal and external enemies, and therefore they contributed to protecting the defence ring around the city of Maputo from Renamo military incursions (3.1.1.5-23/05/05). This was typical of the prevailing 'unified security' concept based on the idea of merging internal and external security measures and forces (Chachiua 2000: 56), depending on the nature of the threat. It was also grounded in the perception that all threats, including internal criminality - see below in justice section - were infiltration attempts stemming from the war of destabilisation.

The Police, however, failed to enjoy the privileged status of the FPLM-FAM because of the war (3.1.2.5-18/05/05, 4.5.4-09/09/08, 4.5.1-27/02/09). The force was also less prominent than the intelligence services - *Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular* (SNASP) - which, besides collecting and analysing information, were authorised to search, investigate, interrogate and detain (Decree 21/75 of 11/10, Art. 5). Furthermore, the SNASP maintained a prison (4.5.4-09/09/08, 2.3.1-25/02/09) intended for those accused of counter-revolutionary activities. Although this was its main focus of activity, the SNASP was also authorised to instruct judicial and criminal processes,

holding, in practice, greater powers than the criminal investigation police (Decree 25/75 of 18/10). The SNASP was also more powerful than the Attorney General, given that both he and the Police had legally established detention periods, whilst the SNASP was exempt from such limits (4.1.1-26/02/09). In this regard, the SNASP resembled the PIDE-DGS, representing a line of continuity or path dependence with colonial practice.

The Police, being the 'poor child' in the far-reaching security system established by FRELIMO, suffered from an enduring inferiority complex compounded by politicians' attempts to bring in outsiders to occupy leadership positions (3.1.2.5-18/05/05). This long-lasting trend was illustrated by the absence of a police commander between 1979 and 1995, with the force being directly managed by the Minister of Interior - a member of Frelimo's top hierarchy - to whom each Police branch was accountable (3.1.5- 20/09/08). It was an additional sign of the strong grip Frelimo maintained over the security sector. Despite the fact that the Police was institutionally weak and deprived of the prestige of the FPLM-FAM or the SNASP, the Ministry of Interior (MInt) was, nevertheless, a powerful institution.

The 'Democratic Structures of People's Power'

Significantly, the law stated that the primary mission of the MInt was to guarantee the working of the 'democratic structures of people's power' at the local level, and its coordination and liaison with the national level, in addition to

ensuring the transformation of the Police into a real instrument of security and defence of the popular masses (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 5).

The emphasis given to 'people's power' was followed with a series of structures of social and political control based on the creation of people's committees extending from the national down to the local level, but under the close observation of Frelimo's National Political Commissariat. It was no coincidence that, at the time, Armando Guebuza, Mozambique's current President, simultaneously held the posts of Frelimo's National Political Commissar and Minister of the Interior.

Guebuza can be credited with bringing dynamism to the democratic structures of people's power (Veloso 2006: 105), centred upon the *Grupos Dinamizadores* (GD) created on the eve of independence. These consisted of Frelimo party cells organised at the neighbourhood level to perform political mobilisation and control, as well as judicial, administrative and security alert (neighbourhood watch) functions (Meneses et al 2003: 351-354; Brito 2010: 19). The latter task, in particular, was carried out by sub-level structures such as the *chefes dos quarteirões* (chief of block) and the *chefe das dez casas* (chief of ten houses). These observed neighbours' behaviour and reported to the GD any suspicious movements suggesting collaboration with 'the enemy', or instances of inobservance of Frelimo party rules and rules of social conduct (4.1.1-26/02/09).

In addition to the former structures, as the war progressed, the *Grupos de Vigilância Popular* (GVP) were created to carry out surveillance against sabotage in factories or, more widely, in the communities, adopting informal patrolling roles, and acting effectively as armed people's militias (*Tempo* 15/04/79; *Notícias* 5/5/84).

These 'democratic structures of people's power' became the bedrock of the security system guaranteeing public order, and their work represented a significant input and source of information for all state security institutions. Their cooperation with the Police, for instance, was embodied in the concept of 'Police-People' liaison that mandated close collaboration between these actors (4.5.4-09/09/08).[42] This solution denotes institutional bricolage, insofar as the gaps in security institutions were consciously bridged by a combination of state-led and quasi-institutionalised activity of non-state actors. In this way, besides extending security control over society, Frelimo also boosted its legitimacy by creating structures for citizens to allegedly exert people's power in practice.

Whilst these structures became an effective platform for people to intervene in society, the result was not necessarily progressive. In general, the actions of the democratic structures of the people's power produced, at best,

[42] This principle and the experiences associated with it became a source of inspiration for the community-policing efforts that were set up in the post-civil war period (4.5.4-09/09/08) but which have also been a target of contestation by populations at large and by those citizens involved in implementation.

controversial and unintended results. On the one hand, they served as useful administrative and security informants; on the other, they contributed to many abuses and injustices. The people serving often manipulated these structures for personal profit, witch-hunting, and petty revenge (*To the Point* 31/10/75). They were under the oversight of Frelimo's Political Commissar, but the abundance of the 'structures' in such a large country hindered oversight, even with the help of local populations who were encouraged to denounce and report misconduct (*Notícias* 23/05/83).

Furthermore, the veracity of the information that these people's structures produced (some of it anonymous) was difficult to verify, for example, by the SNASP or the Police, resulting in the security institutions becoming accomplices in the plentiful misdemeanours and unjustified punishments that occurred (*To the Point* 20/07/79). Public indignation ranged well beyond Police complicity with the democratic structures of people's power, given that Police interventions in general were characterised by brutality, owing to its paramilitary nature (Seleti 2000: 354-355). In addition, their performance was significantly affected by the low education and the poor training of the cadres, coupled with the high level of indoctrination around the need to uphold and protect the political and social values of socialism. This combination earned the security institutions a long-lasting negative reputation (Seleti, 2000, Leão, 2004), with unfortunate implications for its credibility in the post-civil war period.

This section highlighted that changes in the public security apparatus, as in the Defence sector, represented a critical juncture in terms of discontinuity with the institutional arrangements of the colonial era. It also shed light on the capacity of Frelimo to engage in institutional bricolage, complementing formal state structures with societal means of political control through the institutionalisation of the democratic structures of people's power. This value-laden choice was also a pragmatic decision given Frelimo's creation of an incipient paramilitary Police force, which lacked the ability to maintain public order and societal control on its own. The outbreak of the civil war reinforced the secondary role of the Police relative to the intelligence or the Defence sectors, in a similar pattern to that which prevailed during the war of independence.

4.2.3 Justice

The Legacy of the Colonial System

For a long period the colonial system of Justice was based on dualism, with separate structures for *whites, coloured and assimilados* on the one hand, and for the majority black population on the other. The former had access to the judicial courts, whereas the latter could only make use of the so-called 'Private Courts of Indigenous People'. In rural areas, Portuguese authorities administered justice with the help of traditional local authorities (Trindade 2003: 99).

The prison system replicated this dualism, with the creation of special prisons, or special sections within prisons, for indigenous people (Decree-Law 39 997 of 29/12/54, Arts 1 and 2.3). This reasoning was infused with a sense of *'mission civilisatrice'* and in that spirit the indigenous villages within the penal colonies aimed *'… to obtain a considerable improvement in the degree of civilisation of all users, in tandem with recuperation of the condemned'* (Ordinance 17 710 of 04/05/1960, Ch IV §II. B) Z.1. and Z.1-A3.).

In the late colonial period, the indigenous status was abolished creating juridical equality but in practice discrimination and prejudice persisted (Trindade 2003: 99), partly because of oppressive legislation stemming from Portugal's fascist era. Moreover, the time lag between the approval of laws in the Portuguese capital and their introduction in colonial legislation caused the colonies to apply outdated legislation. For instance, Decree-Law 26 643 of 1936 reforming the organisation of prisons was only adapted and transposed into law in the colonies through Decree-Law 39 997 of 1954.

These problems were common to all of the colonies' inhabitants but for most of the Mozambican population additional obstacles existed in terms of access to justice. Amongst them was the colonial era legacy of widespread illiteracy resulting in a lack of awareness of legal rights and economic resources to access legal services. Moreover, particular provisions and separate prisons existed for political crimes (Decree-Law 26 643 of 28/05/36, Arts 7.7 and 7.8)

and, if in Portugal it was not possible to obtain a fair trial in a political case, the situation was worse in the colonies where the PIDE exerted tight control (Sachs and Welch 1990: 2).

Taking into account this legacy of fascist, colonial and elitist systems of Justice (Sachs and Welch 1990: 2) and Security, Frelimo decided that an entirely new judicial structure was required. Nonetheless, it was pragmatic enough to declare that all legislation prior to the Constitution of 1975, which was not against its predispositions, was applicable until its modification or revocation (Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 1975, Art 71).

Hence, despite the clear intention to completely break with the colonial Justice system and the actual organisational restructuring led by Frelimo post-independence which indicated a state of critical juncture, the seeds of continuity and path dependence persisted, taking into account the Herculean task of legal overhaul, which remains unfinished (Trindade 2003: 97).

Building a Popular Justice System

The new system was based on the concept of popular justice (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 13) and was meant to promote fairness, abolish the injustice inherent in the colonial apparatus and implement justice that advanced the interests of the Mozambicans (Law 12/78 of 02/12, Preamble). A novel, unitary Justice framework was established that merged executive and judicial

powers. The executive managed the system through the Ministry of Justice (MJus), which amongst other roles, centrally appointed professional judges.

Besides comprising its own functional directions, structure-wise the MJus led the Court Structure and the Attorney General's Office (Decree 1/75 of 27/07). The Judiciary Police, subsequently renamed Criminal Investigation Police (Decree 25/75 of 18/10), transferred from the MJus to the MInt (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 15). The prison and re-education services remained under MJus supervision until they were transferred to the MInt (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Arts 6.10, 13, Decree 26/75 of 18/10).

Priority was awarded to legislative reform (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 14.3), ensuring the simplification of technical legal language and the dissemination of the main legislation to make it accessible to the common citizen. The former happened by incorporating long clarifying preambles in the newly adopted laws (Sachs and Welch 1990: 12), and the latter by publishing them in the mainstream media such as the newspaper *Notícias* and magazine *Tempo,* and by having them explained in broadcasts by *Rádio Moçambique*. In addition, legal explanatory campaigns were carried out by law students and justice officials in the provinces (Trindade 2003: 106, 2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.4.1-24/03/09).

The willingness to adopt inclusive processes was reflected in the fact that the production of new judicial system legislation was based on an extensive, nation-wide consultation and debate, incorporating actual input from the population. This process began in 1975 and resulted in the official law only being approved in 1978 (Sachs and Welch 1990: 4, WLSA 2000: 38; Trindade 2003: 109). An entirely new system, completely distinct from the colonial structures, was designed, reinforcing the tendency to critical juncture.

The new judiciary comprised at its base local popular courts (neighbourhood popular courts in the urban areas), followed by district-level popular courts, provincial popular courts, and the supreme popular court (Law 12/78 of 02/12, Art 10.1). Criteria of fairness were taken into consideration and therefore the different court levels applied gradually increasing penalties, functioning also with successive stages of appeal. At the lower level, courts were to be exclusively composed of lay judges (Law 12/78 of 02/12, Art 36), and in the other echelons professional and elected judges were to work together. People's assemblies selected the non-professional judges from a list of names proposed by the party committees in coordination with the mass organisations at the corresponding level (Law 12/78 of 02/12, Art 52.4). This arrangement pointed towards a solution of institutional bricolage. Not in terms of improvisation, given that the process of designing the new judicial organisation was consultative and comprehensive, but rather concerning the compromise found between a quasi-informal and formal institutional arrangement, where

different actors effectively contributed towards a plural, more organic and legitimate system. This process can be interpreted as a genuine form of people's participation in justice delivery, aside from the caveat requiring previous party-related structures, such as the women's wing, to vet candidates eligible by communities to join the local Justice structures (Gundersen 1992: 260). This solution, in addition to promoting legitimacy for the regime, also addressed a significant institutional lack of specialised staff and material resources (Ministério da Justiça, 12/2000: 23).

The underlying philosophy in the delivery of justice was the use of common sense, so long as this did not contradict existing law. It was founded on progressive revolutionary principles, side-lining mainstream traditional authorities and customary law. This exclusion in particular, represented ideological continuity with earlier FRELIMO liberation war convictions that local traditional authorities had collaborated with the colonial powers; hence they had to be barred from participating in the new Justice system. Moreover, the formation of courts at the local level, as an interim measure, was in keeping with the experience of the liberated zones. One important difference however, was that FPLM members were now barred from serving in the local courts (Frelimo 1976: 121). In practical terms between 1975 and 1978, and until the implementation of the new law, judicial responsibilities were mainly carried out by the GDs that subsequently became the main detractors of the new Justice

system, given that its full operation implied the reduction of their power (2.1.1-17/09/08).

Genuine concern for implementation of the judicial reorganisation prevailed in accordance with the principle of 'people's' power, with priority being devoted to the local level, where the new system gained popular adherence. However, the expansion towards district and provincial levels, as well as the creation of the supreme popular court - which was only set up in 1989 - was constrained by lack of trained staff to undertake work in the several Justice institutions at the various levels (2.1.1.5-17/05/05, 2.4.1-24/03/09) and by the progression of the war in the 1980s. This protracted process of implementation, coupled with the absence or the destruction of state structures, ultimately constrained progress at the local level, resulting in traditional authorities regaining their original conflict resolution roles based on customary law (WLSA 2000: 48).



Fig. 5 Structure of the Ministry of Justice under the unitary conception of power

The institutional implementation described above became tainted by the growing harshness of the laws adopted and executed as the war progressed. However, these draconian measures were not solely a function of war, but had a deeper ideological goal, i.e. that of Frelimo's nation and state-building aim grounded on modernisation. In President Machel's understanding, the Mozambican consciousness had to be transformed in line with the belief that 'the tribe ought to die for the nation to emerge' (Machel 1975a: 34). In addition, the creation of the 'New Man' was central to Frelimo's nationalist project, encompassing the rejection not only of colonialist values but also those of obscurantist tradition. Amongst others, this meant rejecting sorcery and embedding rationalism in individual and collective thought through scientific education, pedagogical and moral campaigns, sharing the experience of revolutionary political struggle, and military discipline (Machel 1975a: 31-35,159-165, Cabaço 2010: 284-289). President Machel upheld these views consistently; however, they reflected a common civilising aspect of an *oppressive modernist ontology*, regardless of the adoption of a capitalist or a socialist orientation, or of colonial or independent rule. Hence, a subtle ideological continuity existed between the colonial authorities' and Frelimo's modernist state-building project.

In 1983, the militarised environment of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary warfare led to the peak of radicalisation of the Frelimo regime, highlighting the

disparities between its stated objectives at independence, and the measures implemented. For instance, a Presidential decree clarifying the MJus mission of defence of the people's power through 'repression of violation of legality' reinstated the goal of completing the implementation of the judiciary structures (Presidential Decree 69/83 de 29/12, Preamble). However, in the same year, President Machel paradoxically decided, on political and ideological grounds, to close the Faculty of Law (until 1990). This decision was acclaimed by the Popular Assembly members, who associated this training institution with bureaucratic, rhetorical and elitist colonial law practices, detached from Mozambique's socio-cultural reality (Sachs and Welch 1990: 118-120, *Notícias* 23/03/83). Yet, given that this was the sole legal training institution, its closure produced long-term negative consequences for the staffing and institution building of the Justice system of the independent Mozambique (Ministério da Justiça 12/2000: 26). Hence, it is plausible that this might have been a tactic to postpone the completion of the judiciary pyramid, which, as mentioned previously, would only be finalised with the creation of the Supreme Popular Court in 1989.

This suggestion gains credibility if weighed against the fact that the regime simultaneously expedited the politicisation of common delinquency and economic crimes, as demonstrated by the revision of the law on 'Crimes against the Security of the People and the People's State', approved in 1979 (Law 2/79 of 01/03). This law was intended to combat increasing internal

crime, which was seen by the regime as a counterrevolutionary threat against the people, the people's power and society. Hence, the amendments introduced penalties to punish common social, criminal and economic offenses, which had become rife in the climate of economic hardship, and instituted the practice of public flogging. In addition, it provided for capital punishment in cases of economic sabotage, including smuggling of goods and speculative activities. Massive acquisition of products harming public provision of goods and the illegal traffic of foreign currency were also severely punished (Law 5/83 of 31/03). These legal dispositions were implemented and a massive operation of revolutionary 'purification', labelled *Operação Produção* (Operation Production), was carried out that same year (1983) (*Notícias* 11/04/83).

Operação Produção was a large-scale campaign intended to address rampant social problems, but was also used to remove and punish people whose ideas were not in line with those of Frelimo. It targeted unemployed people in general, unemployed single-mothers, criminals, intellectual dissidents and ex-PIDE agents. Members of the religious group Jehovah's Witnesses were also subject to systematic persecution because of their 'conscientious objection' to bearing arms in a military conflict or to serving in the armed forces (Human Rights Watch 1992: 23, *Público Magazine* 25/06/95). Arbitrary arrests were made for minor offences such as not carrying identification papers, a practice which led to many disappearances since the security forces did not normally

allow people to contact their relatives or colleagues to inform them about the detention (Granjo, 2010). Furthermore, those convicted in the courts for crimes of sabotage as well as political and economic offenses were also sent to re-education camps. From 1982 onwards, these trials were held in public both to instil transparency in the process and deter further crime (*Notícias* 13/08/1982).[43]

Despite the trials, discretionary powers held by the security forces in this operation resulted in many prolonged detentions without trial as well as imprisonment under severe conditions. Forced labour, collective humiliation, torture, violent punishment, and extrajudicial killings characterised the operation, which marked a grim period in the history of independent Mozambique and of Frelimo's rule. The prevailing excesses led President Machel to adopt in 1985 a political decision which mandated that no one should be sent to re-education camps without trial and conviction (2.3.1-25/02/09, *Notícias* 04/01/85).

Thus, the *Operação Produção* using discretionary powers held by security agents in conjunction with the incompleteness of the judiciary pyramid, prevented potential judicial processes and decisions that might have curbed - to a certain extent - the implementation of extreme measures from the start.

[43]According to the Judge-President of the People's Provincial Court of Maputo, João Trindade, trials stopped being held in the court premises because the audience was limited. Instead, it became common practice to hold them in the neighbourhoods, before hundreds of people, and in the presence of the administrative structures and GD members, who were able to testify regarding the behaviour of the accused (*Notícias* 13/08/82).

This further supports the idea of intentionality behind the stalling of the implementation of the Justice system. Decision makers considered that the security threat perceived also as stemming from internal sources needed to be firmly met and that an effective Justice system would slow down and hinder such processes. Yet, it has to be considered that the Justice apparatus was part of the system of the time and that people's judges integrated the *ad-hoc* verification posts that decided whether citizens were sent to re-education camps. At a later stage, trained judges also played a part in the process, when an appeal procedure was established (Granjo 2010: 85).

In general, however, it is clear that the Justice staff received political directions concerning the need to eradicate strict legalist positions in favour of revolutionary legality (Ministério da Justiça 12/2000: 25). They were to take 'material truth' - understood as following the requirements of the revolution - into account, particularly in the case of judicial rulings. The following quote from an editorial of a publication of the MJus illustrates the predominant thinking:

> *The independence of the judges consecrated by constitutional principle does not mean neutrality in the class struggle, it does not mean being apolitical, and even less means the liberty to take decisions that are objectively contrary to the revolutionary process* (*Justiça Popular* 1981: 2).

This indicates that, although judges retained functional independence, they were not immune to the revolution and courts therefore implemented laws drafted by the party and the executive that often resulted in harsh sentences,

although acquittals also took place (*Notícias* 14/12/83 and 22/10/87). In addition, citizens' rights to proper legal defence were often violated, despite the state's declared goal of ensuring people's access to legal defence, in particular with respect to criminal offenses (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 4.2). The National Service of Consultation and Juridical Assistance (SNCAJ) created for this purpose had not yet been put into practice due to the absence of both the necessary regulations and material resources. It was only in 1986 that its successor was formed and designated the National Institute of Juridical Assistance (INAJ). The act recognised the gap created in terms of people's rights and re-established the role of private advocacy, which had been abolished as a business activity after independence (Sachs and Welch 1990: 12, Trindade 2003: 106, Marques e Pedroso 2003: 35-36).

In this environment of revolution and counterrevolution, Frelimo actively promoted the work of the Military Revolutionary Court (MRC). This supposedly interim structure was created in 1979 and remained operational for 10 years, until the judiciary was ready to perform its duties in the context of the Law on 'Crimes against the Security of the People and the People's State' (Law 3/79 of 29/03, Art 23). The MRC judges were appointed by the MoD (Law 3/79 of 29/03, Art 4) and were mainly military career officers, who mostly lacked any legal training (Trindade 2003: 33). MRC verdicts were final; their capital sentences were executed by firing squads within five days (*Tempo* 08/04/79a and 22/04/79, *Notícias* 22/08/79 and 23/02/83), and their

deliberations were carried out behind closed doors, although the decisions were made public through communiqués (Law 3/79 of 29/03, Arts, 3, 6, and 14). The depositions were not registered in writing and any magnetic recording was subjected to MRC approval, although the clerks of the same court could prepare an abridged summary of the proceedings (Law 3/79 of 29/03, Art 15). These procedures hampered any accountability in political and judicial decision-making.

This normalised succession of violent justice and security provisions and implementation, which in most cases would only be utilised by rulers as measures of exception, was in part due to a deteriorating economy. In particular the proliferation of certain merchants profiteering from the circumstances, whilst the general population endured constant food scarcity, lead to rising popular resentment and protest. Under these conditions the public demanded justice and harsher punishments, not only because they felt strongly about the issue, but also because accusing a fellow-person often promised them political and societal approval, allowing them to evade scrutiny themselves. In addition, they felt empowered to make such claims given that Frelimo's discourse and action had been that of people's power, supported by hybrid societal-party-security structures where people effectively participated. This emerged as an outcome of Frelimo's initial build-up of populism, leading to complex circumstances whereby the party's use of violence to consolidate the revolution was strengthened and taken to extremes, allegedly by popular

demand. In light of that situation, Frelimo's reasoning was that had it not responded in a satisfactory manner, 'street justice' would have proliferated, creating the perception of the party's loss of security control accompanied by loss of legitimacy (*Tempo* 08/04/79b). Ironically, the loss of legitimacy occurred all the same due to the radical methods employed.

The foregoing analysis detailed how, despite Frelimo's intention of rupturing with the colonial system, legislation carried on from the colonial era and Frelimo's modernist approach to nation and state-building conformed to path dependence. At the same time, the institutional design of a new judiciary utilising high levels of popular participation was an instance of critical juncture. The new Justice arrangement displayed characteristics of institutional bricolage, combining quasi-informal and formal layers of justice into a plural, comprehensive and organic system. The protracted implementation of Justice reform was damaged by the exclusion of the traditional authorities and by the growing harshness of legislation and its implementation. This was further exacerbated by the intensification of the war and the rise of economic crime, leading to a spiral between Frelimo's radicalisation of the use of violence and popular demand for severe punishment for common infractions. This outcome, characteristic of populist postures adopted by Frelimo in a bid to maintain and display the perception of control, resulted in an exponential decrease of its legitimacy and of the coherence between its stated objectives and performance.



Fig.6 Justice and security system in the post-independence

4.3 Linkages between the justice and security systems and their implications for coherence and sequencing

Coherence

Against the backdrop described above, it can be discerned that, from a macro-level analysis of the nation and state-building project, there was little coherence between Frelimo's discourse and the reality on the ground. This resulted from unintended consequences of decision-making that led to the paradoxical coexistence of independence as a critical juncture and elements of path dependence from the colonial era. This lack of coherence was further due to contradictions between Frelimo's normative socialist agenda aiming at an egalitarian and progressive society, and its use of exclusionary and violent methods of implementation leading to the oppression of a considerable proportion of the population. These circumstances were prompted by a subtle pattern of continuity between the Portuguese colonial regime and Frelimo's self-determination rule, due to the commonly espoused goal of creating a

modern civilisation in Mozambique. This form of unintentional ideological path dependence evolved in tandem with Frelimo's acknowledged transfer of practices from the liberated zones to the remaining territory following independence. At times, said practices were at odds, such as in the setting up of direct participation and consultation; in other cases they reinforced each other, such as the use of violence to impose certain models of Justice. Over time, and as Mozambique's economic and security challenges grew, the resemblance between the regimes increased in aspects such as the centralisation of decision-making and the adoption of severe security measures.

The intended coherence of Mozambique's state-building project was often transposed to the meso-level of the Justice and Security system, as an integrated whole through the centralisation of processes in the hands of the Executive and via the appointment of high-ranking party members to key government positions. For example, the MJus was responsible for the structure and decision-making of most of the Justice system (Ministry, Courts, Attorney General, Legal Aid structures) with the exception of the MRC and the PIC. This suggested the existence of strong interconnections between the various institutions. Interviewees provided evidence of weekly or monthly work at the neighbourhood administrative level, including hands-on problem-solving campaigns. This meant that all Justice institutions were represented in these meetings with the populations and worked jointly to resolve practical

problems. In addition, all institutions within the ministry participated in national meetings, enhancing the dialogue amongst them (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.4.1-24/03/09).

However, whilst the interviewees stated that closer coordination and cooperation existed in problem solving at the meso-level, at the macro-level, the coherence between the stated goals, the laws approved and their implementation was more problematic. Symptomatic of this was the fact that Frelimo's aim of boosting and protecting people's power was watered down by the use of extreme violence targeting the same people it vowed to empower.

In the same vein, although the links between the Justice and the Security structures were intended to develop collaboration, due to the understanding that the system could only work if each party fulfilled its role (*Notícias* 08/11/82), in practice the justice-security relationship was unbalanced. Although justice in theory benefitted from a stronger foundation for institution building, in fact, it was rather less developed than the security institutions. The latter had strengthened due to the war and this ultimately led to the disregard of the Justice sector in the civil war peace agreement and in the subsequent transition.

With regards to interconnections between security institutions, the earlier sections mentioned inter-institutional rivalry between the PPM and the FPLM-

FAM, and between these and the SNASP. In fact, besides its core organisational structure, the SNASP initially had a strong presence within the MoD and the MInt, owing to its military and paramilitary counter-intelligence bodies within these institutions. It was also well represented at the level of the Immigration Services. This arrangement deepened *inter-institutional suspicions* (4.5.4-09/09/08) and it was the creation of a Joint Command of the Security Forces (JCSF) that eventually resolved the issue (Veloso 2006: 104). Subsequently, SNASP was removed from the other security institutions, and the MoD and the MInt took ownership of their own counter-intelligence units (4.5.4-09/09/08). In addition, the fact that the country was facing an armed conflict served to unify the competing institutions and the direction of a cohesive party helped to ease tensions. The creation of the JCSF was important in supporting coherence in security delivery through the coordination that it brought to the operational level, by implementing practices such as information sharing and joint operations. Besides the activity of the JCSF reinforcing inter-institutional dialogue, this was also consciously promoted through engagement in civic and peaceful activities, such as sports events between teams representing the various security forces (*Notícias* 14/06/85).

Sequencing

In terms of sequencing, the main challenge at the macro level of the nation and state-building project was that all areas needed to be built simultaneously, given the decision to dismantle the colonial state apparatus and to create state

institutions from afresh. However, at the meso-level of institutional development this goal proved unattainable, given the dearth of qualified human resources. In addition, the emergence of the post-independence armed conflict further stymied the development of sector and institutional strategies in general. In consequence, the 'learn by doing' approach prevailed, as underscored by several sources across different areas (J. Veloso-08/04/09, 2.3.1-25/02/09, 4.5.1-27/02/09, *Domingo* 29/06/08). The security sector was no exception, and despite receiving priority in resource allocation, it remained largely reactive with respect to protecting national security in wartime.

At the meso-level of institutional development in the Security and Justice system, the sequencing of reforms consistently took a back seat whenever wider political goals were at stake, as in the creation of a tripartite structure for the prison establishment. This resulted from three interrelated factors, with the first, the need for political control leading to the establishment of prisons under the aegis of SNASP, predominating. There was, secondly, an aversion to placing the prisons under the management of the MJus, as had been the case during colonial times when many Frelimo members had served political sentences. And lastly was the conviction, rooted in the experience of the liberated zones, that open re-education centres with productive activities were the best way to rehabilitate criminals and the 'non-adjusted'. Therefore, the

re-education services were created and placed under the responsibility of the MInt (2.3.1- 25/02/09, *Summary of World Broadcasts* 06/10/81).

This disjointed responsibility produced institutional disjuncture, with the prison organisation partitioned between several ministries and operating according to distinct criteria. The SNASP was responsible for political prisons and the MInt for pre-trial detention prisons, post-trial jails and for re-education centres. The MJus covered central, provincial and district level prisons, penitentiaries, a women's detention centre, and open prison facilities for post-trial detainees. There was very little coordination between these institutions on prison matters and the standard of prisoner treatment was generally dismal (*Notícias* 04/01/85, 2.3.1-25/02/09, *To the Point* 20/07/79, *Rádio Maputo* 27/06/89). Yet, the re-education centres in particular were object of international and national criticism due to human rights abuses and illegal imprisonment.[44] A symptom of these circumstances was that in the mid-80s around 42,000 detainees were held in re-education centres in comparison to around 7,000 serving sentences in the other prisons (2.3.1- 25/02/09).

Sequencing, or lack of attention to it, also negatively impacted the security sector as a result of the fact that the Police lagged behind the armed forces with regards to institutional development. However, from the perspective of

[44] The abuses were primarily denounced by Catholic Reverend Daniel Sithole in a letter addressed to the US and other Western governments in 1981 (Sithole, 23/08/81). Subsequently they were mentioned in a Human Rights Watch Report from 1992 and further substantiated in the *Público* Magazine, 25/06/95 and in a publication by a Christian missionary (Hammond, 1998).

social and political control, sequencing was taken into consideration - even if unintentionally - and the gap that arose from the diminished role of the traditional authorities and Police weakness was filled (or attempted) by Frelimo with the creation of the hybrid society-state-party democratic structures of people's power.

It can also be argued that a particular sequencing awareness was present in Frelimo's concern with formal political control in the process of the creation and development of the security forces. Control was legally concentrated in the hands of the President, and in practice few other high-ranking Frelimo leaders had any input on security matters. The Popular Assembly, which did not play any legal role, complied strictly with party directions in case of disagreement. Hence, in terms of oversight, any measures taken in this single-party governing arrangement, to address abuses by the security forces, were manifestly insufficient. Such measures took place through, for example, the *Ofensiva da Legalidade* (1981) (Legal Offensive), a campaign whereby the President called on people to denounce abuses committed by the security forces in order to 'purify the ranks of our defence and security forces' (President Machel quoted in *Tempo* 15/11/81). His pleas were met with masses of citizens turning up at political rallies, and their forthcoming attitude in denouncing abuses committed by the security forces (*Tempo* 15/11/81) worked as an indicator of people's support and participation in these initiatives. Yet, such popular adherence was surrounded with ambiguity since, given the

circumstances of populism, people participated because they felt strongly about the issues, but also because they were afraid of being sanctioned if they did not.

In general, members of the security forces, and of the SNASP in particular, were accused of abuse of authority, of making undue use of the material means at their disposal, of unprofessional conduct, etc. Through public sessions and internal disciplinary and control measures they were admonished, punished or expelled, according to the seriousness of the infraction (*Africa* 12/1981, *Notícias* 22/02/82, *Tempo* 28/02/82). These public rallies served a triple function as morality, accountability and deterrence campaigns, given that they were also intended to bridge the gap that arose from the incipient internal mechanisms of inspection of the security institutions. In addition, people's support of the *Ofensiva da Legalidade* conferred legitimacy on Frelimo, and provided further authority to the President, thus appeasing public outrage caused by the security forces' wrongdoing. Nonetheless, institutionalised mechanisms of external oversight were lacking and therefore systematic accountability for the performance and management of the security forces was null, fulfilling the objective of centralised control by the core of Frelimo's leadership of that era.

In light of these accounts, a pattern of disregard or of relegation of sequencing was evident as it related to institutional development, in contrast to when it

concerned political and social, and even institutional control. This trend was prominent whether the decisions were unintentionally prompted by the surrounding circumstances - such as in the case of pragmatic decision-making leading to the build up of the armed forces to the detriment of the Police during the ongoing war - or whether they were motivated by Frelimo's proactive agency, such as in the case of the closure of the Law Faculty or of the launch of the *Ofensiva da Legalidade*.

		Defence	Police	Justice	Intelligence
Critical Juncture		• Dismantlement of colonial forces; • Creation of the FPLM-FAM; • Exclusion of Mozambican members of former colonial military forces from the FPLM-FAM.	• Dismantlement of colonial police forces; • Creation of the PPM from afresh.	• Dismantlement of colonial justice system; • Creation of a new system based on popular justice; • Justice organisation based on unitary conception of power. • Delivery of revolutionary justice.	• Dismantlement and vigilance over action of former PIDE and other Portuguese special security forces. • Creation of the SNASP from afresh.
Path-dependence	**Liberation struggle experience and principles**	Members of the FPLM initially formed the FPLM-FAM under Frelimo political party control.	Former members of the FPLM-FAM plus new recruits integrated the PPM in 1976 (officially created in 1979).	Exclusion of mainstream traditional authorities from local justice delivery.	Leadership came from top echelons of the party and the FPLM.
	Colonial Practices	Use, in the 1980s, of former members of colonial commando force to integrate specialised security unit to combat RENAMO.	Oppressive means of Government with excessive use of violence and exclusion, e.g. *Operação Produção*	Continuation of all colonial legislation, which did not contradict new socialist revolutionary orientation.	▪ Held greater investigation powers than the criminal investigation police; ▪ Held and managed prisons for political prisoners.
Institutional Bricolage	• Creation of the Democratic Structures of People's Power (structures of representation of local masses); • Creation of Court system with combined participation of professional and lay judges.				

Fig. 7 Illustrations of post-independence critical junctures, path dependence and institutional bricolage

4.4 Conclusion

Frelimo's development as a liberation movement and the values that it espoused when it became a government shaped its post-independence rule, but the outcomes of its decision-making were also shaped by contextual factors. Frelimo's social engineering attempt to create both a modern state

and the ‘New Man’, whilst simultaneously countering regional security threats and Renamo’s insurgency in a confrontational international environment, ultimately hindered its state-building project. Policy and institutional shortcomings, as well as popular resistance, also contributed to preventing Frelimo’s socialist ideology from materialising in full. Frelimo addressed these contestations with the use of violence, but also with the legitimate creation of governing structures inclusive of the people. Regrettably, the use of violence became predominant, resembling the colonial order that Frelimo had intended to dismantle, thus exacerbating, instead of appeasing, societal conflict.

It is not surprising that Mozambique’s Justice and Security system is usually vilified when its role in the post-independence period is discussed, given the poor preparation and the plentiful excesses the security forces committed with impunity. However, it needs to be reiterated that these forces were under Frelimo’s political civilian control, which also bore responsibility for the misdemeanours committed by the quasi-formal securitised structures of people’s power. The abuses perpetrated were in total contradiction to the spirit of freedom, fairness and justice that FRELIMO proclaimed at independence, and the increasing rhetoric of repression and punishment was matched in practice. This occurred not only via security forces’ transgressions, but also through Frelimo’s excessive zeal in the quest for control of security, institutionalising violence with the passing of draconian legislation, subsequently implemented by the judiciary.

Although discursively and to a large degree in practice, Frelimo distinguished itself from colonial thought and performance, the critical juncture represented by independence and by institution building from afresh of the Security and Justice system was tempered by the subtler ideological path dependence of modernism. Another critical source of continuity was pragmatic decision-making, often driven by the similarity of the challenges and threats faced by the colonial regime and Frelimo, such as in the case of insurgency. Path dependence stemming from colonial rule interacted with another type of continuity deriving from Frelimo's liberation war traditions and governing experience. Nonetheless, whilst the former was often prompted by unexpected circumstances and the need to cope with unintended consequences, Frelimo deliberately used the latter. However, the patterns of governance applied to limited areas under tight social, economic, political, and security control when transferred to a much wider territory with lesser state control, resulted in major inadequacies.

The continuities deriving from Frelimo's experience within the liberated zones were ideologically and sequentially prominent in comparison to those originating from colonial policies; the simultaneous manifestation of both legacies also furthered the disparity between Frelimo's discourse and practice. Importantly, the convergence of these different types of path dependence strengthened the tendency towards problem solving based on reactivity and pragmatism. This subordinated strategic and medium to long-term policy-

making, with coherence and sequencing factors of institution building policies being systematically overridden, when competing with tactical political considerations.

Further to the above, the paradoxical coexistence of critical juncture and path dependence at the macro, state-building level fostered incoherence in institution building policies for the Justice and Security system at the meso-level. These policies were downgraded in light of the paramount need for institutional adaptation to meet the demands of the civil war, which became the main driver of institutional change. In this sense, coping measures were put in place through, for example, the creation of the JCSF to harmonise operational performance. Importantly, to address existing institutional gaps in the Justice and Security system, Frelimo resorted to institutional bricolage. These creatively addressed institutional design by combining formal elements with flexible societal-based arrangements. Such was the case in the security establishment, featuring formal security forces alongside democratic structures of people's power, and in the Justice arena, with the formation of a hybrid judiciary, with professionally trained magistrates working together with untrained judges nominated by the people. These institutional bricolage solutions addressed pragmatic governance concerns, at the same time as they conferred functional legitimacy on the institutions created, given the participatory nature of their design. However, this needed to have been complemented by performance-based legitimacy, achievable through the

degree and quality of the delivery of the goals such institutions were set up to achieve. Yet, the analysis carried out in this chapter underscored that the quest for legitimacy within the state-building project was hampered by Frelimo's failed attempt to change social consciousness through the use of violence, resulting instead in shattered chances for reconciliation within the Mozambican society and the deepening of the civil war.

CHAPTER FIVE

Sequencing in Mozambique's Transitions: economic liberalisation, peacebuilding and democratisation in perspective

'What those whites did was to occupy us. It was not only the land: they occupied us, they camped in the middle of our heads. We are wood that caught rain. Now we don't provide fire nor shade. We have to dry in the light of a Sun that does not yet exist. That Sun can only be born inside us.'

Zeca Andorinho, a Mozambican fiction character from the novel the *Last Flight of the Flamingo*, Mia Couto, Ch14, p.158

5.1 Introduction

The historical background to Mozambique's security and justice institutions introduced in chapter IV (1975-1992) established that the country has been immersed in a series of successive transitions, with short intervals of stability, since the beginning of the liberation struggle in the 1960s. Despite the critical juncture epitomised by independence in 1975, patterns of continuity with old governing practices asserted themselves. In this chapter three major transitions which marked the late 1980s and 1990s are examined, namely, the change from a central planning model to a market economy, from one-party to multiparty politics, and from war to peace (referent to the civil war). The analysis focuses primarily on the driving forces and sequence of events that unfolded during this triple transition in order to understand the outcomes.

The chapter draws on a macro level analysis of the power dynamics prevalent from the late 1980s to 2009 and then goes on to portray the context behind the

post-civil war security and justice reforms to be discussed in Chapters VI and VII. It starts by discussing the priority accorded to economic liberalisation over political change immediately prior to the end of the civil war through the late 1980s and 1990s. It then pays attention to the impact of the IFIs prescribed policies on peacebuilding, including changes in the security establishment. Finally, the medium to long-term impact of the prioritisation of economic liberalisation over peacebuilding and political liberalisation on wider democratisation up to 2009 is considered.

This triple transition has been referred to elsewhere as 'total transition' (Lundin 2002: 135). It was underpinned by high levels of social engineering typical of the post-Cold War period, where dominant international reconstruction players often experimented in post-conflict environments (Paris and Sisk 2009: 1). However, in Mozambique, the critical juncture symbolised by rapid changes started to wane towards the end of the first decade of transition (1990s), giving way to a period (2000s) when a mixture of change and continuity came to light. This was represented by an increase in signs of path dependence, characterised by slower change and enduring legacies in politics and in policy-making, bringing into question the true extent of the transition. In addition, whilst sequencing was crucial, especially at times of critical junctures, it was not an isolated factor in shaping the direction of events in Mozambique. Rather, it was interlinked with internal politics, including the tactics of

adaptation and accommodation of the national leadership to the fast and externally driven changes.

Hence, the main argument advanced in this chapter is that *the sequence of events that led to economic liberalisation preceding and prevailing over peacebuilding and democratisation, significantly moulded the short, medium and long-term outcomes of the triple transition in Mozambique. This specific sequencing of reform processes combined with elements of path dependence (e.g. the resurgence of Frelimo's past behaviour) shaped a particular type of political bricolage that resulted in weak post-conflict state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors. It also led to growing structures of inequality and exclusion for the poorest in society, and sowed the seeds for the emergence of volatile and violent democratic politics.*



Fig. 8 Mozambique's triple transition

5.2 Sequencing Mozambique's triple transition

The triple transition, from a central planning model to a market economy, from one-party to multiparty politics, and from war to peace, unfolded as a series of complex processes, which were each symbolised by specific events. These were, respectively: the adoption of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1987; the approval of a democratic Constitution in 1990 and the holding of the first multi-party elections in 1994; and the signature of a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992. Despite the involvement of diverse practitioner communities, the various philosophies behind each specific process, and the different scheduling of each transition, they nevertheless overlapped enough to warrant bundling them conceptually into a single, large-scale process of change.

The onset of economic liberalisation was a direct response to Mozambique's devastated financial and economic situation throughout the 1980s and followed the refusal of the COMECON to accept Mozambique as a member (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 110). This led to the realisation among the governing elites that a strategy of rapprochement with the West was unavoidable, as the country grew increasingly reliant on emergency food aid (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 108). Whilst Mozambique had enjoyed the support of donors such as the Nordic countries since independence, reconciliation with more mainstream donors such as the US and the UK became vital. This led to a rapprochement that carried with it an implied trade-off in the form of economic liberalisation, resulting in the 'normalisation'

process of a country previously associated with the Eastern bloc (Duffield 2001: 7-8, Macamo, 2005). Specifically, Mozambique adopted a SAP called the Economic Rehabilitation Programme in 1987, followed by an Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (ESRP) in 1989 (Hanlon 1991: 113, 117, 120-122, 164, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 69). Yet, the economic liberalisation process really began with Mozambique's admission as a member of the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1984, which incidentally was the year the N'komati agreement with the RSA was signed. This suggests that membership of the referred IFIs was a political reward for Mozambique's efforts towards regional peace and re-alignment with the West (Hanlon 1991: 114, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 141).

Mozambique's SAP was comparable to that adopted by other severely indebted countries (Wuyts 1989: 16, Marshall and Lester, 1992, Arndt 1999: 5) and corresponded to the IFIs policy blueprint in use at the time (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 30). It aimed to bring about macroeconomic stabilisation, prioritising measures such as the control of inflation through currency devaluation and credit restriction; it liberalised trade by removing restrictions on imports and exports, and eliminating price fixing and state subsidies. It also intended to reduce the role of the state in the economy through asset privatisation, and envisaged the control and monitoring of government spending through cuts and caps on public expenditure (Hanlon 1991: 133-144,

Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 38, Arndt 1999: 5-9, African Development Bank Group - AfDB 08/10/99: 4).

However, whilst most other African countries applying those programmes were similarly facing political and economic transitions as was the case in Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania and Malawi, none were at war when the implementation of a SAP began, unlike Mozambique (Wuyts 1989: 16, Hanlon 1991: 128). The argument advanced by the WB was that the economic growth foreseen with the implementation of the SAP would emerge in the medium and long-term, after 'exogenous factors' such as security concerns had been resolved (World Bank 1987: 4 quoted in Wuyts 1989: 16, Hanlon 1991: 130). Yet, the SAP was also meant to restore productive sectors through specific funding allocations and that required the rehabilitation of the production structure and the circulation of goods and people, including those in the rural areas (Hanlon 1991: 129, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 38, AfDB 1999: 4-5, 4.3.3.5-20/05/05, 4.1.2-25/02/09). With an ongoing war, the basic economic conditions for the execution of the SAP in Mozambique were absent (Wuyts 1989: 22, Hanlon 1991: 129-131, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 20-21, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 33-40, Hanlon 1997: 161, AfDB 1999: 18).

In one interviewee's words:

> *Regardless of the merit of the theoretical construction of the SAP…one has to question how it can be applied in a context where the war is at its peak… significantly affecting communication routes, destroying infrastructure and productive capacity, and turning populations into refugees or internally displaced people…were people idiots to apply*

> *such a programme in a Mozambique at war or were there ulterior motives?* (4.1.2-25/02/09).

This type of questioning reinforces the view that Westen countries were ideologically motivated by their faith in neoliberalism and therefore facilitated and accelerated liberalisation (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 41-43) in a country experiencing a fully-fledged armed conflict when, in principle, conflict resolution should have been given precedence in order to end the war and establish a minimumly favourable economic environment (Mhone, 1992).

In retrospect, it is obvious that the inappropriate sequencing of events reflected the priorities of Mozambique's western donors, including the reinstatement of capitalism accompanied by the introduction of a market economy, as indicative of their Cold War ideological victory.[45] Nevertheless, economic liberalisation and conflict resolution were not entirely working at odds (Saul 2005: 311), as happened in Sierra Leone where the implementation of the SAP had the perverse effect of setting the stage for war (Gbla 2006: 80). In Mozambique, the SAP provided an incentive to local elites, signalling that financial aid would be available in the post-conflict phase, and that the end of the war was in their interest. Yet, the donors' objective of

[45] Herman Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the time, emphasized the active support of the US for economic reform and democracy by stating that *'…we are as pleased by the steps African countries are taking to discard outworn ideologies for free markets and democratic reforms…'* (Cohen, 1990). Also revealing is Saul's account of the discussions carried out in an international conference entitled 'Rethinking Strategies for Mozambique and Southern Africa' held in Maputo in 24/05/1990. On this occasion, Mozambique's leadership reiterated its commitment to liberalisation in exchange for the promises they were made by Western donors; at the same time, they also demanded better results from the economic policies being implemented (Saul, 1991).

economic liberalisation had to be implemented in such way as to bind the country's incumbent and future decision and policy-makers to the policy agreed upon, independently of the 'winner' of the subsequent peace negotiations and democratisation process. Hence, *this goal was achieved through the sequencing of processes adopted, which prioritised economic liberalisation over the more pressing and immediate conflict resolution and peacebuilding needs*.

It can be argued that even if conflict resolution efforts had been prioritised, Western goals would have been equally achieved given that Mozambique's finances had already collapsed, and the country was left with no alternative but to adhere to the SAP. Nonetheless, it is plausible to consider that if a more concessional financial aid process had occurred during the last phase of the war (Hanlon 1991: 117, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 43), with simultaneous priority afforded to peace negotiations, outcomes might have been different. An opportunity might have arisen for the Government of Mozambique (GoM) not to act as hastily as it did in forging ahead with the introduction of its own SAP before the IFIs approval, in a bid to show to Western donors its willingness to embrace economic liberalisation.[46] Yet, at the time, a more concessionary position towards Mozambique would have

[46] Hanlon argues that, given the numerous meetings in the previous years between the IFIs and the GoM, the latter knew what was expected of them policy-wise. However, the WB and the IMF felt that the GoM programme was still insufficient, hence Mozambique's decision to launch it without previous IFIs approval. Although this could be interpreted as a position of Mozambique's policy independence, in fact, the generalised context of overall power relations contradicts such an interpretation. The GoM had to make further policy concessions during implementation and actually had little room for manoeuvre to counter the IFIs prescriptions (Hanlon 1991: 117-122, Wilson, 1995).

meant boosting the position of a government then seen by western donors, and in particular by the US, as rogue due to its association with the Eastern bloc (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 85, Hanlon 2010: 85-87). It would also have unbalanced the peace negotiations to the advantage of Frelimo, who could have flaunted such support and provided humanitarian relief to the people. This was not the intention of influential donors, who envisaged a power sharing agreement with the formation of a government of national unity (Saul, 1994, Synge 1997: 48, 116, 123-126, 4.5.1.5-05/05).

5.2.1 Sequencing and Institution Building

Against this background, it has to be acknowledged that whilst the sequencing of the transitions significantly affected results, simply following a different sequence may not have fully altered the outcome. A distinct balance in the prioritisation of the processes would have been required, with conflict resolution and political liberalisation not only preceding economic liberalisation, but also being awarded enough time to progress (medium to longer-term), whilst receiving sufficient donor support for the promotion and consolidation of democratic institutions. Had this occurred, more room for manoeuvre would have been created for embryonic democratic institutions such as political parties, media, parliament, civil society and religious congregations to develop and contribute to the discussion of economic development. It would also have created circumstances favourable to the boosting of social alliances, the capacity for negotiation and the ability to

effectively debate the orientation, pace and sequencing of economic liberalisation. This thinking is in line with the argument that capable and legitimate national institutions must be in place for sensible peacebuilding to occur and that more time and attention should have been devoted to institution building prior to full-scale liberalisation (Paris 2004: 7-8). Nevertheless, in Mozambique, prominent researchers observed in the immediate transitional phase that:

> *At the same time that the programme [the SAP] creates social differentiation and new contradictions of interests, it does not allow the possibility for the emergence of new political parties, which, with the help of different economic programmes, could attempt to provide answers to the needs of the different interest groups…the conditionality of the Bretton Woods institutions does not allow any other economic policy, beyond the one that is exerted currently. It looks like no one wants to carry-out the demand of breaking with Bretton Woods and the PRES* (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 303).

This indicates that, whilst Mozambique's social fabric was damaged by the war and its national CSOs were unable to launch a protest against donors' and government adopted policies, donors purposefully exploited the context by prioritising economic liberalisation over conflict resolution and democratisation. This argument is supported by Hanlon's position that the US controlled the IMF and the money as well as Renamo and, therefore, the duration of the war (Hanlon 1991: 256, 259). In addition, Mazula's question about why an important subject like the development of the country was not raised during peace negotiations implicitly suggested that it was because the answer had been pre-empted by prescriptions determined earlier by the IFIs (Mazula 1995: 34).

Hence, stronger institutions better able to manage change might have resulted from an inversion of the order, prioritising 'institutionalisation before liberalisation' (Paris 2004: 179-211), or even of 'institutionalisation to resist liberalisation'. However, the donors did not opt for such an order. Indeed, whilst Mozambique's triple transition was rooted in a neoliberal framework, the specific succession of processes did not merely represent a procedural sequential model of reconstruction. Instead, the primacy of economics over conflict resolution and peacebuilding, as well as in relation to political liberalisation, ultimately reflected Western donors' strategic goal of reintroducing capitalism. This suggests that the type of institutionalisation or 'de-institutionalisation' promoted in the earlier phases of reconstruction, for example, the shrinking of the already weak civil service, served to advance donors' agendas.

Equally, at a subsequent peacebuilding stage, and in the context of economic liberalisation, donors' minimalist understandings of change determined that support was first given to revenue generating areas such as customs and tax reforms (Hanlon, 1999, Diogo 2002: 219, *Savana* 15/08/2008). Regarding political liberalisation, support for electoral institutions pre-dated broader reforms aimed at building up democracy. This particular choice of areas over others within the economic and political fields reinforced the priority of economic liberalisation, given donors' contemporary perception that multi-party elections created the required stability for attracting foreign investment.

Hence, institutionalisation (or the lack thereof) developed as a function of the particular kind of liberalisation being carried out rather than independently of it.

So far, we have argued that *the particular sequencing of processes deliberately fostered by dominant donors at this stage of Mozambique's transition, ultimately subordinated politics to the expansion of global neo-liberal capitalism. In addition, the specific type of liberalisation approach adopted, mainly based on 'de-institutionalisation' resulted in weak post-civil war state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors.*

5.3 Economic liberalisation, peacebuilding and security dynamics

The previous section highlighted how the sequencing of processes prioritised economic liberalisation over conflict resolution and political liberalisation, due to donors' ultimate goal of reinstating capitalism. It also posited that the specific sequencing and the particular kind of liberalisation promoted a peculiar type of institutional reform that hindered the development of state institutions. These important assertions are nonetheless insufficient to explain the change dynamics that impacted on the security sector in Mozambique. Thus, this section details how economic liberalisation impacted peacebuilding and security reforms, demonstrating the disconnected and piece-meal approaches, as well as the contradictory policies that bedevilled reconstruction.

5.3.1 Reconstruction and Structural Adjustment at Odds

Mozambique's transition from war to peace represented a critical juncture marked by the introduction of a democratic Constitution in 1990. This paved the way for the signing of the peace agreement between Frelimo's Government and Renamo in 1992. The subsequent peacebuilding process took place during a post-Cold War global transition in which international development was still caught between the immediacy of humanitarian aid and the longer term commitments to development aid and security (Duffield 2001: 98-100, Junne and Verkoren 2005: 3-5, Pupavac 2006: 258). Moreover, unlike the more recent peacebuilding experiences of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Central African Republic (CAR), where Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) considered post-conflict recovery needs, attempting to align security and economic requirements, in Mozambique that did not take place. On the contrary, multidimensional peacebuilding as an agenda was still in its infancy, facilitating the primacy of economic liberalisation policies. Meanwhile, due to Mozambique's simultaneous transitions, peacebuilding took the form of a multitude of programmes rather than a coherent plan, although the same is still observable in most current post-conflict settings. In the words of one interviewee:

> *in Mozambique's post-peace agreement era there were no reconstruction policies, there were only emergency projects from which lessons were extracted and picked-up by the Government to formulate its subsequent programmes, with the aid of donors* (4.1.2.5-05/05/05).

Yet, even in the absence of a coherent reconstruction strategy, peacebuilding efforts did take place, even though some were at odds with the requirements of the SAP. This confirms existing research that found that one of the most evident areas of contradiction is that of employment (Woodward 2002: 201-203). In Mozambique the SAP mandated privatisation of state assets drove significant numbers of formally employed people into the informal economy.[47] The downside was that in terms of sequencing, this measure was carried out on the eve of a massive military demobilisation, which exacerbated even further the number of people unemployed (Cramer 2001: 103). Thus, by driving a portion of the labour force into the same precarious and growing informal market, the already sparse opportunities for economic reintegration of ex-combatants, refugees and the internally displaced were diminished. In addition, the fall in civil servants' salaries that resulted from the adjustment of the economy (Wuyts 1996: 743, Arndt 1999: 20, Hanlon 2004: 7) reduced the likelihood of the abovementioned groups obtaining support from their extended families, given the rising number of people dispossessed. An area that potentially could have absorbed some of the war-affected populations into gainful employment was that of infrastructure recovery in the form of emergency relief and state reconstruction programmes. However, according to an interviewee employed by humanitarian organisations at the time:

[47] A number of 38,000 lay-offs were reported by unions in the Mozambican media in October 1995 (Hanlon 1997: 96). However, it was difficult to find official primary data on the numbers of people laid-off and realistic estimates about the ratio/proportion of the formal/informal economy during that decade. In fact, the lack of accurate data about the economy underlined the flaws of the SAP design and the *Instituto Nacional de Estatística* (INE) (National Statistics' Institute) became a priority in terms of receiving donor capacity-building support. Regardless of the dearth of data, a common public perception existed about the worsening of living conditions as a result of the adjustment of the economy, the rising number of unemployed in urban areas, and the deterioration of the terms of trade in rural areas (Hanlon 1991:145-154, Marshall and Lester 1992: 26, Hanlon 1997:1-5).

> *the populations were only hired to work on the rehabilitation of tertiary roads and small bridges in the context of humanitarian projects…at the beginning this engagement was random, although with time it became more of a practice in the context of emergency relief programmes"* And he added *"…the state? Authorities existed in Maputo…ok mostly in the cities…but you do have to realise that those were the days of the SAP, meaning that the state had to cut, cut, cut* (4.6.4.5-05/05).

As part of the economic liberalisation, the Mozambican state was required to scale down spending, which meant that it was unable to launch programmes that might have actively aided people's recovery from the devastating economic effects of the war. Yet, this was not simply a case of state default as a consequence of IFIs diktats. Reconstruction was actively hindered by the IMF orthodoxy that money should not be channelled into the economy until inflation had been brought under control. This stance was only softened in 1995 when, in an unprecedented move, donors publicly opposed the IMF, given that its policies also precluded them from providing aid funding for post-war reconstruction, whilst they had large budgets to spend (Hanlon, 1999, Hanlon 2004: 7, Manning 2009: 9).

Further to this, market liberalisation constrained the contribution of state institutions such as the armed forces towards public works like demining, rebuilding of roads, bridges, etc., although the GPA had originally foreseen their participation in activities of national reconstruction (GPA 1992: Protocol IV.I.2a). In the opinion of one interviewee, this was because their participation in these activities was considered by the IFIs to be *'a state subsidy that distorted the workings of the free market'* (1.2.2.5-05/05). Hence, if the state

wanted to participate it had to do so by competing with alternative market suppliers in a given area.

In general, and given that at the national level the private sector and the NGOs community were embryonic or considered inefficient or corrupt, the main beneficiaries of post-war reconstruction, humanitarian activity and subsequent development aid were foreign organisations (4.1.1.5-05/05, Hanlon 1997: 65, Matusse 2000: 50-53, Alden 2001: 94-96, Negrão 2003: 4, Tollenaere 2006: 3). Demining provided an example of a sector where significant external financing resulted in donors determining which foreign commercial contractors and charitable international NGOs benefited the most from access to funding. Data from successive annual Landmine Monitor Reports confirmed that amongst the former were companies like Ronco, Mechem and Minetech, and amongst the latter were organisations such as The Halo Trust, Norwegian People's Aid and Handicap International (Landmine Monitor Reports on Mozambique, 1999-2005).

In light of the above analysis, it can easily be seen that Mozambique represented an excellent example of the argument that *'economic policies that guide international implementation of peace agreements are often the weakest link, running at cross-purposes with the needs of war termination'* (Stedman et al 2002: 20).

Nonetheless, on a positive note, Mozambique's peacebuilding was backed by generous contributions from donors, including financing for the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) as well as for other bilateral and multilateral reconstruction programmes.[48] By promoting the development of political parties in general, and in particular the transformation of Renamo into a political party, a new form of democracy assistance was pioneered for subsequent peacebuilding contexts, and precedent was set with the creation of multi-donor trust funds to finance reconstruction programmes (Manning, 2002, Manning and Malbrough 2009). An example of a well-funded programme was DDR which took into account similar contemporary experiences elsewhere.[49] Whilst implementation suffered from poor coordination and mismanagement (Ball and Barnes, 2000, Clark 1996: 18-21, Lundin et al 2000: 173-212, Manning 2009: 85) as well as shortcomings in terms of medium to long-term reintegration outcomes (Coelho 2002: 141-236, Lalá 2005: 155-185, Alusala and Dye, 2010), the sizeable funding was motivated by the recognition on the part of bilateral donors that the DDR

[48] A donor conference and a subsequent meeting took place in Paris in June 1993 in order to obtain funding for the implementation of the GPA and to finance the remaining transition programmes. Whilst the GoM originally requested 412 million USD, the total donor pledge amounted to 450 million USD (Ball and Barnes 2000: 177). In addition, after the first multi-party elections were held in 1994, a World Bank Consultative Group Meeting dated March 1995 pledged 780 million USD, excluding debt relief (Alden 2001: 83).

[49] There is data discrepancy concerning the full cost of DDR programmes in Mozambique. One article based on UNDP data states that the total amounted to 100,713 million USD, of which 26,045 million were paid by the GoM, with the rest coming from different donor sources (Lundin et al 2000: 186). Another work based on a report prepared for the International Organisation for Migration by Creative Associates International presents the total figure of 112.9 million USD (Ball and Hendrickson 2005: 33). Despite difficulties with data availability and accuracy, the numbers presented by Ball and Hendrickson for similar contemporary experiences - for instance Uganda with an amount of 43.2 million USD, Eritreia with 68.8 million USD, or Rwanda with 19.4 million USD - show that Mozambique's DDR funding was substantial. In addition, the percentage paid for by donors matters, given that for example in Eritreia and Rwanda donor contribution was minimal, with most costs being supported by national governments for political reasons (Ball and Hendrickson 2005: 33-42).

programme was crucial to ensuring peaceful elections. The programme also represented an exceptional instance when the IFIs agreed not to cut the state budget or security expenditure during the transitional phase (Mohn 1994: 18). The cut was delayed instead until after the 1994 elections,[50] denoting an economic liberalisation model with short-term security modifications to shore up liberalisation.

Regrettably, these positive aspects were the few silver linings in a series of political and economic conditionalities that included the withholding of humanitarian aid (during the early 80s), the introduction of the SAP (in the late 80s), and the disregard for profoundly needed security reforms (in the early 90s). The neglect of this area led to recurrent political tensions around the role of the post-war state security institutions, affecting in particular their medium and longer-term capability and effectiveness, as discussed in Chapters VI and VII.

[50] The defence and security expenditure data presented in academic research differs, although all feature a downward trend after the 1994 multi-party elections. For example, whilst using recurrent expediture data, Wuyts presents a defense and security expenditure of 33.9% in 1992 (Wuyts 1996: 736), whereas Arndt offers the figure of 34% for the same year (Arndt 1999: 13). In addition, Arndt stated that defense and security expenditures accounted for the following percentages of the state budget: 34% in 1992; 38% in 1994; 23,24% in 1995-1996 (Arndt 1999: 13); whilst Chachiua, using total budget expenditures, cited the following: 18.5% in 1992, 18.5% in 1994 and 10.1% in 1995 (Chachiua 2000: 59). Chachiua's data was consistent with that advanced by Lundin et al, and both report a slight military budget rise in 1996 and 1997 to 15% and 14.2% respectively (Chachiua 2000: 59, Lundin et al 2000: 179), before dropping again to 9% in 1998 and 11.1% in 1999 (Chachiua 2000: 59). In 2001 recurrent expenditures with defence fell to 0.9% of the GDP (Diogo 2002: 218).

However, despite widespread rhetoric to the contrary, the lack of concern with institution building until around the year 2000 reflected the predominant paradigm adopted by donors in the previous two decades. It posited that less state was more (van de Walle 2003: 1-33). The rebuilding 'package' adopted by donors meant that the UN and international NGOs were largely responsible for the delivery of immediate reconstruction projects, as mentioned previously. This served to drain capacity from the Mozambican state as the best-trained civil servants were attracted to work at the UN and NGOs because of higher salaries and better working conditions (Wuyts 1989: 25-26, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 51, Hanlon 1997: 61-62, Hodges and Tibana 2005: 146, Hanlon and Smart 2008: 240).

In addition donors co-opted different ministries for different strategic purposes (Harrison 1999: 329), and co-opted civil servants to serve their purposes whilst working on projects institutionalised within Mozambique's ministries (Hanlon 1991: 254). This furthered the structural shortage of qualified human capital in both the public and private spheres. The *de-institutionalisation* practices had a significant impact on public sector planning and service delivery capacity in the post-conflict period, raising the need for foreign technical assistance (4.3.2.5-18/05/05, 4.3.3.5- 20/05/05, 4.3.1- 26/08/08, 4.5.1- 27/02/09, Hanlon 1991: 254, Hodges and Tibana 2005: 146-152). This structural weakness favoured a path dependence stance, where advisors from the West replaced those from

the Eastern bloc, whilst the pattern of the GoM reliance on public policy transfer persisted.

The multiple tensions identified above confirm that, in theory and in practice, peacebuilding did not encompass a comprehensive reconstruction strategy integrating political, security, economic and social aspects (4.1.2.5-05/05/05, 4.3.1.5-05/05, 4.6.1.5-05/05, 4.6.2.5-05/05, 4.5.4-09/09/08). It was delivered instead through a panoply of contradictory policies and actions, which prevented the emergence of a coherent and adequate process to address the needs of a country transitioning from war to peace.

5.3.2 The Influence of Economic Liberalisation on Security Changes

The preceding analysis illustrated how the economic liberalisation imperatives of Mozambique's SAP were in conflict with peacebuilding requirements, mainly resulting in incoherent and disruptive dynamics for the post-conflict recovery process. These dynamics are analysed with regards to their impact on the security changes.

The UN peacebuilding missions of the early 90s did not include SSR as one of their formal programmes, given that security reforms had not yet formally adopted such nomenclature. Components such as the UN civilian police (CIVPOL) were in their inception, but there was rising awareness at the

international level of the need for support of security reforms beyond the implementation of DDR programmes (UNSG Report 17/06/1992, Doyle 1996: 532). Those were the early days of putting together security reform approaches to adopt in post-conflict environments, which meant that Mozambique did not benefit from such programmes. The neglect of the security sector started as early as during peace negotiations, when donors proposed a peace agreement that determined that Mozambique's new armed forces should comprise a small number of military staff, with a maximum of 30,000 men (Synge 1997: 103).[51] According to Mozambican interviewees this number was introduced without previously carrying out any threat analysis, national security assessment, or any other kind of evaluation to establish the needs of security institutions during peacetime (1.2.2.5-05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08). However, certain publications stated that after the US was admitted as an official observer in the peace negotiations,[52] an American team of military and legal staff provided technical support (Cohen 1993, della Rocca 1998: 205-206, Hume 1994: 118-119) and demonstrated how expensive it was to maintain an army (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1996: 25). When questioned

[51] Cameron Hume presented the figure of 27,600 men (Hume 1994: 125-127).

[52] It needs to be factored in that the bilateral governments that would subsequently provide some sort of security assistance - France, Portugal, the U.K - together with the U.S and the UN merely became official observers (Hume 1994: 102) in Mozambique's peace negotiations in June 1992, when the process had formally started two years earlier. Keeping these actors at arms length from the peace negotiations, given their history of strong interference, had paid off clearing the way to a successful mediation by the Italian religious Community of Saint'Egidio, with the backing of the Italian government. However, the drawback was that the observers only had four months to actively prepare technical advice and documentation before the agreement's signature. This late addition might also have contributed to the absence of the UN from the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Forces (Alden 2001: 42). On the other hand, this could have been deliberate, given that the GPA stated that the countries to provide support in this area were to be selected by the conflicting parties (GPA 1992: Protocol IV.6.iii.1)c).

about this, Mozambican interviewees involved in the process suggested that a comprehensive study taking into account the defence and military requirements of the country was not carried out, and what was put forward was based on general military models and did not necessarily reflect Mozambique's needs (1.2.2.5-05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08). Furthermore, the neglect of a security needs assessment coupled with military staffing numbers had two distinct advantages. The first was *'… to disband the armed forces, which were viewed as the machinery of war, and leave them inoperational for years…'* (1.2.2.5-05/05). This perception was shared by two other interviewees who pointed out that the course of action adopted by Western donors derived from their view of the armed forces as the primary instrument of Mozambican communist political power. Hence, Western donors needed to assert their Cold War victory in the context of Mozambique's peace negotiations and of the subsequent peacebuilding phase (4.1.2-25/02/09, 1.1.1-01/09/08).

The second advantage was that the armed forces were perceived to be over-spenders and corrupt (Saul 1991: 108, Human Rights Watch 1992: 57, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 27, Harrison 1999: 325, 1.1.1-01/09/08) and there was a need *'…to guarantee that economic resources necessary for the recovery of the country were not spent on the military'* (1.2.1.5-27/05/05). Thus, besides political reasons, the lack of concern with the reform of the security sector served mainly to guarantee that military expenditures remained

low, in line with the prescriptions of the SAP (Synge 1997: 64, 105), which also hindered the possibility to carry out human rights and prisoner treatment training initiatives (Human Rights Watch 1992: 168). This neoliberal position stemmed from the understanding that military expenditure was unproductive, diverted resources away from growth-generating sectors of the economy, and diminished the resources available for social welfare, while at the same time adding to external debt (Ball 1988: 161-211).

Undoubtedly, the sequencing of processes, implying the unfolding of the peace negotiations simultaneously with the implementation of structural adjustment in Mozambique meant that the latter affected the former. This was particularly so since these events took place at a time when donors were focused on fostering on-going economic reforms, transparent budgetary procedures, corruption control, and reducing military expenditure (Synge 1997: 142). The most significant impact came from expenditure restrictions that negatively affected not only security reforms but also the future capability and effectiveness of the security institutions, especially those of the military, as described above.

However, the predominant focus on the armed forces also had negative implications for the police and intelligence services, who received only residual attention in the peace agreement. The provisions for these areas were confined to prescriptions about respect for the civic, political and human rights

of citizens, and for impartial and non-partisan behaviour (GPA 1992: Protocol IV/IV, IV/V). No other mention was made about re-structuring these sectors, although admittedly these were areas where the Frelimo Government effectively resisted the inclusion of reform plans in the peace agreement (3.1.3.5-19/05/05, 4.1.1-26/02/09, 4.5.1-27/02/09, Chachiua 2000: 56). The Justice sector remained outside the framework of the agreement because none of the parties, mediators or the donors at large saw it as important for the resolution of the conflict in light of the more prominent political issues (2.1.2.5-18/05/05). Up to the writing of this thesis, and following twenty years of peace, a major strategic review of the security sector has yet to take place.

Whilst there was a notable lack of SSR, according to the notion of the security and justice institutions making up an integrated system, some aspects of security reform did take place, although they could have been better coordinated with other peacebuilding components. Nonetheless, issues were compartmentalised during peacebuilding, and therefore, potential embryonic security reforms were awarded low priority by UNOMOZ. In fact, the leader of UNOMOZ and UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, prioritised the political aspects of the transition in the belief that they best represented the formula for enduring peace (Ajello 1995: 129). Despite the impracticality of an agreement between Frelimo and Renamo in the form of a government of national unity, results demonstrated that his strategy paid-off in the short and medium term, even if it had to be

accompanied by a constant mixture of conditionality and monetary 'buy off' of the parties.[53] According to Ajello mission delays prevented any careful attention to crucial and immediate security issues such as disarmament (Ajello 1995: 129), and even less so to the reform of security institutions, as is discussed further in chapter VI.

'Guns or Butter' and other Idiosyncrasies

Whilst the GPA was considered a political success, the process suffered from several shortcomings regarding security provisions and their poor execution, sowing the seeds for skewed reforms of the security sector. This specific outcome of the implementation of the GPA was embedded in the post-Cold War donor discourse of 'peace-dividend', based on the premise that resources released by the security establishment would directly revert towards social areas and the economy. Whilst encompassing valid points, in Mozambique this discourse was based on the premise that state security and human security were mutually exclusive outcomes, favouring a zero-sum dichotomy between security spending and social spending (Lalá 2003: 146). The following public statements by Mr Dennis Jett, the American Ambassador in Mozambique at the time, were illustrative of the orthodox thinking of dominant

[53] Conditionality emerged on the donors' part mostly due to the need to make the parties advance with the demobilisation process. As to any monetary 'buy off', it concerned both private and other donors' generous financing of the peace process and the transition. For example, donors provided incentives to the GoM by making generous aid pledges. In addition, Tiny Rowland, chief executive of the British Multinational Lonrho provided significant resources in order to ensure Renamo's participation in several talks (Vines, 1998). Renamo's open request for financial assistance started early during the peace negotiations, stalling the process at certain points (Vines 1998: 73-74), given that this organisation was poorly resourced in everything, from daily basic logistics to means of transport and communications (Hume 1994: 100, della Rocca 1998: 197). Furthermore, after the signature of the GPA, a trust fund was created to support the transformation of Renamo from a guerrilla movement into a political party, and Renamo threatened to boycott elections, backing down only when the funds were effectively contributed (Synge 1997: 119, 126).

donors: *'It is always a matter of choosing between social expenditures and military expenditure. Choosing between guns and butter. You can't have both at the same time'* (Mozambique File 1995: 15).

Accordingly, no consideration was awarded to the potential contribution of the security forces to Mozambique's economy, for example through tackling newly emergent regional and transnational threats via adequate control of the country's porous borders or through the protection of its maritime resources and aerial space. The role of the armed forces in natural disaster times and their regional duties concerning peace operations (1.2.2.5-05/05, 1.2.2-14/09/08) were similarly overlooked. Even the conventional economic assumption that a modicum of security is necessary to attract foreign investment and generate economic growth was ignored (3.1.1-03/09/08).

Entrenched ideas of security dating back to the Cold War were also partly to blame for the neglect of proper security reform. Earlier research showed that influential circles in Mozambique's military and certain politicians, as well as some donors, displayed a view of security as something to be solely addressed by the national government, considering any involvement in the defence and security sector as constituting a breach of state sovereignty (Lalá 2001: 88). This was paradoxical, given donor support for UNOMOZ, which implemented its mandate through a significant amount of external interference in the internal affairs of the Mozambican state (Ajello 1995: 129, Cabaço 1995:

96), and effectively *'dictated the direction of most contemporary policy options'* (4.5.1-27/02/09). This inconsistency between donor discourse and practice epitomised the global transitional context at the time where concepts of state sovereignty and national security were being reconsidered. Humanitarian reasons called for more intrusive measures in peace operations, and a serious international debate was being held on the issue. Furthermore, multidimensional peacebuilding was being conceptualised, encompassing the need for an increased component of security assistance from UN missions to the security institutions of the states hosting the operations. However, these concepts had not yet crystallized into formal institutional policies.

In Mozambique most bilateral donors, not just the UN, were reluctant to become involved in the security arena. They did not view defence reform as important beyond demobilisation and installation of a new and merged defence force, nor did they maintain an open channel for supporting future police reforms (4.5.1-27/02/09). On the one hand, the security sector, and especially the military, was regarded as a problem and as incapable of being part of the solution. On the other hand, with the end of Apartheid in South Africa, the peaceful regional environment led to a perception of 'the end of threat' in Mozambique, akin to the thesis of 'the end of history' or the 'end of ideology'. According to one interviewee, the combination of these two factors prompted serious donor suggestions that *'a country such as Mozambique did not need armed forces'* (4.5.1-27/02/09). Such donor contempt for the armed

forces stemmed from its view of the former FPLM-FAM as the icon of *'the nationalist and revolutionary character of Frelimo as a vanguard party'* (Honwana 1995: 559). Admittedly, many cadres of Frelimo acquired their political beliefs during military training (Cabaço 1995: 84) within the FPLM during the liberation struggle. However, after independence, the FPLM-FAM was clearly subordinated to Frelimo's political and ideological control, turning it more into an instrument of the regime rather than its driver; yet donors failed to grasp this nuance.

Mutual distrust between donors and Mozambique's leadership at the time of the GPA led to the dismantling of the FPLM-FAM, and the creation from afresh of the new *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM) integrating former Government and former Renamo military staff (4.3.1-26/08/08). This situation, typical of a critical juncture, was further complemented by a strategy of not maintaining existing operational military equipment and letting it become obsolete, in order to make it impossible for the GoM to return to war. An interviewee claimed that the *'advantage of such a draconian approach was realised only by the international community, which saw this as the sole solution to stability'* (4.1.2.5-05/05/05). Indeed, resources that could have been converted for civilian use such as air force planes were wasted, despite their huge cost and contribution towards Mozambique's external debt. In addition, careful oversight of the handling of the equipment could have allowed the new FADM at least some foundation to build from.

Engaging in Bricolage

In light of these circumstances, and taking into account the overwhelming scale of social, economic and infrastructure rebuilding needed, together with the enormous dependence on foreign aid and the highly asymmetrical environment (Hanlon, 1991, 1997, Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994, 1995, 1996, Saul, 1991), the GoM downplayed the importance of security and prioritised the predominant concerns of the IFIs (4.5.1-27/02/09). Yet, whilst initially perceived by Mozambicans as an imposition given the devastating implications for the security sector, conditionality ended-up playing into the hands of successive Frelimo governments.

Firstly, given that the security forces were traditionally subordinated to the political power (1.2.1.5-27/05/05), it was possible for Frelimo's GoM to deplete the sector's resources without disruptive protest, because the matter had been previously discussed at the party level to appease the more orthodox members (4.5.4-09/09/08). In addition, what became 'non-refundable' loans from public commercial banks and from an Agriculture and Rural Development Fund appear to have been offered to the higher echelons of the military and party officials as incentives for the trade-offs, with donor knowledge (Hanlon 1991: 221,233, Hanlon 2004: 5, Hanlon and Smart 2008: 106, 4.6.2.5-05/05).

Secondly, a growing number of voices in Mozambican society, including the political reformist leadership, the emergent civil society and the nascent

business community expressed the view that the country ought to have dedicated more capacities and energy towards development, rather than security as had happened in the past (4.1.4.5-23/05/05, 4.6.2.5-05/05, 1.2.2-14/09/08).

Thirdly, whilst conceding on the dismantling of the armed forces, the Frelimo Government protected certain sections of the security sector by not allowing the police and intelligence to become the target of peace agreement reforms. Also, the GoM obtained the acquiescence of those in the security sector who did not welcome the intervention of the international community in reforming 'sovereign' areas and who believed that, upon regaining some economic stability, the Mozambican state would invest in the sector again (3.1.3.5-19/05/05, 4.3.1.5-05/05).

Fourthly, the peace agreement did not include provisions for support of institutions responsible for democratic oversight of the security forces. This was reinforced by an absence of systematic donor and NGOs efforts to support the emerging entities of democratic oversight (Ball and Barnes 2000: 196), whether in immediate peacebuilding or in subsequent democratisation. This sent a message to the GoM that such institutions would not pose a real challenge.

Fifth and most importantly, by being the donors' 'good pupil' more aid and financial support was guaranteed to Frelimo for governing the country, and in

the context of the on-going SAP, the phase of primitive capital accumulation by the Mozambican elites initiated in 1987 could continue, 'enabling the openness and the enlargement of the elite' (4.1.3.5-18/05/05). This clearly indicated tactics of accommodation through political bricolage.

The assessment provided in this section has shown, through the illustration of contradictions between the prescriptions of economic liberalisation and the requirements of post-conflict reconstruction, that a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy was absent in Mozambique. It has further demonstrated that the simultaneous occurrence of economic liberalisation and of peace negotiations, even if managed as two independent processes led by different communities of practitioners, had significant implications for Mozambique's security institutions. The priorities set by the SAP in relation to expenditure levels significantly affected the role of the new armed forces, restraining their future capabilities and effectiveness. However, what was initially SAP driven conditionality imposed by donors onto the GoM, became a coinciding interest, allowing both parties to advance their purposes at the cost of forfeiting a much-needed re-thinking and reform of the security sector. This represented a visible instance of political bricolage by the GoM, whose capacity to adapt, even if constrained initially, was present from the earliest stages of the triple transition.

5.4 Economic liberalisation and democratisation

The analysis has so far discussed sequencing and institution building during the triple transition marked by the prioritisation of economic liberalisation over political change, peacebuilding and security reforms. In doing so, it has mainly stressed the prominence of critical junctures during the early peacebuilding phase of the 1990s, when change was fast paced in Mozambique. In this section, the impact of the previously mentioned prioritisation on wider democratisation is examined in an extended period until 2009, in order to show the lasting effect of the initial sequencing. The analysis of interaction between change and continuity in this longer period identified an emerging pattern of slower change and enduring legacies in politics and in policy-making, denoting path dependence and questioning the full extent of the triple transition. It also underscores the importance of the type of response adopted by national players, in face of an environment heavily influenced by donors, as another crucial variable underpinning the triple transition besides the sequencing factor. The past experience and the values of Mozambican local actors surfaced, throughout time, shaping their resistance and accommodation tactics, oftentimes encompassing political bricolage.

5.4.1 Democratisation of Corruption

The promising narrative of democracy and development as mutually reinforcing processes 'sold' to Mozambique has, in practice, been characterised by conspicuous capital accumulation and the shrinking of

democratic politics. The fast pace of the initial stages of privatisation (Cramer 2001: 80-82), fostered by donors in the context of the SAP, created a ripe environment for corruption, which in time *'developed into routine and afterwards into institutionalised culture'* (4.1.2.5-05/05/05).[54] The illicit accumulation of wealth or the *'democratisation of corruption'* (4.1.3.5-18/05/05) became a generalised process that occurred at the upper, middle, and lower levels of state administration, accompanied by growing impunity, owing to the weakness of the judiciary. These views are corroborated by the Corruption Perception Index which ranked Mozambique 130th out of 180 countries in 2009, awarding it 2.5 points on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is highly corrupt and 10 represents very low level of corruption (Transparency International, 2009).

At the political level, the liberalisation process revolved around different wings of the Frelimo elite who gained political power through elections, but used their positions to develop a neo-patrimonial system that secured access to lucrative economic opportunities for themselves and their networks. This was facilitated by the fact that they no longer faced the socialist-era legal restrictions on the accumulation of business interests and state positions.

[54] There was no endemic culture of corruption in Mozambique prior to economic liberalisation. Whilst it cannot be affirmed that it was a corruption free country, this was not a generalised trend amongst political leaders, state institutions and society at large (at least during Machel's rule 1975-1986). At the social level the main problem was perhaps that of smuggling of food and other goods to be sold at speculative prices, when they were scarce in the country. At the level of political leadership corruption was severely condemned and punished, and at the level of state institutions the phenomena started to grow from 1986 onwards. There were growing reports of corruption in the military and other state institutions' recipient of foreign aid such as the unit responsible for assisting populations in cases of natural disaster (Hanlon 1984: 194-5, 241-2, 1991: 151, 230-8, Dinerman 2006: 11, 287).

At the economic level the process at stake was the creation of a national bourgeoisie, which following donor logic represented an essential condition for the development of the national economy (Rapley 2002: 143-146), but which was also threatened by a globalised context that favoured only large external investors. In hindsight, it might be said that if the process of privatisation had initially been more regulated, it might have produced more equitable opportunities for emerging Mozambican investors. In practice, nationals faced credit limitations deriving from the IFIs impositions, which created a bottleneck, forcing most Mozambicans to accept partnerships with foreign private investors. This lack of opportunity for nationals (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 40, 52, Hanlon 1997: 96, Ratilal 2002: 269) and the lack of concrete regulation (Cramer 2006: 271) led the process into disarray. As one interviewee pointed out '*if some of the partnerships were genuine investment-wise, most were agreements of convenience whereby Mozambicans got cash flow in return for opening channels for foreigners to invest'* (4.6.1.5-05/05). This resulted in a variety of deals, ranging from facilitating access to privileged government information about privatisation investment opportunities, to bureaucratic contacts to speed legal and business set ups, to simply offering a local name for partnership purposes in order to meet foreign investment requirements in place at the time (Law 4/84 of 18/08, By-law 8/87 of 30/01).

Given the environment, Frelimo party members who thought they had dedicated their lives to liberating the country were unhappy to lose out in a

process where the national economy was handed over to foreign groups. Hence, even if some members of the Frelimo elite agreed to take a back seat at the party stage or at the government level (4.1.3.5-18/05/05), those in the GoM, unable to favourably negotiate the settings imposed by the IFI, allowed them alternative means of accumulation, resulting in Frelimo's *'transformative preservation'* strategy (Pitcher 2002: 6). Regrettably for Mozambique, this strategy surpassed the use of political access to obtain shares in major investments. It went on to include the embezzlement of state resources and administrative corruption, resulting in the unintended consequence of generalised corruption in state and society (4.1.1.5-05/05, 4.1.2.5-05/05/05, 4.1.3.5- 18/05/05, 4.6.1.5-05/05).

This situation has been extensively depicted by national and international media and scholars, and clearly showcased with the murders of investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso and bank official manager Siba Siba Macuacua. They had discovered fraudulent schemes and scandalous unrepaid loans to members of the upper echelons of Frelimo that led to the bankruptcy of two major banks that the state had to subsequently bail out (for e.g. *Committee to Protect Journalists* 22/11/2000, *AIM* 05/09/2001, *Zambeze* 14/11/2002, *BBC News* 25/05/2003, *Savana* 19/09/2003, *Zambeze* 29/01/2009, 09/04/2009).

Fig. 9 Carlos Cardoso memorial: the banner reads ‘Weapons do not silence the voice’

The Mozambique public was appalled at the situation and widely held that it was too high a price to pay to create an exhibitionist national bourgeoisie displaying conspicuous consumption in the form of luxury houses in upmarket areas, the latest model car and designer apparel, and which in most cases did not reinvest proceeds in the economy. The media, despite the subsequent level of intimidation by criminal networks, also derived greater inspiration for investigative journalism and the denouncing of corruption, a role supported by 59% of Mozambicans (Afrobarometer 2008: 18, Q35) and that earned them, over time, the status of the most trusted national institution to fight corruption (Transparency International, 2011). Yet, none of this was enough to make the GoM responsive to the appeals of society for justice. As a result, a generalised feeling of impunity prevailed.

Faced with the overall spread of corruption, the bank scandals and the killings of Cardoso and Macuacua, donors largely condoned the situation (Lalá and

Ostheimer 2003: 59) not only continuing to accept the lip-service paid by the GoM to keep the inflow of resources, but actually rewarding it with increased aid (Harrison 1999: 327-328, Hanlon 2004: 5).[55] Even considering that additional donor contributions might have been prompted by the economic devastation caused by the severe floods that coincidentally occurred in Mozambique in 2000, *it is clear that donors stayed the course to prop up the myth of the Mozambican success story, which supported the appropriateness of economic liberalisation, peacekeeping and of the development aid industry*. In the longer-term, the end result has been that donors have been caught in a '*pathological equilibrium'*, sustained by a symbiotic relationship they developed with predatory factions of the Mozambican elite (Hanlon, 2004a, Hanlon, 2004b). As such, they were satirically coined as *'Perfect Partners'* (Killick et al, 2005).



Fig. 10 Evolution of disaggregated donor aid funding
Source: Author's graphic built with data sourced from the Bank of Mozambique

[55] According to data sourced from the Bank of Mozambique, programme funding increased from USD million 30 in 2000, to 63.8 in 2001, and 106.2 in 2002. These came in the form of credit provided by multilateral development aid funds (FAD). However, programme donations decreased from USD million 188.9 in 2000, to 171.1 in 2001, and 118.3 in 2002. Official Development Assistance (ODA) data provided by the WB corroborates the rising tendency of programme funding since 1999, and reaching a peak in 2002. See figures 28 and 29.



Fig. 11 Evolution of ODA
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank online databank
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx

Mozambique is therefore a typical case where, from the viewpoint of sequencing and coherence, the prioritisation of economic liberalisation, instead of producing the optimal market economy, actually resulted in the unintended consequence of the emergence of neo-patrimonial networks. Pervasive corruption in public and private affairs spread in a manner similar to what happened in countries like Uganda (Watt et al, 1999) and Bosnia (Divjak and Pugh, 2008) during similar transitions, in a trajectory clearly rejected by Frelimo in the post-independence period.

5.4.2 Political Expediency and Survival Tactics

The initial and unfeigned subservient attitude of the GoM in relation to donors was gradually transformed into ‘strategic subservience’, i.e., along the process and upon realising an opportunity to extract benefit from this posture, the GoM

started using it as part of its political bricolage strategy. As such, the GoM and therefore Frelimo, used it to guarantee uninterrupted funding for its political projects, and more specifically to deliver on the promised expansion of health and education to rural populations (Castel-Branco, 2008).[56]

This has garnered Frelimo enough support or absenteeism - voter turnout in national elections dropped from around 87.9% in 1994 to 44.44% in 2009 (*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*- CNE/ *Secretariado Técnico de Admnistração Eleitoral*- STAE, Mozambique) - to keep winning general elections and securing parliamentary majorities. The consequence has been that the latest two legislatures, in particular since the accession of Armando Guebuza to Mozambique's presidency, have been characterised by an absence of genuine dialogue between Frelimo and Renamo (the larger opposition party), especially at the leadership level, heightening political tension.

Renamo, excluded from access to political power and from major economic opportunities, has kept searching for a revalidation of the GPA, as its grievances have continued to mount since the early days of the transition (Manning 1998: 161-189, Naidu 2001: 8, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin

[56] In 1975 the illiteracy rate was of 93%. It lowered considerably in the 5 years following independence to 72% in 1980, and dropped again to 50.4% in 2007 (INE 2010: 12). In addition, in 1980 there were 5,730 public primary schools, whilst in 2009 the number had grown to 10,027 (INE 2010: 12). Concerning healthcare, in 1975 there were 113 hospitals, 120 health centres and 326 health posts, in contrast to only 52 hospitals, 1018 health centres and 254 health posts in 2009 (INE 2010: 23). The lack of faster progress in the education and health sectors denote the level of destruction to which these instituions/services were subjected during the civil war.

nr 26, 2001, *Jornal A Verdade* 08/03/2012, *Canalmoz* 13/11/2012, *allAfrica* 14/11/2012). A failure to understand that electoral democracy would not bring them political equality was part of the problem as one interviewee observed: *'Renamo failed to adopt a long-term vision in its position at the Rome negotiations, and keeps running after its damages till today'* (4.1.3.5-18/05/05).

The grievances refer mostly to failures to convince Frelimo governments to award them high-level state posts[57] and to overhaul the political system, and, in particular, to enact significant changes in the electoral law (*RDP África* 13/11/2012). They have demanded the integration of non-demobilised Renamo armed men into the security forces,[58] the fostering of a non-partisan public service, and a more equitable income distribution (*Jornal A Verdade* 18/10/2012, *DefenceWeb* 19/11/2012, *Zambeze* 06/12/2012).

However, the propensity of its leader, Mr Dhlakama, to regularly create political crises that end suddenly and without noticeable political accomplishments, have contributed towards Renamo's loss of credibility, mirrored in diminishing voting results after the 1999 general elections. It has

[57] Renamo had an opportunity to play an active role in the choice of governors for six provinces after the 1999 elections, and more specifically in the course of negotiations held with Frelimo after the eruption of violent manifestations by Renamo protesters at the end of 2000. However, since the proposed criteria of appointment of governors did not fully meet its desired requirements, Renamo altogether rejected the opportunity (Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 26, April 2001).

[58] In the context of the GPA and its implementation, out of distrust for the PRM, Renamo extracted the concession from the GoM that it could maintain around 200 armed men to serve as a personal protection guard for Renamo's leader Afonso Dlakhama. This situation remains up to this day and has been the cause for several recurrent political tensions. This issue is further analysed in Chapter VI. Vines 2013: 375-393 also analyses this matter.

been suggested that the crises end when Mr Dhlakama obtains material benefits from Frelimo to resolve these episodes, and he acknowledges accusations by his peers whenever he demonstrates a lenient attitude towards the solution of the conflicts (*Lusa* 21/04/2012, 02/10/2012). Renamo's reputation as a party that accepts peace in return for financial reward[59] (Vines, 1998, Manning 2002: 103, 4.1.1.5-05/05, 4.5.1.5-05/05) still looms and has been further reinforced by its inability to produce a politically strong programme over the years. Nonetheless, research on multiparty democracy in Mozambique and on Renamo's performance as a political party points out that the party's main flaw stems from the fact that it only mimics and intends to replace Frelimo in power, reproducing a pattern of clientelism instead of constituting a viable political alternative (Nuvunga 2005: xiv, Cahen, 2011).[60] In addition, Mr Dhlakama has never taken office as the opposition leader in parliament, allegedly because that would have reduced his time, and therefore ability, to control Renamo party matters (Cahen 2011: 7). Over time he has centralised power around himself (Naidu 2001: 23, Lalá and Ostheimer 2003: 25, Cahen, 2011), resorting to expelling potential future replacements from the party, allegedly on the basis that they had been financially co-opted by Frelimo. All in all, Renamo's political adventurism stands in stark contrast to its electoral manifesto of 2004 *'Renamo, for a quiet change'* (Renamo, 2004),

[59] See footnote 9 above.

[60] Two crucial factors have been identified for Renamo's decline as a political party. The first is that Renamo displays a notorious lack of intra-party democracy, a characteristic common to all Mozambican political parties (Nuvunga 2005: 80) whilst related to this are its shortcomings in the management of political appointments (at all echelons and not just the top) (Cahen, 2011). In addition, its diminishing capacity for creating economic rewards for its political network (Manning 1998: 189) - mostly due to the loss of many positions in the parliament and in municipal elections - reinforces the pattern.

given the reality of cyclical and violent crises surrounding the party's strategy for political survival and enhanced societal relevance and visibility.

The sum of these shortcomings resulted in Renamo depriving the country of a viable and strong political opposition, which is essential to the development of democracy. For instance, members expelled went on to create their own political parties, further fragmenting opposition to Frelimo, in a period when this party is headed in the direction of growing authoritarianism. The remaining opposition parties, alone, are not strong enough to challenge Frelimo, although the creation of the *Movimento Democrático de Moçambique* (MDM) may come to represent a step in that direction (Nuvunga and Adalima, 2011). Whereas Frelimo has experienced electoral defeats in some municipal elections, these are likely to remain exceptions, even if there has been growing dissatisfaction with the party's performance in urban areas. As one researcher noted, these constituencies are unlikely to penalise Frelimo in electoral terms (Sumich 2008: 111-125) at least until they see that a viable alternative exists, i.e. one that will deliver the services required without replicating the exclusionary model of financial accumulation through political power.

In addition, a survey conducted in 2008 demonstrated that 61% of Mozambicans believe that the GoM is *'like a parent that needs to take care of their children'*, reinforced by the view of 44% who think that citizens should

show more respect for authority (Afrobarometer 2008: 10, Q16 and Q18). In contrast, only 29% thought that *'the GoM is an employee of the people, and that therefore should be controlled by them'*, supported by 41% who believed that citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of their leaders (Afrobarometer 2008: 10, Q16 and Q18). This conservatism and lack of predisposition on the part of Mozambicans to demand accountability from the GoM further reinforces the view that the pattern of Frelimo's consolidation of power is likely to continue at the same time that democratisation fades. The party's growing tendency towards intolerance, centralisation of power and absence of meaningful dialogue with other political and societal actors is a telling sign. An example of such boldness is the open fostering of Frelimo partisanship amongst the civil service (4.3.2.5-18/05/05, African Peer Review Mechanism or *Mecanismo Africano de Revisão de Pares* - MARP 2009: 23, 101-103, 217-218, *Canalmoz* 29/04/2012, 21/05/2010, Hanlon and Mosse 2010: 7, Forquilha and Orre 2011: 39), breaking with the policies advanced under the leadership of former President Chissano. This has been a generalised trend in society (Agenda 20-25 2003: 66), as shown by the use of 'sticks and carrots', such as speeches attempting to pressure university students into seeking formal membership of the party, or the speedier resolution of administrative processes of people holding Frelimo membership cards (Hanlon and Smart 2008: 217), whilst those of others are delayed and/or even obstructed. This tendency towards aggressive and intolerant political behaviour on the part of Frelimo resonates with path dependence, insofar as

this course of action resembles that of the post-independence period, when revolutionary violence was used as a common governing method, as analysed in Chapter IV. It is no coincidence that some members of the older conservative Frelimo wing are back in decision-making roles, or that the president Guebuza's centralising political style government has resurfaced.

At the local level, the party's consolidation of power has been enhanced by encouraging Frelimo membership as a means of obtaining privileged access to the District Development Funds (DDF) (Tvedten et al 2009: 6, Forquilha 2010: 43, Orre 2010: 13). This initiative has been plagued by lack of transparency and corruption in fund allocation (Tvedten et al 2009: 21, Tvedten et al 2010: 51, Tvedten et al 2012: 37, Maschietto, 2012), despite the good intention of making much needed credit available in the rural areas. Whilst the enterprise has been surrounded by much controversy due to shortcomings in planning and implementation (Sande, 2010, Orre 2010: 13, CIP 2012: 19), the injection of cash has had a revitalising effect on local economies, as was observed during fieldwork for this project in the rural districts. However, an interviewee who held a high state position at the provincial level noted that:

> *…when the Administrator has some acceptance from the populations and has persuasive capacity, he is able to manipulate the consultative council that analyses the projects submitted for funding… and it is not rare to see the members of this council or their relatives and friends benefit before the general population* (4.3.3-14/08/08).

Thus, in practice, the DDF initiative does not appear to have benefited the poorer populations (Tvedten et al 2010: 51), pointing instead in the direction of an extension of Frelimo patronage networks to the rural areas (4.3.3-14/08/08).

Together with the earlier recognition of the role of traditional authorities in local governance (Decree 15/2000) by the GoM, the introduction of the DDF demonstrated a lesson learnt from post-independence and the civil war, regarding the exclusion of local authorities and rural areas. Hence, path dependence is not inescapable and learning occurs within Frelimo and the GoM. Frelimo placated the local authorities by breaking the precedent of unshared wealth accumulation by elites at the national level. Whilst this may have partially boosted its legitimacy in rural areas, it concurrently created new spaces of inclusion/exclusion within the communities (Kyed and Buur, 2006, Maschietto, 2012). Furthermore, the expansion of this rentier model of governing the country to lower admnistration echelons has also aggravated the already acrimonious relations with Renamo, whose affiliates lose out in all profitmaking and development opportunities.

This perilous strategy, alongside the exclusionary creation and consolidation of Mozambique's business elite in a neo-patrimonial model has resulted in societal marginalisation and the perpetuation of poverty and destitution, as evidenced by the eruption of violent societal conflict. Manifestations of direct

violence, whether linked to elections, issues of justice, or social and economic concerns have been present during the entire post-civil war transition in Mozambique. Illustrative of this were the demonstrations against Frelimo's electoral victory by Renamo supporters in November 2000, which ended with over 80 people dead from asphyxia, due to imprisonment in cramped cells by the police (*LA Times*, 25/11/2000, *Aim News* 18/12/2000). Other examples include the assassinations of professionals investigating corruption, such as journalists, bank employees or customs officials (*The Guardian*, 24/11/2000, SADOCC 01/05/2003, *allAfrica* 27/04/2010, *Aim News* 28/04/2010, *Savana* 30/04/2010). Demonstrations by a group of citizens who used to work in East Germany and who demanded the payment of their pensions by the Mozambican state also led to police repression, resulting in deaths on at least one occasion (*Taipei times* 16/07/2004, *IPS News* 11/07/2012). Instances of lynching and other forms of spontaneous justice have been recurrent (*A Tribuna Fax* 24/02/2010) and are recognised in public official speeches (Informação da Situação Geral da Nação 13/12/2007, 22/06/2009). Cyclical urban riots have taken place in February 2008, September 2010 and November 2012 and have also been met with violent police responses (*Zambeze* 07/02/2008, *BBC News* 01/09/2010, *SABC* 15/11/2012).

The GoM has treated these signs of intense societal conflict with condescension and as isolated and controllable events.[61] This stance is

[61] For example, Mozambique's Deputy Minister of Interior claimed that the majority of rioters were criminals (Zambeze, 07/02/2008), suggesting a certain level of denial about the social unrest.

probably reinforced by perceptions of almost parity between the 42% of Mozambicans that think that *'the GoM has helped most people, with only a few suffering'*, and the 44% that believe that *'GoM policies hurt most people, benefitting just a few'* (Afrobarometer 2008: 8, Q11). Nonetheless, the GoM is taking a risk by ignoring the growing number of those who fall into the latter category. Another menace is the fact that 55% think that the GoM is performing poorly in terms of narrowing the gap between rich and poor, against only 33% who think it is doing well (Afrobarometer 2008: 33, Q57e). This demonstrates that part of the Frelimo elite is only selectively learning (or is indeed choosing to ignore) the lessons from the armed conflict between Renamo and Frelimo, namely that disregard for inequality and political intolerance in the absence of genuine societal dialogue can act as a powerful trigger for violent conflict.

Under these conditions, it is clear that, in addition to the negative setting created by donor prioritisation of economic over political liberalisation, these domestic elements of the politics of expediency and the recourse to survival tactics by Mozambique's main political parties constitute permanent and powerful challenges to the consolidation of democracy in the country. Whilst donors' sequencing contributed to heightening political competition for power and economic opportunity, a phenomena that has intensified due to the expansion of natural resource extraction in recent years, national players could choose alternative paths to those of creating heightened political tension

as a means of securing their own interests. This combination of factors has resulted in a polarisation of politics and society in which growing intolerance is constraining dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution (Agenda 20-25 2003: 85).

The shortcomings of Mozambique's democratic process are reflected in the low positions occupied in the 2009 Legatum Prosperity Index (LPI)[62] as regards democratic institutions and governance, with ratings of 73 and 78 respectively, out of a total of 104 countries (LPI, 2009). However, in the same year, the Global Peace Index (GPI) ranked Mozambique as 47 out of a total of 143 countries, meaning that it is placed in the second group (in five) of the most peaceful countries globally (GPI, 2009), a finding somewhat surprising in light of the previous qualitative analysis of the negative developments. Closer observation of the detailed indicators of this Index shows a more nuanced picture in terms of political tension. For instance, on a scale where 1 represents very low and 5 very high, Mozambique is awarded 3 in terms of organised internal conflict, 2.5 concerning likelihood of violent demonstrations, and 2.25 concerning political instability (GPI, 2009). In 2010 the ranking of political instability increased to 2.5 (GPI, 2010). Whilst this is still an

[62] The Legatum Prosperity Index intends to foster a holistic view of prosperity encompassing also non-material wealth such as social capital, health, opportunity, security, effective governance, and human rights and liberties, and overall quality of life (LPI 2009: 2).

intermediate position,[63] it should make those affected, including investors, cautious.

5.4.3 Democratic Deficit and Political Bricolage

The previous section highlighted the challenge of ensuring the irreversibility of democracy, taking into account that Mozambique has not yet been able to overcome the *'permanent entrenchment of democratic minimalism'* (Ostheimer, 2001). Thus far, the country has failed to make a *'qualitative leap from a procedural into a substantive approach of consolidation of national democratic institutions'* (4.1.2.5-05/05/05) and the likelihood of this happening is low. Despite the existence of a vocal media that contributes to this goal with permanent questioning, the Parliament has been turned into the hegemonic site of Frelimo's power and CSOs, albeit stronger, remain heterogeneous and oftentimes dubiously aligned with the GoM (Homerin 2005: 5, Tamele 2007: 6, Hanlon and Smart 2008: 218).

A pattern of path dependence emerges in that Frelimo keeps returning to its previous methods of monopolising and centralising political power that characterised post-independence. This is not to claim, however, that the situation remains unchanged. In the post-conflict era, Frelimo has been

[63] The score is high given the growing level of internal political and economic tensions described in this chapter. However, this rating may reflect the fact that the GoM strategy was still holding out and that people were still complacent with the direction of developments as revealed by the Afrobarometer 2008 Survey quoted above.

managing change through a working method of *political bricolage* that allows it to adopt new procedural means such as elections to obtain external and internal symbolic legitimacy, even if the quality of the process sheds doubt on its substantive result. Similarly, by adopting new democratic values, many improvements are in place: people are allowed the freedom to join the political party and associations they wish;[64] and a vibrant and outspoken media is allowed to continue denouncing malpractice, including that of Frelimo members and the GoM, provided such denunciations do not cause true harm to the core of the regime. From the viewpoint of national politics, Frelimo has not been oblivious to indications that Mozambicans are already incorporating important democratic values. For instance, a survey found that 59% of the population perceive democracy as the best kind of government (Afrobarometer 2008: 16, Q30), whilst 71% consider elections a necessary step for legitimising power (Afrobarometer 2008: 16, Q31) and 57% value freedom of expression (Afrobarometer 2008: 11, Q21). Therefore, Frelimo knows it could damage itself politically if these values were openly and fully reversed.[65] However,

[64] No direct coercive security strategies exist to prevent this, although connotations with other political parties than Frelimo may render 'invisible' obstacles in a whole range of economic, political and administrative spheres. In the Afrobarometer 2008 Survey 47% of Mozambicans stated they were free to say what they thought and another 15% added they were somewhat free (Afrobarometer 2008: 9, Q15a); 50% confirmed they had freedom to join any political organisation they wanted, plus 15% alleged they were somewhat free to do so (Afrobarometer 2008: 9, Q15b).

[65] In 2009 Mozambique was considered 'Partly Free' by Freedom House standards. It scored an overall value of 3 in a ranking where 1 represents greatest freedom and 7 represents the least freedom (Freedom House, 2009). Yet, in 2010, its score changed to 3.5, given what was considered a decrease in the level of political rights (Freedom House, 2010). Confirming the trend of deterioration, the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance features Mozambique's largest six-year score decline (2006-2012) in the component of 'Participation', from 63.4% to 49.3% (IIAG, 2013). In contrast, the Legatum Prosperity Index classified Mozambique as 49th out of a total of 104 countries, concerning 'Personal Freedom', meaning that it is amongst the average country ranking in this factor, in contrast with the low overall country position of 91 in 104 (LPI, 2009).

given its current political hegemony, the changes that have occurred will only continue to the extent that the party perceives the gains to outweigh the costs.

Taking into account this evolving state of affairs and *looking at donor/GoM interaction as far as democratisation is concerned, what stands out is the shallow nature of democratic reform.* For instance, it is noticeable that, on the one hand, donors vowed to strengthen democratisation by promoting national ownership of different policy initiatives and documents, including 'arm-twisting' the GoM into accepting CSOs participation in policy-making processes. On the other hand, they were less keen to advance a similar agenda with regards to resource negotiation and financial allocation for implementation. An illustrative example was the decision to hold crucial IFIs/donor/GoM negotiations about resource allocation simultaneously with the GoM's presentation of the state budget to the Parliament. This compromised the Parliament's oversight over government financial management, given that the budget presented was not the final version agreed upon with donors (4.3.3.5-20/05/05, 4.6.2.5-05/05, Hodges and Tibana 2005: 80-81, de Renzio and Hanlon, 2007, Hanlon and Smart, 2008). In addition, neither previous nor recent frameworks of GoM accountability to donors on programme execution and financial matters include provisions for CSOs or Parliamentary participation. For example, the Action Plans for Reduction of Absolute Poverty have never been subject to Parliamentary approval, even though they constituted the main source of Mozambique's financing (Hodges and Tibana 2005: 83). Thus, a paradox has

been created in which the GoM became more accountable to donors than to Mozambique's domestic institutions, political actors and people (Agenda 20-25 2003: 112). This behaviour from donors facilitated the materialization of the scenario of co-optation and accommodation by the Frelimo elite, predicted at the start of democratisation by a prominent Mozambican scholar and denounced elsewhere (Mazula 1995: 66, Weimer 2002: 55-81).

This lack of substantive accountability has deepened over time reinforcing the expanding democratic deficit and, at this stage, donors, even if willing to exert pressure, are progressively losing influence over the GoM for two main reasons. On the one hand, Mozambique's external debt appears to be shrinking in line with economic growth and the rise in GoM revenues.[66]



Fig. 12 Evolution of Mozambique's external debt
Source: International Debt Statistics, World Bank online databank
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx

[66] It should be noted that Mozambique has benefited from debt relief in the context of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the IMF since 1998. In addition, significant debt forgiveness took place after the year 2000, given the success of the Jubilee debt campaign.

On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the General Budget Support scheme adopted in 2005 - in keeping with the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness - encompasses a framework of shared responsibility between donors and receiving countries. Although this framework appears to entail a trade-off between increased ownership and significant procedural burden on the GoM authorities (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 15), in practice it also raises the stakes for donors should they decide to 'unplug the aid cable' (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 16, Scholz and Plagemann 2008: 2, Astill-Brown and Weimer 2010: viii). In particular, any decision of this nature would likely generate economic instability in the country, and donors do not wish to bear such responsibility, as they would risk losing credibility (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 16, Scholz and Plagemann 2008: 2) and tarnishing Mozambique's success story. Further to the differences amongst Western donors on whether or not to consider such drastic measures, an additional important factor is the mounting investment in Mozambique of countries such as China, India and Brazil, which comes without ties to political indicators like good governance, accountability and democratisation.

Foreign Direct Investment, in USD million.										
Country / Year	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
South Africa	487,9	4,1	12,2	36,6	176,2	160,4	41,4	129,3	97,0	-47,7
Germany	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,2	0,8	1,8	0,7	0,8	5,1
Austria	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	29,8	0,0	-0,3	0,0	0,0
Australia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	10,7	2,2	1,0	1,7	-44,8	635,9
Belgium	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Brazil	-	122,8	-	6,5	80,6	101,2	374,6	608,3	907,9	1.299,6
China	-	-	-	-	-	0,0	0,1	0,3	4,0	124,1
Denmark	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,2
Spain	0,0	0,0	0,6	0,0	0,0	0,2	1,6	-2,0	0,1	3,3
Finland	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
France	0,0	1,3	19,1	-1,4	-4,1	5,1	-0,9	1,3	0,2	6,6
Greece	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Holland	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	26,7	90,2	32,1	-81,8	7,6	0,0
India	-	0,1	12,6	-	24,8	14,9	2,2	- 1,7	9,6	409,4
Ireland	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,1	0,0	32,6	73,3	291,9	0,0
Iceland	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Italy	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,4	4,7	2,1	638,9
Norway	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	2,3	2,6	84,6
Netherlands	0,0	0,1	0,0	4,0	0,2	0,0	1,3	0,5	-0,1	9,0
Portugal	0,0	13,0	20,3	-13,5	22,5	-25,0	101,0	-18,0	62,0	64,4
UK	957,5	10,1	10,7	12,7	4,5	-6,5	27,6	8,1	38,9	95,2

Fig. 13 Evolution of foreign direct investment, 2003-2012
Source: Bank of Mozambique

Another important feature contributing towards the lack of consolidation of democratisation in Mozambique concerns *targeted donor support for this process, which has taken a minor role in comparison to revenue generating areas in the context of economic liberalisation*. Donor programmes comprising support for democratisation in the aftermath of the civil war lost momentum over time and have been replaced by feeble support for democratic governance programmes, particularly when compared to the level of rhetoric around them (Tollenaere 2006: ix). An illustrative example is the intense focus on building technical electoral capacity, which, whilst laudable, has not addressed the controversial contents of successive elections' management mechanisms, contested laws and electoral processes. Hence, high levels of societal conflict persist and limited democratic progress has been attained,

with donors making an *'unintentional move from good intentions to no intentions at all'* (Tollenaere 2006: ix,12).

Symptomatic of the negligible support for democratisation is the low level of support for the institutionalisation of Parliament (Azevedo 2009: 12). With the exception of the UNDP's support, and in particular their programme focused on strengthening parliamentary oversight co-financed with Denmark from 2007 to 2011, support from other donors has been negligible. One parliamentarian noted: *'The Parliament has not had many steady partners… I can recall support from the AWEPA and USAID on general issues, but what we need is targeted support with specific and technical legal matters, especially for the drawing up and analysis of laws'* (4.4.3.5-12/05/05). Another member of parliament (MP) corroborated the need for support on specific matters, complaining *'…who has the technical and financial means to propose a law…isn't it only the Government?...it's very difficult to be a good parliamentarian in Mozambique'* (4.4.1-21/09/08).

Donors are thought to view Parliament as characterised by high turnover of MPs and high levels of conflict exacerbated by political party rivalry, and strong intra-party discipline. From a donors' perspective these factors render money spent on training parliamentarians as ineffective (4.2.1-24/02/09), since, even if willing, MPs are not able to translate new knowledge into meaningful change in their political behaviour, given the political parties'

internal discipline. In addition, Mozambicans feel distanced from their parliamentarians (MARP 2009: 112), with 47% claiming their elected MP never spends time in their constituency, against 20% who state that they visit only once a year (Afrobarometer 2008: 29, Q53b). Moreover, 58% of people think that the MPs do not try their best to listen to ordinary people (Afrobarometer 2008: 29, Q54a). These insights are not encouraging from a donor's perspective of programme output maximisation.

As such, alternative donor programmes were designed to support the media (Tollenaere 2006: 19-23) and in recent years to train the youth within political parties and to support CSOs. Examples include the Mechanism for Civil Society Support funded by DfID, USAID and Irish Aid, as well as other programmes supported by German political foundations like Friederich Ebert and Konrad Adenauer. Yet, this should not have precluded robust support for strengthening parliamentary capacity and, specifically, that of their administration and staffers, but also to improve MPs' education and skills on various subjects, given *'the overall insufficient level of basic knowledge'* (4.4.1.5-05/05).

Finally, with regards to a strong indicator of democratisation progress, i.e., justice reform, donor demands for a functioning judiciary and for anti-corruption policies have fallen short of what was required, allowing successive Frelimo governments to cope by adopting palliative measures. Examples

include the fostering of cosmetic justice reforms and the unleashing of Frelimo intra-party witch-hunting amongst its different wings, enacting criminal investigations, trials and condemnation of former GoM members on corruption charges (*Notícias* 23/09/08, *Escorpião* 30/09/2008, *Savana* 20/02/2009, *allAfrica* 24/05/2011). In addition, several middle and lower management civil servants have also been brought to justice on corruption charges (*BBC Africa* 09/01/2007, *Canalmoz* 27/04/2011, *Canalmoz* 18/05/2011) as part of an overall state and society moral and ethical campaign. Resemblance with the post-independence approach was noticeable, at least from a rethorical point of view; in practice only symbolic progress has been achieved. This is so because the process has taken place without sanctioning any Frelimo members, who in the post-2004 electoral period, and through the holding of public office, have continued to exert political influence to secure lucrative shares and partnerships in an increasingly oligarchical business environment. Mozambique's Center for Public Integrity (CIP) report on *'The business interests of public managers in the extractive industry: alliances with the stamp of trafficking of influence and conflicts of interest'* clearly documents this continuing trend (Machel, 2012).

Overall, in terms of political liberalisation, donor support for the judiciary was neglected in the earlier stages of the transition comprising limited approaches towards the separation of powers and institution building, focusing mainly on building or rehabilitating infrastructure. Wider approaches such as the rule of

law and access to justice were incorporated at a much later stage. During that hiatus, however, the vulnerability of the justice sector increased, due to its penetration by illegal networks that captured, in particular, the criminal justice system. Improvements in this field have been problematic over time, highlighting the cost of flawed donor sequencing between political and economic liberalisation in the earlier stages of transition. Justice, and the rule of law approach in particular, ought to have functioned as a bridge between those two parallel processes, given that it is essential for business related and property rights that are pivotal in processes of economic liberalisation. Still, democratisation requires that people increasingly gain access to justice to ensure their rights and resolve complex and growing societal, economic and political issues, a transformation that is occurring at a much slower pace than necessary. These impediments not only undermine ongoing democratisation but also strike at the heart of the underlining liberal peace project.

This section has shown that economic liberalisation and democracy, despite being part of the same liberal project, have not been mutually reinforcing paradigms in Mozambique. The sequencing of events has meant that the primacy of economic liberalisation over political liberalisation produced an environment prone to a pernicious political bricolage by national elites, who used several tactics to circumvent conditionality and to strengthen political power at the expense of consolidating democratisation.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the sequence of events that allowed economic liberalisation to precede and prevail over political liberalisation and peacebuilding in the early days of the transition had a significant negative impact on democratisation in the short, medium and long-term during the intertwined transition in Mozambique. The combination of this sequencing of processes and the path dependence manifested, through for example, the resurgence of Frelimo's past behaviour, has shaped a particular type of political bricolage that has resulted in weak post-conflict state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors. It also produced growing inequality and exclusion of the poorest in society whilst also sowing the seeds of a volatile and violent democratic political situation.

By mapping the driving factors as well as the sequencing and changing power dynamics of the triple transition starting in the late 1980s, this chapter has established that the introduction of liberalisation in Mozambique was heavily influenced by the dynamics of the Cold War, and its end, which implied the final victory of neo-liberal ideology.

The sequencing of the transitions, mainly driven by donors' strategic goals, but actively adopted by the GoM, consisted of prioritising economic liberalisation over political liberalisation. This meant that peacebuilding and democratisation not only began at a slightly later point in time, but they also

took a back seat to economic liberalisation, implying that the objectives of economic liberalisation prevailed whenever in tension with the most immediate requirements of peacebuilding and democratisation. This promoted an environment in which contradictory policies led to the creation of weak post-conflict state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors, undermining the liberal project.

The diktat of economic liberalisation led to the downgrading of security reforms over time; they received little attention beginning with the peace agreement and continuing on through peacebuilding and subsequent democratisation phases. The lack of support for security sector reform negatively affected the capacity and effectiveness of the post-war security establishment, as well as of those institutions responsible for democratic oversight of the security forces. As a corollary, after twenty years of peace, a major strategic review of the security sector has yet to take place. This state of affairs evolved from what was strict conditionality imposed by donors onto a situation that later came to serve the interest of the Frelimo governing elite.

This coincidence of interests between donors and Frelimo was based on the former's interest in maintaining the myth of Mozambique's success story, and the latter's desire to guarantee the inflow of financial resources. This produced serious unintended consequences, of which two stand out. The first was the spread of corruption, including the infiltration of an already weakened

justice system by criminal networks. The second was that institutional reform and public policy-making fell prey to the dynamics of Frelimo's accommodation to donors' demands.

This chapter has also shown that, contrary to the prevailing rhetoric of the liberal project, economic liberalisation and democratisation have not unfolded as mutually reinforcing paradigms in Mozambique. The primacy of economic liberalisation over political liberalisation created an environment prone to the use of pernicious *political bricolage* by the Frelimo governing elite, which, through its attempts to circumvent donors' prescriptions and to consolidate internal political power, has jeopardized Mozambique's democratisation. This has been noticeable in the narrowing of the democratic space where national actors resort to political expediency and survival tactics, hindering political dialogue and calling into question the full extent of the transition.

As in other countries, in Mozambique, the initial transitional and peacebuilding stages represented critical junctures, whereby the dismantling of the old system, institutions and modus operandi happened very quickly. However, over time and as the new system became more institutionalised, patterns of path dependence became prominent, insofar as Frelimo's political choices post-independence began to resemble those made in the post-civil war period. Increasing party centralisation, political power monopolisation, downplaying of political and societal dialogue, and growing political intolerance are examples

of such similarities, which have been gaining strength at the expense of reversing democratic gains secured earlier in the transition. Yet, this pattern of path dependence is not inevitable, nor does it signify that the situation fully resembles the past. Rather it means that, despite the similarities, the situation differed in that Frelimo has been able to manage change through the employment of *political bricolage*. In practice this suggests that Frelimo has adopted some older tendencies while at the same time embracing new elements of democratisation, such as elections and media freedom, in a bid to maintain its internal and external legitimacy. This strategy of adaptation through *political bricolage* has nonetheless demonstrated that the Frelimo elite is only selectively learning the lessons from the civil war, disregarding the weight of inequality and of political intolerance as potential triggers of longer-term violent conflict. Until now, this posture has rendered the Frelimo elite high financial and economic returns, but in the future it may put at risk the contested but promising peace.

Taking into account the findings of this macro-level examination of the triple transition, the following chapter thoroughly analyses the security provisions and corresponding implementation of Mozambique's General Peace Agreement, to provide particular insight on how the security and justice system was specifically affected over the medium and long-term transition.